POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT

OMARI SCOTT SIMMONS*

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic and social unrest have focused considerable corporate attention on political risk. The disruptions to company operations are voluminous and diverse: entertainment and hospitality industry closures, airline industry cancellations, eviction moratoriums in residential real estate, international trade interruptions, manufacturing supply shortages, employee vaccination mandates, and ride-hailing service restrictions. Enterprise risk management (ERM) is the mechanism through which boards and their respective firms can manage complex political risks. In the current business climate, more companies should emphasize and integrate political risk oversight in their ERM programs. Although neglecting political risk may not trigger legal liability from regulators or courts, it can cause significant financial and reputational loss to the company. Contemporary corporate boards should not operate with political blinders; they must remain politically sensitive. Politics should not be avoided but managed in a nuanced way pursuant to effective board oversight of ERM. Board political sensitivity is an issue of risk management rather than “wokeness.”

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Companies must contend with courts of law and the court of public opinion, each with its own distinct rules. Missteps in the latter may injure the corporation more seriously than unfavorable judgments in the former. The failure to manage political risk is not in the best interests of the corporation. This Article adds to the legal literature in three important areas. First, it situates political risk within the contemporary ERM discussion. Second, it re-examines how corporations engage with politics in the contemporary context. Finally, it contributes to theories that posit the large modern corporation as a quasi-public institution and argues, with some caveats, that it functions as a quasi-political institution, mandating more robust board oversight of political risks.
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of an apolitical corporation is utopian. Boards of directors cannot serve the best interests of corporations through political blindness. In the contemporary environment, companies proactively influence the shape of regulation through an array of mechanisms to benefit their interests. They also react to political and regulatory developments, selectively taking public stances on voting restrictions, racial justice, anti-Semitism, gender equity, human rights, climate change, reproductive rights, and other politically charged issues. The COVID-19 pandemic and societal unrest...
in the wake of broad social justice demands illustrate the political minefields companies must navigate.\(^3\) The confluence of investor concern, stakeholder demands, and the recent emphasis on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors is pressuring companies to become more sensitive to political risk.\(^4\) But most large public companies find the effective management of political risk elusive.\(^5\)

Although we have no consensus definition of political risks, they are as palpable as cybersecurity, climate, human capital, and financial risks.\(^6\) Investors, portfolio managers, insurers, lenders, and

\(^3\) See, e.g., Te-Ping Chen & Sara Randazzo, *Companies Tiptoeing Back to the Office Encounter Legal Minefield*, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2020, 7:26 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-tiptoeing-back-to-the-office-encounter-legal-minefield-11605529593 [https://perma.cc/7X2L-BMNS] (“The list of rules and guidelines employers must consult when reopening offices is varied, including guidance from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. It also includes regulations at the local and state levels.”).


\(^5\) Cline et al., supra note 4, at 14 (“Senior executives repeatedly report that they struggle to develop an integrated and systemic capability to sense risks emanating from the external political environment and to mitigate their myriad impacts or seize the opportunities that they may offer.”).

ratings agencies regularly incorporate data related to political risk into their decision-making processes. Political risk exposures raise the cost of capital and premiums for corporations perceived as riskier. Historically, political risks focused on transnational risks, including trade wars, military conflict, and terrorism in developing or emerging markets that could impact corporate investment and market valuation. Recently, domestic political risks related to COVID-19, populism, racial unrest, and a potential new era of enhanced state intervention have grabbed the attention of boards, investors, and other stakeholders. Whereas mainstream investors are more likely to evaluate political risk data associated with their portfolio investments, company approaches at the enterprise level are generally reactive, less sophisticated, and more ad hoc.

Corporate political engagement intersects with the longstanding corporate-purpose debate. A leading critique of stakeholder governance, or an argument in favor of shareholder primacy, is the concern that it provides managers cover to pursue their own political and other self-interested prerogatives in their decision-making, thereby making companies plutocracies in disguise. Not surprisingly, some observers are reluctant to mix business and politics. Despite important democratic-legitimacy concerns beyond the scope of this Article, modern corporations, specifically corporate boards, must inevitably engage with and manage political risk in their strategic oversight role. Contrary to what some contemporary observers may think, political demands on the corporation are neither new nor likely to disappear. Board failure to adequately

7. Failing to address political risks, similar to other financial and social risks, can have a sweeping impact on investors. See McDonnell et al., supra note 6, at 345 (“Many institutional investors, the owners of most shares of public companies, are highly diversified in their share ownership. They thus care about the effect that the behavior of one company may have on the long-term profits of their other portfolio companies.”).

8. Cline et al., supra note 4, at 14.

9. Id. at 7.


13. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1500 (“[C]orporate demand for political activity is a natural response to the effect of legal rules on business operations. As a result, regulatory restrictions
oversee political risk, even when it evades legal liability, can have serious negative implications for corporate strategy and value.\textsuperscript{14} A company’s response to political risk depends on context, and designing political risk-management capabilities at the enterprise level demands a coordinated, proactive, strategic approach.\textsuperscript{15} ERM is a dynamic internal-governance mechanism through which firms can address political risk, among other key business risks. Effective board oversight of ERM has the potential to help firms navigate complex political minefields and capture business opportunities. As part of the corporate immune system, ERM complements external corporate governance mechanisms: shareholder empowerment, markets, litigation, gatekeepers, insurance, public sentiment, and top-down public regulation.\textsuperscript{16} It also performs an internal regulatory function that lowers monitoring costs for government regulators.\textsuperscript{17}

This Article adds to the legal literature in three ways. First, it situates political risk within the contemporary ERM discussion.\textsuperscript{18} Second, it reexamines how corporations engage with politics in the contemporary context.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, it contributes to theories that posit the large modern corporation as a quasi-public institution and argues, with some caveats, that it functions as a quasi-political

\begin{itemize}
\item[14.] See CLINE ET AL., supra note 4, at 7.
\item[15.] Id. at 16.
\item[17.] Id. at 1136-37.
\item[19.] E.g., Fisch, supra note 1, at 1499; Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 387-89 (2017) (describing companies—like Uber and Tesla, among others—that make changing the law a material part of their business plan); Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REGUL. 471, 473-74 (2002) (describing how Enron developed its political capital—making large political donations and developing relationships with government officials—to obtain favorable regulatory changes enabling it to build its energy-trading market).
\end{itemize}
institution, mandating more robust board oversight of political risks.

Part I explores past and present corporate political engagement. Part II examines political risk as an element of ERM. Part III establishes the link between corporate legal doctrine, oversight, risk management, and political risk. Part IV analyzes proactive political engagement and reactive responses to political pressures. Part V discusses the connection between politicization, political risk, and corporate purpose. The Article concludes by detailing the implications of political risk management for contemporary boards.

I. CORPORATE POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT, PAST AND PRESENT

A. Corporate Political History

Since the beginning of the United States, corporations have been embroiled in politics, controversy, and public mistrust. The impetus behind the enactment of general corporation statutes, at least in part, was the concern that corporate chartering by special acts of state legislatures was a tainted process involving cronyism and lobbying. State general corporation acts were considered an
innovation that democratized the chartering process and removed unnecessary political influence by powerful interests. \[22\] Since the beginning of the twentieth century, corporate political activity has been subject to federal regulation, especially restrictions on campaign contributions. \[23\]

Historically, corporations have experienced periods of public hostility. \[24\] Nonshareholder interest groups have generally followed two approaches to influence corporate behavior: (1) working indirectly through federal and state governments and (2) directly pressuring corporations. \[25\] The direct approach became prominent with the civil rights and antiwar movements. \[26\] The 1970s witnessed

\[22\] In the early 1800s, most corporate charters required special acts of state legislatures, and thus corporations were, in a very immediate sense, creatures of the states—and legislatures—that brought them into existence. In his 1819 *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward* opinion, Chief Justice Marshall defined a corporation as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). Writing twenty years later, Chief Justice Taney shared Chief Justice Marshall’s view. See *Bank of Augusta v. Earle*, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587-88 (1839); see also *Ohio & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Wheeler*, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 297 (1862) (citing *Bank of Augusta*, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 512). *Dartmouth College* did not constrain the states’ powers to create corporations with special privileges or regulate corporations’ actions so long as both the privileges and the regulatory authority were laid out in the corporate charters. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 661. *Dartmouth College*, among other cases, focused political attention squarely on state legislatures and the policies they pursued in chartering corporations. Id. at 707-08 (Story, J., concurring); *Bank of Augusta*, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 599-600 (McKinley, J., dissenting). By the mid-nineteenth century, such heightened attention would bring about changes that stripped legislatures of their power to enact specialized corporate charters. JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS 1791-1875, at 192-97 (1949). The shift from special corporate charters to general incorporation shepherded in a profound change in the relationship between corporations and American democracy. See id.

\[23\] Fisch, *supra* note 1, at 1496.

\[24\] *See, e.g.*, CADMAN, *supra* note 22, at 69-79.


\[26\] Harwell Wells describes the direct pressure citizens applied to corporations during the American civil rights movement:

In October 1950, well in advance of Greyhound’s 1951 shareholders’ meeting, Peck and Rustin again submitted their proposal to the company. Greyhound responded as expected, notifying Peck and Rustin, as well as the SEC, that it planned to exclude the proposal, relying on the earlier SEC pronouncement allowing omission of proposals of a “general political, social, or economic nature.” ... [Greyhound argued:] “If the proposal should be adopted it is apparent it could and would be used by Mr. Peck and his organization as propaganda to bear to force the management to act on the recommendation ... and institute a social reform.... If the proposal should be voted down, Mr. Peck could use that fact as propaganda to discredit Greyhound.... We feel that to permit Mr. Peck to submit this proposal to our stockholders would be likely to cause irreparable damage to
Ralph Nader and other consumer advocates employing shareholder resolutions as one means, among others, to directly influence corporate policies.\(^{27}\) In a watershed moment in corporate history, the Project on Corporate Responsibility, a group of young lawyers backed by Nader, campaigned through a range of shareholder proposals to make General Motors more socially responsive to environmental, health, safety, and other concerns.\(^{28}\) A contemporary academic observer stated: “As the result of the search for a more vulnerable target, the corporation, rather than the political structure, has increasingly become the recipient of the political goals and pressures of various youth, anti-war, anti-pollution, anti-racist and
consumer-oriented organizations.” Activists sought to use major corporations as a forum; as Nader said, “G.M. may be the host for a great public debate on the role of this giant corporation in American society rather than a wooden recital of aggregate financial data.”

B. The Contemporary Moment

In contemporary society, stakeholder and political demands upon corporations are multifaceted, direct, indirect, and fast moving due to social media and technological innovation. All of society’s institutions and their activities have come under increased scrutiny, especially corporations’ role in, and accountability for, economic and social outcomes. Dissatisfaction with political gridlock and failures, in part, make corporate engagement a pragmatic tool among a range of mechanisms available to activists. Are we experiencing a new, defining contemporary moment? History suggests not, yet the COVID-19 pandemic has elevated the importance of political risk for corporate boards and arguably changed the way companies operate.

Contemporary observers are resurrecting and repackaging previous reform efforts as well as engaging in novel approaches. Meanwhile, public values are shifting, and a socially oriented investor base has become a formidable source of support for movements targeting changes in corporate objectives, such as impact.

29. Blumberg, supra note 27, at 431.
31. Lin, supra note 26, at 1544-45.
33. Blumberg, supra note 27, at 431; Lucy Colback, The Role of the Corporation in Society, FIN. TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/482a8435-c04c-4be8-9856-941e7ecf1 28a [https://perma.cc/XVU3-8Y56].
The mainstream investment community is becoming receptive, recognizing the business and financial implications. For example, the recent small shareholders’ Engine No. 1 campaign at Exxon garnered the support of mainstream institutional investors BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. The campaign also reflects a perceived convergence of climate risk concerns, financial returns, and long-term value. Managing political risk in the contemporary context connects with ESG-related initiatives and disclosures, particularly the social aspects, which are the least quantified, most fluid, and, arguably, the most political.

According to some observers, the European and U.S. movements toward stakeholder capitalism are occurring at a different pace, but both are headed in the same direction.


36. Id. (“[Engine No. 1] convinced the mighty BlackRock. ‘We believe more needs to be done in Exxon’s long-term strategy’ on reducing climate risk, which threatens shareholder value, [BlackRock] said in a statement explaining why it had sided with Engine No. 1.”).

differences in pace reveal that corporate governance systems are themselves, in part, politically determined. Pace differences may be related to differences in the overarching regulatory systems. EU regulators with various codes often reference and recognize the rights of stakeholders and push asset managers harder on environmental issues than their U.S. counterparts. By contrast, the U.S. corporate regulatory regime, including Delaware and the federal government, generally takes a more cautious approach. Facing more limited interest-group considerations and a plaintiff-driven system of common law adjudication, Delaware is moving slowly toward stakeholder capitalism while the federal government has stepped into corporate internal affairs incrementally to fill regulatory gaps. Currently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is moving toward enhanced ESG and political disclosures. The reaction from the investment community, however, is mixed. Although large asset manager BlackRock has been a vocal proponent of stakeholder capitalism, other large asset managers take a more measured approach. The pace of a U.S. transition may also depend upon the political party in power and the development of more uniform standards that would make it easier for regulators, investors, and other stakeholders to monitor corporate ESG performance.

The modern corporation both proactively wields political power and reacts to external pressures from a range of constituencies.

38. See Jackson, supra note 37, at 325-29; Coffee, supra note 37, at 13-16.
40. See Jackson, supra note 37, at 325-27.
41. See id.
44. See Fink, supra note 34.
45. See Coffee, supra note 37, at 14-16; Hill, Good Activist, supra note 37, at 498-99; Hill, Shifting Contours, supra note 37, at 168-69; Jackson, supra note 37, at 313-14, 321-22.
46. Blumberg, supra note 37, at 425 ("The increasing politicalization of the large American
Accountability still remains the threshold governance issue. In *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means address its two dimensions: (1) the minimization of internal costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control among diffuse shareholders and managers and (2) the external abuse of corporate power at the expense of society at large.\(^{47}\) The status quo of the modern corporation is not rigidly rooted in one extreme or the other but vacillates in the tension between a narrow shareholder primacy view and a broader stakeholder approach. A fair reading of history, legal doctrine, and modern corporate practice reflects this tension and a trend toward hybridization or flexibility to address evolving challenges and preferences.

### C. The New Wave of Populism

Since the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, populism has made inroads.\(^{48}\) Although particular manifestations have been analyzed before, devising strategies that adequately address populism in the context of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in developed countries is a new challenge confounding firms and researchers.\(^{49}\) Institutional volatility and political events abroad and at home may close markets and threaten supply chains and other operational concerns.\(^{50}\) This extreme uncertainty is hard to characterize and is distinct from more planned institutional reform, which tends toward a direction or endpoint.\(^{51}\)

The economic and business literature captures the effects of political and economic policy risk in “normal” times—for example,
elections may lead to a rollback in investment\textsuperscript{52}—but populism can magnify uncertainty and vitiate marketplace information, “making firm assessments, investments, and valuations more difficult.”\textsuperscript{53} Populism is also often associated with weakening economic conditions and stagnation as well as institutional volatility and transition.\textsuperscript{54}

\textbf{D. The COVID-19 Pandemic}

The COVID-19 pandemic has tested companies’ risk-management capabilities. Numerous governments—foreign, domestic, and local—shifted policies in response to waxing and waning infection rates and death tolls.\textsuperscript{55} Political risks include lockdowns and travel restrictions affecting human capital; export controls affecting supply chains and access to strategic products (for example, microchips); industrial policies to increase self-sufficiency in production; as well as vaccine mandates, diplomacy, and nationalism.\textsuperscript{56} A recent survey indicates that while some “[e]xecutives may be discounting the likelihood of some political risks,” nearly “half of global executives expect political risk to be higher in the coming year, with geopolitics being the highest area of concern,” and “more than 90% of global executives say that their company has been affected by unexpected political risks in the past 12 months.”\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{53} Hartwell & Devinney, \textit{supra} note 48, at 8-9.


\textsuperscript{56} CLINE ET AL., \textit{supra} note 4, at 7, 13.

Despite this heightened awareness, most companies’ approach to political risk is reactive. In the current business environment, investors, regulators, and other stakeholders are nudging them to demonstrate a more integrated and strategic approach to managing political risks and opportunities.  

II. POLITICAL RISK AS AN ELEMENT OF ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT

A. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)

Oversight responsibilities for risk management are a salient part of the contemporary director role. Risk brings benefits and detriments, upsides and downsides, minefields and opportunities. There is an inherent tension between profit maximization and risk management. As two former Delaware jurists opined, “[risk management] is not simply a business and operational responsibility of a company’s management team—it is a governance issue that is squarely within the oversight responsibility of the board.” The ABA Corporate Director’s Guidebook adopts the following definition of risk management:

Risk management is a multifaceted process that includes identifying and assessing risks, considering mitigating factors,
implementing risk controls, and monitoring. The board’s responsibility with respect to risk management encompasses both direct decisions about matters such as strategy and risk tolerance and oversight and monitoring implementation of those decisions and the effectiveness of the corporation’s compliance programs.62

ERM is a holistic approach to managing a company’s risk profile—that is, a composite view of a company’s most important risks.63 The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission defines ERM as

a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives.64


64. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, supra note 63, at 2. COSO introduced one of the most widely adopted ERM approaches. COSO’s proposed framework also assigns responsibility for risk management oversight to everyone who works for the business. See Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55, 66 (2011) (“COSO’s ERM framework involves several elements, including careful evaluation of a firm’s risk culture; articulation of a clear statement of the firm’s risk objectives and risk management policy; development of responses to risks ex ante; and improvement of the flow of communication, information, and monitoring of risk across the enterprise.... The framework requires everyone engaged in accomplishing an enterprise’s business goals to act in a manner reasonably consistent with the company’s risk management objectives.”).
ERM empowers corporate actors at many levels across the organization to identify, assess, and communicate about risk exposure. This practice, in turn, allows boards to work more effectively with their management teams to monitor and mitigate risks and encourages them to embrace a risk-aware culture supporting firm-wide communication.65 ERM’s objective is not to eliminate all risks but to maintain a level of risk that aligns with the company’s risk appetite or the type and amount of risk the company is willing to take on.66 From a strategy perspective, “the board is expected to make informed judgments on risk tolerance and the management of risks, including financial, legal, reputational risks, and enterprise risks.”67 “[Contemporary board] oversight responsibilities also require it to establish and monitor programs relating to ... cybersecurity, data-privacy, ESG, and, most recently, COVID-19[, often under the ERM umbrella.]”68

In the ERM context, board oversight must be distinguished from operational management and micromanagement. For example, the “board hires the management team, makes strategic decisions on risk, and oversees management execution of that strategy, including compliance with legal and financial norms. But the board does not go down to the engine room to run the operations or crunch the numbers, at least in the first instance.”69 Although “[t]he management of risk in today’s often-extended enterprise is complex, with executive teams typically transferring ownership of risks to specialist functions,” the “examination of recent risk disasters reveals that diffuse accountability for risk management is a major problem.”70 Some delegation to a standing committee (for example, a risk or audit committee), a chief risk officer (CRO), or outside experts is necessary, but risk management remains the responsibility of the entire board.71 By reinforcing the legal oversight framework

65. Harner, supra note 60, at 1.
66. Id. at 3.
68. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 6.
71. See Comm. of Sponsoring Orgs. of the Treadway Comm’n, supra note 63, at 95-96.
with its emphasis on information flow and internal control systems, ERM encourages boards of directors to foster and embrace a risk-aware culture that supports firm-wide communication and, hence, better governance practices.\(^\text{72}\)

**B. Aspirational ERM Design Considerations**

The design of company-wide ERM programs is crucial to their efficacy. Aspirational ERM design features include: (1) a clear, concise risk-appetite statement to guide strategy and set management expectations internally and externally;\(^\text{73}\) (2) a firm grasp of the company risk profile;\(^\text{74}\) (3) transparent reporting (for example, heat maps and dashboards);\(^\text{75}\) (4) understanding the severity, velocity, and duration of identified risks beyond mere enumeration (for example, prioritizing top risks and intermediate risks); (5) establishing authority and accountability for risk, in which people and processes are identified and evaluated;\(^\text{76}\) (6) interactive decision-making versus box-ticking and massive data dumps;\(^\text{77}\) (7) a multidirectional view of risk from the vantage point of key stakeholders (investors, customers, suppliers, employees, regulators, and others);\(^\text{78}\) (8) understanding the links among various types of risk (for example, financial, operational, reputational, and political risks);\(^\text{79}\) (9) a board’s understanding of the top risks, or mission-critical strategic assets that must be protected;\(^\text{80}\) (10) a board’s forward-thinking engagement on risk (that is, discerning whether the company’s risk profile accounts for future risks); (11) a board’s consideration of whether the company risk profile adequately accounts for emerging

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72. See id. at 28, 34.
73. See id. at 71.
75. See Comm. of Sponsoring Orgs. of the Treadway Comm’n, supra note 63, at 77.
76. See id. at 86.
77. Harner, supra note 74, at 5.
78. See Comm. of Sponsoring Orgs. of the Treadway Comm’n, supra note 63, at 44.
80. Harner, supra note 60, at 5.
risks, such as political events; (12) a board’s understanding of how the company’s risk profile aligns with key value drivers; (13) a board’s understanding of how management measures the likelihood and severity of risks; and (14) a board’s understanding of how the company compares to peers (for example, benchmarking). A firm-wide ERM system reflecting the above features is more likely to be dynamic and proactive and to increase the effectiveness of board oversight.

C. Political Risk Management

1. Status of Academic Political Risk Research

The academic literature on political risk is fragmented and interdisciplinary. Since the 1960s, political risk has been an active topic of research in international business literature. The topic evolved largely in reaction to the conditions MNEs faced in emerging markets, focusing on the risks of appropriation, nationalization, and decolonization and taking a qualitative, case-based approach. More recent research has shifted to a large-scale, quantitative, empirical approach. The earlier tendency focused narrowly on discrete risks and their impact rather than embracing a holistic

81. See Jones & McCaffrey, supra note 79.
82. See Comm. of Sponsoring Orgs. of the Treadway Comm’n, supra note 63, at 22.
83. See id. at 51.
84. For a detailed review of the political risk literature, see Hartwell & Devinney, supra note 48, at 8-9; Cline et al., supra note 4, at 5 (“Political risk is a complex concept, incorporating risks from the transnational level to the local level. Both the academic and corporate community tend to focus on discrete risks and discrete impact, rather than approach the risk environment, and potential management of those risks, holistically.”).
86. See Hartwell & Devinney, supra note 48, at 8-9; Dunning, supra note 85, at 14-24. See generally Boddewyn, supra note 85, at 343-60; Vernon, supra note 85, at 3-40.
87. Historically, academic research relied primarily on qualitative case studies or relatively crude proxies for political risk; however, recent research increasingly draws on quantitative methodologies and more strategically useful data sets. A potential benefit of these research efforts is the ability to better predict and compare company political risk exposure over time. Cline et al., supra note 4, at 8.
approach encompassing the entire risk environment. Political scientists and sociologists traditionally focused on the strength and power of corporations rather than their vulnerabilities. The political risk literature eventually evolved to recognize corporate firms as actors in the political context, not merely passive observers. The literature examined the ways in which companies proactively and preemptively addressed political uncertainty and captured opportunities. Another strand of research emerged to explore how political institutions contribute to the risk environment, but the legal literature concerning political risk management remains underdeveloped.

2. Defining Political Risk

Political risk has no consensus definition. Broadly, it refers to “the probability that political decisions, events or conditions at the geopolitical, country, regulatory or societal level will impact the performance of a company, market or economy.” Political risk is difficult to define because it affects and overlaps with other key risk areas, and ERM processes do not necessarily untangle them. For example, items characterized as operational risks may actually result from government actions, such as closures, that reverberate across the entire corporate enterprise. Political risk management is “the governance and processes that adapt risk management practices to overcome challenges and seize opportunities associated with political risks.” Although fraught with complexity, it is integral to enhanced governance under the ERM umbrella. Understanding the

88. Id. at 5.
90. See Hartwell & Devinney, supra note 48, at 5.
91. Id. See generally Boddewyn, supra note 85; VERNON, supra note 85.
92. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 1, at 1504-07 (describing relationships between FedEx, its CEO and founder, and Washington insiders); Lin, supra note 26, at 1546; Mark J. Roe, Essay, Backlash, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 217 (1998); Pollman & Barry, supra note 19, at 386; Blumberg, supra note 27, at 427.
93. McCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 30; Hartwell & Devinney, supra note 48, at 6 (“Political risk is fundamentally a statistically stationary concept that posits unknowns which can be characterized (and hence managed and financially hedged).”).
nature of political risk relative to other contingencies is important. As one contemporary observer notes:

No one can perfectly predict the future. In many situations, however, we can make good predictions, because we can extrapolate from sufficiently similar, or homogeneous, past events. We can predict possible outcomes and their payoffs, as well as their associated probabilities, with an appreciable degree of confidence and precision. By contrast, in other situations our predictions require extrapolation from dissimilar (heterogeneous) events; these predictions will not be nearly as good.95

Frank Knight in his book *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit* described the former category as “risk” and the latter as “uncertainty.”96 A contemporary observer further explains the implications of this distinction as it pertains to political risk:

Risk can be adequately quantified; the more homogeneous the events, the more we know about the distribution of possible outcomes. By contrast, quantification of “uncertainty” is far more difficult; indeed, the more heterogeneous the events, the less we know about the distribution of possible outcomes. Political risk is quite heterogeneous. Each event differs markedly. Moreover, as the world changes, the profile of political risk changes.97

With new information and events, companies are constantly revising their assessments for all types of risk. Yet, the heterogeneity of political risks makes their discrete classification and assessment more challenging compared to other types of risk (for example, supply chain, human capital, and cybersecurity risks).98 For example, events and new information within more homogenous risk categories “should prompt far less revision: even a dramatic event within a homogeneous class [or category] can readily be incorporated into

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97. Hill, supra note 95, at 287-88 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
98. See id.
the previously established probability distribution.” However, “a new event within the class [or category] of political risk can revise the definition of political risk itself.”

Another complicating factor to managing and defining political risk is that there is a lack of agreement concerning what constitutes a “political” issue. For example, Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter is not necessarily a political move. Yet, some critics might argue that his attempts to return former president Trump to the platform reflects a political stance. Many of Elon Musk’s tweets, however, indisputably contain more overtly political statements. In today’s environment, a simply contested or disputed issue is often labeled as “political.” This labelling can be used strategically to discredit a range of seemingly innocuous initiatives.

3. A Taxonomy of Political Risks

To elucidate the scope and impact of political risk at the enterprise, functional, and business-unit levels, defining its subcategories
is helpful. However, this attempt at categorization is inevitably im-
precise, incomplete, and evolving. In practice, companies may be
effective at addressing one subcategory but deficient at addressing
others. Political risk affects an array of business areas: operations
and supply chains, human capital, revenue, growth and investment,
finance and taxes, data and intellectual property, and compliance
and reputation.\textsuperscript{103} Moreover, it can be viewed from several perspec-
tives: (1) geopolitical, (2) country, and (3) societal.\textsuperscript{104} Geopolitical
risk arises when countries' foreign policies, regulatory environment,
or international relations more broadly affect markets and compa-

dies.\textsuperscript{105} Examples include political conflict, retreat from multilateral
accords, sanctions, trade wars, terrorism, and military conflict.\textsuperscript{106} Country risk arises when “the national political environment, the
stability of the government and institutions,” or legislation and its
implementation affects companies.\textsuperscript{107} Examples include “political
(regime) transitions, policy shifts, lack of law enforcement, civil con-
lict, buy-national policies and corruption.”\textsuperscript{108} Societal risk springs
from tensions between groups or public actions launched by groups
ranging from trade unions to consumers that affect markets and
companies.\textsuperscript{109} Examples include “boycotts, protests, disruptions of
production or supply chains, corporate espionage[, social media
campaigns,] and local violence.”\textsuperscript{110} The types of political risk are
summarized in the chart below.

\textsuperscript{103.} See Cline et al., supra note 4, at 7.
\textsuperscript{104.} See id. Companies sometimes treat regulatory risk as separate from political risk.
\textsuperscript{105.} Id. (“Transnational or geopolitical risks, in the broadest sense, emerge when the
interests of countries in defined policy arenas collide, or when the international system at
large is undergoing a transformation.”).
\textsuperscript{106.} Id.
\textsuperscript{107.} Id. (“National or country risks emerge when the national political environment, the
stability of the government and institutions, legislation, or the regulatory environment has
measurable economic consequences for domestic markets and corporations acting in those
markets.”).
\textsuperscript{108.} Id.
\textsuperscript{109.} Id. (“Societal risks emerge when groups, such as nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), trade unions and consumer groups, develop a collective political identity and in-
terests that subsequently drive their public activism and, in turn, have consequences for mar-
kets and companies operating globally. These risks typically occur at a local level but can
transcend local boundaries and take on national and transnational characteristics.”).
\textsuperscript{110.} Id.; see Lin, supra note 26, at 1545-46.
Table 1. Political Risk Taxonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Risk</th>
<th>Geopolitical</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Societal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
<td>Arises when countries' foreign policies, regulatory environment, or international relations more broadly affect markets and companies</td>
<td>Arises when the national political environment, the stability of government and institutions, or the legislation and its implementation affect companies</td>
<td>Arises from tensions between groups or public actions launched by groups ranging from trade unions to consumers that affect markets and companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Examples</strong></td>
<td>Political conflict, trade wars, sanctions, retreat from multilateral accords, military conflict, and terrorism</td>
<td>Political regime transitions, policy shifts, lack of law enforcement, civil conflict, buy-national policies, and corruption</td>
<td>Boycotts, protests, disruptions of production or supply chains, corporate espionage, social media campaigns, and local violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally, a company might place political risks into two separate boxes: (1) internal, firm-specific risks impacting operations and strategy and (2) external, non-firm-specific or systemic risks. Managing the former clearly falls within the purview of the board. But responsibility for the latter is contested and likely distributed between state actors and private firms. Notwithstanding, the classification of internal, firm-specific risks versus external, systemic risks presents some challenges. For example, the origins of important reputational risks are sometimes seemingly remote. In practice, companies can define their own firm-specific political risks and ideally manage them through an ERM framework. Given the breadth of political risks, it may be helpful for companies to further divide them into workable discrete categories based upon their nexus to the business: operational, reputational, financial, and legal risks.

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111. See CLINE ET AL., supra note 4, at 6-7.
112. See id.
113. MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 28.
Additionally, firms should further prioritize these risks based upon each firm’s level of severity and probability to the extent determinable.

4. Integrating Political Risk Management with ERM

Understanding the probability of risks and damages, as well as potential costs and opportunities, is a fundamental feature of managerial decision-making. ERM is a dynamic internal governance mechanism through which firms can address political risk among other key business risks. Rather than disjointed approaches, effective board oversight of ERM has the potential to help firms navigate complex political minefields and capture business opportunities. As part of the corporate immune system, ERM complements external corporate governance mechanisms: shareholder empowerment, markets, litigation, gatekeepers, insurance, public sentiment, and top-down public regulation. ERM also performs an internal regulatory function that lowers monitoring costs for government regulators.

In theory, assessments of the upsides and downsides of political risks should inform decision-making at the board and management levels, but their disruptive or emergent nature is often not adequately captured by traditional ERM or compliance processes. According to recent surveys, “only one in five global executives (23%) say their company integrates political risk management into broader ERM on a regular basis,” and only about “one-third of companies globally conduct political risk management activities at multiple levels.” This neglect likely undermines their ability to mitigate downside risks and seize upside opportunities related to political considerations. In any case, companies should move

114. See id.
115. See HARNER, supra note 60, at 1.
116. See HARNER, supra note 74, at 6.
117. See Simmons, supra note 16, at 1133.
118. Id.
119. MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 4, 16, 28 (arguing that “[s]uch integration can be particularly impactful if it leverages” quantitative “political risk identification outputs” and “tangible estimations of political risk impact”).
120. See id. at 24 (“Only about half of executives globally (52%) say their company invests enough in political risk management. The other half of executives assess that their company
away from siloed ERM approaches to integrate discussions of disruptive political risks into strategic planning, market entry and exit, and transactional decisions.\(^\text{121}\) According to recent surveys, boards pay most attention to the impact on existing strategy and miss future implications.\(^\text{122}\)

Political risk is hard to predict and hard to measure. According to a recent survey, one-half of investors believe most companies do not fully appreciate or acknowledge the potential impact of political risk.\(^\text{123}\) Their doubts are well-founded: only about 16 percent of boards receive routine geopolitical briefings from external subject matter experts,\(^\text{124}\) and less than 25 percent participate in scenario planning related to political risks and the macro environment.\(^\text{125}\) Moreover, “[o]nly 18\% of companies have a board member with government or political experience, suggesting a lack of leadership experience or acumen to understand and design an effective political risk strategy.”\(^\text{126}\)

5. Proactive Versus Reactive Political Risk Management

Given the impact of political risk on corporate strategy and reputations, effective management requires boards to take a more proactive, adaptive, and forward-looking approach, including: (1) integrating political risk into ERM and strategic planning;\(^\text{127}\)

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\(^{\text{121}}\) See MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 18 (“[O]nly 2\% of executives say[] that their company does not incorporate political risk analysis into market entry and exit or transactions decisions.”).  
\(^{\text{122}}\) Id. at 22.  
\(^{\text{124}}\) MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 9.  
\(^{\text{125}}\) Id. at 22.  
\(^{\text{126}}\) Id. at 9.  
\(^{\text{127}}\) Id. at 4.
(2) staying informed about industry and societal trends; (3) building understanding of cultural, social, political, and broader reputational risks and rewards associated with corporate actions; (4) considering a wider feedback loop that involves employees and outsiders, such as customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders, to reveal potential political risks that do not manifest in internal strategic planning and other initiatives; (5) developing stakeholder relationships at the enterprise, functional, and business-unit levels; (6) coordinating a cross-functional team or committee to manage political risk;\(^\text{128}\) (7) recruiting individuals with political expertise to serve on the board and senior leadership team;\(^\text{129}\) (8) coordinating activities at the enterprise, functional, and business-unit levels to balance exposure to high-risk geographies and parts of the business via diversification and other mitigation strategies;\(^\text{130}\) and (9) collecting qualitative and quantitative data and developing capabilities to assess the impact of political risk on the business.\(^\text{131}\) Adoption of the above features is likely to improve the execution of corporate strategies, political risk oversight, and ERM overall.

**D. Governance Structure and Political Risk Management**

A company’s governance structure determines its ability to manage political risk. In too many companies, political risk governance is siloed and overly centralized.\(^\text{132}\) A more proactive approach would include collaboration among a diverse set of executives engaging with a variety of corporate functions.

### 1. Corporate Functions

Strategic integration of the external stakeholder-facing functions, including government affairs, stakeholder relations, sustainability, community relations, and corporate communications, helps to protect and create shareholder value.\(^\text{133}\) This integration can help to

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128. *Id.* at 20.
129. *Id.*
130. *Id.* at 16.
131. *Id.* at 4.
132. *Id.* at 20-21.
133. **WITOLD J. HENISZ, CORPORATE DIPLOMACY: BUILDING REPUTATIONS AND RELATION-**
reduce uncertainty and costs as well as capture opportunities related to the intersection of business and politics.\footnote{736}{See id.}

2. C-Suite

In the C-Suite, the CRO is the senior executive commonly involved with political risk management.\footnote{736}{See id.} Others include the chief financial officer, chief strategy officer, and chief compliance officer.\footnote{736}{See id.} Note that two important roles are often absent: (1) the chief operating officer (COO), or supply-chain officer, and (2) the head of public policy and government affairs.\footnote{736}{Id. at 21-22.} Risk management teams should include both to capture political expertise. Greater involvement from a broader set of senior executives is needed to implement a less siloed enterprise approach to the various dimensions of political risk, such as strategic planning, financial hedging, and compliance, as well as corporate operations and the supply chain.\footnote{736}{Id.} Exclusion of the COO and the head of public policy and government affairs may suggest a reactive approach to political risk at many companies.\footnote{736}{Id.}

3. The Board

Political risk is the full board’s responsibility. It should be integrated into firm-wide ERM processes and monitored by a designated board committee (for example, risk and audit).\footnote{736}{See id. at 17-18.} In the present volatile political climate, boards are dedicating more time to political risk; in a recent survey, “58% of executives said their boards were increasing time spent on political risk.”\footnote{736}{Id. at 22.} However, the surveyed boards’ approaches remain largely reactive. While 40 percent assess the impact of political risk on the company’s existing

\footnote{736}{SHIPS WITH EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS, at xii (2014) (ebook).}
\footnote{734}{See id.}
\footnote{735}{MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 21.}
\footnote{736}{See id.}
\footnote{737}{Id. at 21-22.}
\footnote{738}{Id.}
\footnote{739}{Id. at 22.}
\footnote{740}{See id. at 17-18.}
\footnote{741}{Id. at 22.}
strategy, 32 percent have a board committee responsible for political risk management oversight, 26 percent receive regular geopolitical briefings from company functions, and 25 percent regularly consider political risk as part of business decision-making. Only 18 percent have at least one member with government or political experience, and only 16 percent receive regular geopolitical briefings from an external subject matter expert. These findings underscore opportunities for boards to improve their political risk management oversight, but recent surveys indicate that it is not a high priority for executives.

4. Board Political Independence and Awareness

Board members should be politically aware but remain independent when exercising their fiduciary duties on behalf of the corporation and its shareholders. Board members who invariably vote along political lines are not objectively evaluating matters before them to serve the best interests of the corporation. A major critique of stakeholder governance is that it may allow politics to invade corporate decision-making by providing cover for managers pursuing political self-interest. To an extent, the director role requires suppressing individual or political affinities in the service of the corporation. Doing otherwise is often viewed as an inappropriate use of shareholders’ money. Boards may inevitably engage in spirited, politically charged discussions unlikely to reach a public audience. Whenever possible, they seek consensus, trying to get everyone on the company bus. The board chair can be instrumental in reminding directors of their fiduciary duties to the corporation and guide or facilitate the discussion, ensuring that many voices are heard and the ideological commitments of certain members do not dominate it.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See id. ("Fewer than one-quarter regularly receive political risk briefings from external experts or engage in scenario analysis on political risks and the macro environment.").
145. See CLARK, supra note 11, § 16.2, at 684.
146. See Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that a corporate board cannot claim protection of the business judgment rule in a derivative suit if the decision at issue was a knowing violation of public law).
Individual board member evaluations and director removal are other ways to mitigate political outbursts and excessive partisanship in the boardroom.

5. Political Risk and the Court of Public Opinion

Political risk that plays out in the court of public opinion should not be treated differently from other emerging risks, such as a major data breach, an airline crash, or a health scare associated with a food or pharmaceutical product. Companies must develop plans, processes, and checklists to address risks that emerge from political issues, actors (for example, politicians and candidates), and stakeholders (for example, shareholders, customers, and employees). Gender-neutral bathrooms, voting restrictions, and a range of politically charged questions are not on the radar for many board members, yet they are asked to carefully and quickly review statements and press releases drafted by their public relations departments. Company responses are often nuanced, nonpartisan, general, and careful. Sales and marketing teams, especially in consumer-facing companies, should also have input. The coordinated company response must be quick.

On the one hand, silence or a slow response may generate criticism and require follow-up action. On the other hand, a multinational company may make a calculated decision not to opine on an issue in a region or area where it has a limited presence for fear of backlash. Adidas delayed strong action after designer Kanye West, known as Ye, made “a series of antisemitic remarks and embraced a slogan associated with white supremacists.” Initially, the sports-wear company indicated that its relationship with Ye was “under review.” But after a growing public outcry and broader condemnation, Adidas cut ties with Ye, ending their deal worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

148. Id.
149. Id. Forbes magazine estimates that Adidas’s deal with Ye was worth approximately $1.5 billion based upon multiples of annual earnings. Lisette Voytko, Billionaire No More:
Ideally, before making a political statement (or a statement that could be construed as political), a CEO will consult with the board, other corporate actors, and experts. Whenever possible, boards do not want to be caught “flatfooted” and respond reactively to forestall stakeholder backlash.

6. The Challenge of Quantifying the Impact of Political Risk

Ideally, political risk assessment should measure, inter alia, business exposure and the potential effect on current business strategy and finances. However, political risk derives from many sources at many levels—geopolitical, national, and societal—and affects a wide range of corporate activities—sales, production and operations, research and development (R&D), security, finance, regulatory compliance, human capital, governance, and Kanye West’s Antisemitism Obliterates His Net Worth as Adidas Cuts Ties, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2022, 9:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoyto/2022/10/25/billionaire-no-more-kanye-wests-anti-semitism-obliterates-his-net-worth-as-adidas-cuts-ties/?sh=6639a69717e7 [https://perma.cc/ANA2-CUYM].

151. C LINE ET AL., supra note 4, at 7.
152. High political risk is related to company strategies employing low-level commitment mechanisms, such as joint ventures. See id. at 11.
156. See Vogel, supra note 20, at 74 (describing how transnational societal networks form international norms when formal treaties or agreements are missing); David Antony
The impacts of political risk are both varied and interdependent, with disadvantages and advantages. They might include shifts in operations, supply-chain disruptions, market-access restrictions, intellectual property theft, higher cost of capital, higher regulatory compliance costs, increased security costs, reputational damage, and internal governance lapses. Moreover, companies’ contextual environments and specific features, including their “ex-ante strategies to protect themselves against political risk,” differentiate each company’s exposure.

Given the complexity of political risk, its impact must be quantified using mixed methods. Geopolitical risk is often measured using (1) the periods or dates of armed conflict and the number of fatalities reported, (2) bilateral trade and investment barriers, and


157. See William F. Maloney, Missed Opportunities: Innovation and Resource-Based Growth in Latin America, 3 ECONOMÍA 111, 126-27 (2002) (arguing that endemic political instability may be a major reason why Latin American countries have low human capital levels). But see Jeroen Klomp & Jakob de Haan, Political Regime and Human Capital: A Cross-Country Analysis, 111 SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 45, 47 (2013) (explaining how companies may focus or increase their investments in human capital during unstable political situations because human capital is a less specific asset and easier to transfer).


159. CLINE ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.

160. Id. at 7.

161. Id. at 11.
(3) media content analysis of the “verbal and material interactions between national government and opposition representatives.”

Country or national risk is measured using metrics such as the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and measures of trust, such as the Edelman Trust Barometer. Societal risk is often measured by the incidence of strikes, social unrest, terrorist attacks, or media content analysis. Still, despite the availability of political risk data, many companies are not using the data. A recent survey indicates that a significant number of companies do not collect quantitative data to identify risk at the enterprise, functional, and business-unit levels. Such data would inform assessments and better integrate political risk into ERM systems.

162. The Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT) has tracked print, broadcast, and web news reports in more than 100 languages across every country since 1979. Other means of measuring political risk include the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, the Political Constraint Index, CHECKS (established by the Database of Political Institutions), executive constraints or state fragility and state failure as measured by the Polity Database and Systemic Peace Project, various measures of constraints on government power within the V-Dem database, and the International Country Risk Guide. See, e.g., id. at 8-9.


166. MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 8.

167. Id. at 9.
The challenge of ex ante quantification and the heterogeneity of political risk leads to a reluctance to actively address it. Traditional financial metrics are not sophisticated enough to capture its impact, yet political risks are palpable. Consider the geopolitical risks related to Brexit; the business risks associated with national, state, and local government mandates and restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic; the fallout from the storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021; and the far-reaching impacts of the Ukrainian-Russian War. These contemporary examples underscore the need for companies to actively engage with and manage potential impacts on the current corporate strategy.

Although most companies, including their boards, assess the impact of political risk on corporate strategy, many take an ad hoc approach at the enterprise level without exploring particular effects and interrelationships at all levels of the organization. Only a small proportion of companies model the financial impact of political

168. See Hill, supra note 95, at 290-91.
169. Nicholas Bloom, Philip Bunn, Scarlet Chen, Paul Mizen, Pawel Smietanka & Gregory Thwaites, Brexit Is Already Affecting UK Businesses—Here’s How, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/03/brexit-is-already-affecting-uk-businesses-heres-how [https://perma.cc/Q8US-EW6L] (“Brexit was also essentially a political shock versus an economic one, and one that was largely unexpected.”).
171. MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 57, at 13 (“Two-thirds of companies already do this on a proactive or regular basis, and 40% conduct these assessments at both the enterprise level and the functional or business unit level. The board is also more engaged in this activity, with 40% of executives saying their company’s board regularly assesses the impact of political risk on strategy.”).
172. Id. at 12 (“Geopolitical risks are expected to overwhelmingly hit companies on the topline strategic areas of growth and investment and revenue, which helps to explain why executives are so concerned about this risk type. In contrast, business operations and supply chains will be most affected by country and regulatory risks.”).
risk at the business-unit and functional levels. Different categories of political risk—geopolitical, country, and societal—may affect specific areas of the business differently and to different degrees. For example, societal risks may have a greater impact on reputation than on finance and taxes, whereas country-related risks (for example, regulatory developments) may have a stronger impact on operations and supply chains. These dynamics call for more nuanced political-risk-aware approaches across the enterprise.

III. CORPORATE LAW, CAREMARK, AND POLITICAL RISK OVERSIGHT

Historically, companies were unlikely to incur legal liability for lapses related to ERM. The law affords significant discretion in the design of risk-management systems as well as legal compliance systems. However, emerging jurisprudence signals rising expectations. This Part addresses several important questions. What are directors’ responsibilities concerning ERM oversight? Does corporate law have anything to say about managing political risk? Even in the absence of clear legal guidance, directors inevitably must respond to broader forces that affect their corporation’s reputational assets. According to the ABA Corporate Director’s Guidebook:

Risk management and legal compliance are critical components of the board’s responsibility for oversight of the corporation’s business and affairs. As businesses and the legal requirements under which they operate become ever more complex, the pace of business change continues to accelerate, and reliance on technology increases, the stakes involved in effectively managing risk and ensuring legal compliance only increase. Well-publicized financial, operational, legal, and security failures in recent years have led to a heightened focus on the role of the board in oversight of risk management and legal compliance.

173. Id. at 13.
174. Id. at 12.
176. ABA CORP. L. COMM., CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 35 (7th ed. 2020).
ERM is an integral tool enabling modern directors to meet their oversight responsibilities. ERM supports firm-wide communications, reinforces a “risk-aware” culture, empowers people throughout the corporate organization to identify, monitor, assess, and report risk exposures, as well as mitigate and manage risks.

A. State and Federal Statutory Support for ERM

Boards of directors have two important functions: strategy and oversight. The statutory power and duty to manage corporations is vested in a board of directors that delegates tasks and functions to senior executives and board committees. Pursuant to Delaware’s General Corporation Law (DGCL) section 141(e), the board can rely on internal and external experts. A large portion of corporate governance is outsourced to third parties, often professional service providers: consultants, external auditors, bankers, and executive search firms. The board must still exercise judgment and not abnegate its role and accountability, but third parties, including standard-setting bodies, provide a significant amount of the content and design of internal controls to address risk, particularly in the ESG context, without a universal set of standards.

177. See id.
178. Harner, supra note 60, at 1.
179. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(c), (e) (2019); id. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”); Robert B. Lamm, Board Structure and Processes, in 1 Corporate Governance: Law & Practice § 7.01[1] (Amy L. Goodman & Steven M. Haas eds., 2021).
The federal regulatory framework supports the establishment of ERM systems, particularly for financial companies, and certain bodies have developed standardized approaches to ERM that many companies have adopted.  

Notably, against the backdrop of the federal sentencing guidelines, the seminal Caremark decision provided amnesty for companies with compliance programs. Arguably, then, to the extent that compliance programs are required for large, publicly traded companies, ERM systems should also be required, especially for top company risks.

B. State Corporate Law

1. Business Judgment Rule

Millions of routine corporate decisions have significant and far-reaching public impacts but are often anonymous and largely insulated from external second-guessing. The business judgment rule, the touchstone of Delaware corporate law, presumes that directors act independently, on an informed basis, in good faith,
with an honest belief that their decisions are in the best interests of the corporation. The rule can be rebutted if the process, independence, or good faith of directors is compromised or the decision cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose. The rule is pragmatic because it allows for shifting business and political environments and intertemporal planning (that is, short, intermediate, and long-term) whereby profit-enhancing decisions in the near term may spark or lead to more socially responsible choices. Additionally, the rule can accommodate failing corporate strategies, risk-management decisions, extensive philanthropic endeavors, political contributions, and lobbying efforts. The rule also largely prevents courts from second-guessing strategic business decisions that prove unsuccessful. A heightened standard would likely subject directors and officers to liability for poor results and arguably have a chilling effect on risk-taking that might enhance the firm’s value.

Business judgment rule protection across a spectrum of decisions accommodates mixed motives, mixed objectives, diverse rationales, and political and other risk calculations. Its penumbra of protection could, in part, explain why some observers and companies see little reason to change their internal documents (for example, their charter) to specifically address stakeholder concerns or expand

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187. CLARK, supra note 11, § 3.4, at 123-24.
188. Id. at 123. Robert Clark describes the business judgment rule as follows: The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors will not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain exceptions apply.
Id.; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278-79 (2000) (“The idea underlying the rule is that courts should exercise restraint in holding directors liable for (or otherwise second guessing) business decisions which produce poor results or with which reasonable minds might disagree. This seems to be a sensible notion. After all, business decisions typically involve taking calculated risks.”).
191. GEVURTZ, supra note 188, at 278-79.
192. See id.
statements of corporate purpose. The status quo may provide sufficient flexibility for them to straddle and juggle stakeholder, shareholder, political, and other concerns. Perhaps the most salient question related to risk should focus not on a particular business decision but rather on director oversight responsibilities for risks beyond legal compliance.

2. Common Law Jurisprudence

Delaware courts resolve cases across a range of factual contexts and are not constrained by bright-line rules. Delaware fiduciary duty law generally addresses three types of decisions: enterprise, ownership, and oversight. Management makes enterprise decisions about what products to manufacture or whether to build a foreign plant. Ownership decisions concern mergers, acquisitions, corporate takeovers, and decisions impacting shareholder franchise. Oversight decisions concern managers’ monitoring role, such as ensuring that employees execute their responsibilities in compliance with the law and other business risks.

Firm legal compliance and risk-management decisions, unlike other types of board decisions, have a strong operational component and involve countless decisions made by employees throughout an organization. Arguably, director oversight cannot be evaluated effectively through a rigid formula or mandatory approach.

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194. Lucian Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita claim that failure to change purpose is an automatic reflection of a firm’s lack of commitment to stakeholder issues. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, 75 VAND. L. REV. 1031, 1086 (2022).

195. See id. at 1049 (assuming that companies must make broad changes—such as updating their statement of corporate purpose—as a prerequisite to addressing stakeholders’ concerns).

196. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Don’t Compound the Caremark Mistake by Extending It to ESG Oversight, 77 BUS. LAW. 651, 652 (2022).

197. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 393-94 (1997) (discussing the types of decisions Delaware courts review, such as enterprise, ownership, and oversight).

198. See id. at 394.

199. See id.

200. See id.

201. See id.

Delaware’s contextualized standards-based lens provides flexibility in the compliance and risk-management contexts.203

3. Evolving Oversight Jurisprudence and Caremark

Caremark was a watershed decision establishing directors’ good-faith responsibility for oversight “as a first principle of corporate governance.”204 Its legacy and recent decisions by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery reinforce “that directors [must] be actively engaged in establishing both the initial oversight and subsequent monitoring procedures” and “the necessity of carefully documenting (e.g., through proper minutes) the directors’ active engagement in oversight and monitoring.”205

In Caremark, the court made the following assertion on the scope of oversight duties:

In light of these developments, it would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that our Supreme Court’s statement in Graham concerning “espionage” means that corporate boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance.206


204. Independent directors violate their oversight duties only if they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge their oversight responsibilities in good faith. See Veasey & Holland, supra note 59, at 5, 26 (“The full scope of the directors' oversight duty is not only that they must conceive and design an adequate information system in good faith, but also they must also monitor the system that they have established to acquire the information and act on it.”).

205. Id. at 26.

This statement effectively made compliance programs a de jure requirement.\textsuperscript{207} It also raised a question: Did Caremark extend beyond compliance with the law to other types of business risk such as ERM?\textsuperscript{208} The court rationalized a high liability standard in the oversight context,\textsuperscript{209} yet “a demanding test of liability in the oversight context is probably beneficial to corporate shareholders ... as it is in the board decision context, since it makes board service by qualified persons more likely, while continuing to act as a stimulus to good faith performance of duty by such directors.”\textsuperscript{210} Affirming Caremark, the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter reinforced the contours of oversight liability to the conscious disregard of known “red flags” and an utter failure to implement a system of controls.\textsuperscript{211} The court also pragmatically acknowledged that, even assuming the best intentions, “directors’ good faith exercise of oversight responsibility may not invariably prevent employees from violating criminal laws, or from causing the corporation to incur significant financial liability.”\textsuperscript{212}

Caremark and Stone were seemingly confined to situations involving violations of law and regulation.\textsuperscript{213} In In re Citigroup Inc. v. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Court of Chancery expressed some reluctance in recognizing a requirement to monitor general business risk versus a compliance program aimed at preventing violations of law and regulations.\textsuperscript{214} The court noted, “a purported Caremark claim cannot become a vehicle for a sneak attack on the business judgment rule.”\textsuperscript{215} In other words, the court tried to distinguish strategic risk-based decisions, protected

\textsuperscript{207.} See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
\textsuperscript{208.} See id.
\textsuperscript{209.} See id. at 971 (“Such a test of liability—lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or systematic failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight—is quite high.”).
\textsuperscript{210.} Id.
\textsuperscript{211.} See 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
\textsuperscript{212.} Id. at 373.
\textsuperscript{213.} See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 964; Stone, 911 A.2d at 364-66.
\textsuperscript{214.} See 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Instead of alleging facts that could demonstrate bad faith on the part of the directors, by presenting the Court with the so called ‘red flags,’ plaintiffs are inviting the Court to engage in the exact kind of judicial second guessing that is proscribed by the business judgment rule. In any business decision that turns out poorly there will likely be signs that one could point to and argue are evidence that the decision was wrong.”).
\textsuperscript{215.} Veasey & Holland, supra note 59, at 12.
pursuant to the business judgment rule, from internal controls to capture violations of law and conscious disregard of known “red flags” related to such violations.

4. Marchand and the New Directions in Oversight

Historically, the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished a company’s management of risk inherent in the business plan from board oversight of company compliance with law or regulation, with liability attached to the latter.216 Despite judicial attempts to confine Caremark’s application, questions remained.217 One observer contends that there is “no doctrinal reason that Caremark claims should not lie in cases in which the corporation suffered losses, not due to a failure to comply with applicable laws, but rather due to lax risk management.”218 A new line of Caremark cases and evolving jurisprudence reflect this tension.219 The Marchand v. Barnhill decision and its progeny signal greater attention to risk oversight; they mark a departure from previous oversight cases and expand the potential for director liability resulting from failure to address risks.220

In Marchand, the complaint addressed listeria outbreaks at an ice cream company, alleging multiple oversight failures at the board level: “(1) there was no committee charged with monitoring food safety; (2) the board did not have a process for a board-level discussion devoted to food safety compliance; and (3) there was no board protocol requiring management to deliver reports on food safety compliance.”221 The court summarized: “the complaint supports an inference that no system of board-level compliance monitoring and reporting existed at Blue Bell. Although Caremark is a tough standard for plaintiffs to meet, the plaintiff has met it

217. For cases illustrating the possibility of oversight liability for business risk, see, for example, Wayne Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Dimon, 629 F. App’x 14, 15-16 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Think3, Inc., 529 B.R. 147, 180 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2015); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215, 2011 WL 4826104, at *22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
218. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 968.
219. See Bainbridge, supra note 196, at 664-65.
220. See 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (en banc); Bainbridge, supra note 196, at 664-65.
221. Veasey & Holland, supra note 59, at 12.
here.”222 Marchand concerned an egregious example: a monoline food company in a highly regulated industry.223 The court explained the heightened plaintiff’s burden when making Caremark claims and cautioned that “plaintiffs usually lose because they must concede the existence of board-level systems of monitoring and oversight such as a relevant committee, a regular protocol requiring board-level reports about the relevant risks, or the board’s use of third-party monitors, auditors, or consultants.”224

Despite this statement, Delaware courts are allowing more risk-oversight cases to proceed.225 Marchand and its progeny have expanded the range of circumstances in which directors may incur liability for oversight lapses.226 Shareholder plaintiffs are recognizing more opportunities to hold directors accountable.227 Claims alleging directors did not act in good faith, breaching their duty of loyalty claims under Caremark, are strategically advantageous.228

222. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822.
223. See id. at 809-10.
224. Id. at 823.
225. See Bainbridge, supra note 196, at 663-64; see also Roger A. Cooper & Mark E. McDonald, Caremark Claims on the Rise Fueled by Section 220 Demands, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/caremark-claims-on-the-rise-fueled-by-section-220-demands [https://perma.cc/35VY-9KZW] (“[T]here has been a notable rise in the number of cases in which Delaware courts are allowing Caremark claims against company directors to survive motions to dismiss.”).
226. In In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Court of Chancery emphasized the importance of a board’s oversight function “when [a] company is operating in the midst of [a] ‘mission critical’ regulatory compliance risk,” suggesting it may be subject to greater scrutiny than the same board’s oversight of less critical business risks. No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188, at *12-13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (quoting Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824). In Marchand, the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision emphasized the importance for corporations operating in heavily regulated industries of implementing a system that ensures that mission-critical risks and compliance issues are brought to the attention of the board, whether through a board-level compliance committee or a direct reporting line between the corporation’s top compliance officer and the board. See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 810, 824.
227. See Bainbridge, supra note 196, at 663-65.
Cases emerging in the wake of *Marchand* dive further into ERM. However, in emphasizing mission-critical risks, which often overlap with regulatory or legal requirements, the cases may not constitute a massive departure from previous compliance-with-law oversight cases.  

Under *Marchand*, oversight claims, in the absence of “red flags,” expanded to include situations involving mission-critical risks that are also the subject of regulation but not necessarily mission-critical risks that *are not* the subject of overlapping regulation or legal requirements. In the first case, liability makes sense because directors cannot say they are exercising their oversight in good faith while ignoring an obvious mission-critical risk, the importance of which is reinforced by regulation. In the second case, liability is a gray area ripe for exploration and testing by shareholder plaintiffs. We can postulate mission-critical or high risks without overlapping regulation; for example, the cybersecurity or data privacy risk of an online retailer such as Amazon. However, recent Delaware decisions have expressed reluctance to extend *Caremark* liability for mission-critical risks in the absence of an overlapping legal or regulatory requirement.

Although most public companies have an ERM system, *Marchand* begs the question of whether ERM should be a requirement for large...
public companies enmeshed in corporate law, just like legal compliance programs under Caremark. From this author’s and others’ perspective, the answer is in the affirmative. Beyond ignoring red flags, emerging cases reflect the need for internal controls to address mission-critical risks to meet modern director-oversight obligations.

ERM covers a range of risks, but at present, only those deemed mission critical warrant liability. This carve-out by the courts raises two important questions: What exactly are mission-critical risks, and why should they trigger liability? First, mission-critical risks can potentially have catastrophic impacts on a company. Such risks would almost certainly be included in the company’s risk profile and monitored and prioritized by the board’s ERM system. The risks may shift, depending upon company context and environment. For example, a car manufacturer must monitor ignition switches that could cause fatalities; an ice cream company must monitor safety risks to assure its “monoline” product is suitable for human consumption; and airplane safety must be monitored to assure planes will not explode in the air. The carve-out of mission-critical risks may allay concerns that expanding liability to general business risks would undermine director protections and strategic risk-taking and experimentation.

236. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 183, at 877 (“The risk committee requirement will be of a piece with our broader concern that boards focus more on risk, not just because of the steps firms will take to meet the requirement, but also because law will be thereby expressing its views as to, and making more salient, the board’s and the firm’s role in risk inquiries.”).


241. In Citigroup, Chancellor Chandler presented a nuanced understanding of the business judgment rule:

In this case, plaintiffs allege that the defendants are liable for failing to properly monitor the risk that Citigroup faced from subprime securities. While it may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the burden under some set of facts,
category of risks that business processes should already address still places a high burden on plaintiffs and, at the same time, incentivizes companies to put systems in place to monitor mission-critical risks and does not dilute the pool of directors willing to serve. Mission-critical risks are the “easiest [risks] for the board to anticipate” and “where the potential harm is greatest.”

C. Predictions for Risk Oversight

Cases such as Marchand reveal that directors who, in the absence of red flags, fail to set up a monitoring system for mission-critical risks and/or fail to monitor such risks on an ongoing basis may be subject to liability. Recent cases such as Boeing, alleging directors breached their fiduciary duties by failing to implement oversight and monitoring mechanisms concerning mission-critical airplane safety risks, underscore the need for contemporary directors to be more risk aware. From the perspectives of shareholder and stakeholder protection, directors should put in place systems that address and subsequently monitor mission-critical

plaintiffs in this case have failed to state a Caremark claim sufficient to excuse demand based on a theory that the directors did not fulfill their oversight obligations by failing to monitor the business risk of the company.

....

Instead of alleging facts that could demonstrate bad faith on the part of the directors, by presenting the Court with the so called “red flags,” plaintiffs are inviting the Court to engage in the exact kind of judicial second guessing that is proscribed by the business judgment rule. In any business decision that turns out poorly there will likely be signs that one could point to and argue are evidence that the decision was wrong. Indeed, it is tempting in a case with such staggering losses for one to think that they could have made the “right” decision if they had been in the directors’ position. This temptation, however, is one of the reasons for the presumption against an objective review of business decisions by judges, a presumption that is no less applicable when the losses to the Company are large.

In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009).

242. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 183, at 872 (“In particular, we are mindful of the courts’ appropriate reluctance to micromanage business, embolden meritless litigation, and discourage people from joining boards because of the potential scope of liability. We thus think that the duty should be strongest where the potential harm is greatest and is easiest for the board to anticipate.”).

243. See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822.

244. See In re Boeing Co., 2021 WL 4059934, at *1.
risks, but as in the legal-compliance context, it seems premature to invite courts to deeply evaluate the adequacy of ERM program functioning ex post in the absence of state or federal regulations establishing uniform standards or requirements. Mission-critical risks are arguably a compromise allowing a small subset of the most obvious company risks to potentially trigger liability. Delaware courts will remain reluctant to second-guess managerial risk oversight, and the threshold for establishing liability will remain extremely high. The distinction between compliance with law and risk-management-based liability, which has been observed in previous court decisions, will likely continue. But in the future, other questions will require answering: Is there a legal requirement for ERM systems to manage business risks similar to the legal compliance program requirement under Caremark? What if directors approve a risk appetite that is too high? What if directors fail to understand a company’s risk profile (such as top or mission-critical risks)?

D. Political Risk and Oversight Liability

As emergent, disruptive, and uncertain, political risks are most likely to fall outside the ambit of mission-critical risks subject to liability under Marchand and other cases. Creating a liability shield, however, is not the only or most compelling reason for companies to manage political risk. Stakeholders, including investors, may desire a more credible commitment in the political sphere. Directors who ignore political risk and the potential for far-reaching and varied impacts on business value are shortsighted and careless. Moreover,

245. Boxticking and overly mechanical approaches to ERM are insufficient because organizational behaviors and cultures matter. Within the U.S. corporate-law context (that is, Caremark and Stone), directors and officers are unlikely to face liability for breaching their oversight duties; due to flawed corporate cultures, they ostensibly set a cultural and ethical tone for the entire organization. Flawed corporate cultures may impede effective management of legal compliance, risk, and corporate malfeasance. The failure to account for them, irrespective of legal liability, risks damage to company and societal bottom lines. See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822.

246. See id. at 824; Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 974-75.

247. Cf. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822 (describing the Caremark standard as “tough” to meet).

248. See CLINE ET AL., supra note 4, at 11-12.
political risks often depend on, are subsumed by, or are components of other risk types.\(^{249}\)

In the present sociopolitical climate, companies will become more stakeholder sensitive but not stakeholder driven. Courts may be drawn into stakeholder issues, but shareholders with legal standing will continue to drive the corporate car with stakeholders in the passenger seat. The overwhelming majority of courts will be reluctant to aggressively retreat from the assumption that the residual or primary purpose of the corporation is to make profit for shareholders. Federal regulators will heighten their emphasis on risk management, particularly with respect to climate and other ESG-related risks, yet a change of presidential administration can always slow the process. Some observers contend that Delaware case law vacillates in response to various interest groups, scandals, and market shocks.\(^{250}\) They suggest Delaware judges are influenced by political developments.\(^{251}\) An alternative explanation is that director expectations and duties, from Graham to Marchand, are evolving.\(^{252}\) In any case, Delaware courts are likely to take a measured approach, as reflected in recent Caremark cases addressing risk management.\(^{253}\) Some observers wonder whether Caremark liability

\(?^{249}\) See id. at 16.
\(^{251}\) E.g., Griffith, supra note 250, at 63.
\(^{252}\) Former Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey provides the following alternative explanation for movements in Delaware law:

Our courts do not have a political agenda that vacillates from time to time to favor one litigant over the other. Delaware courts today are not any more “pro-stockholder” and less “pro-director” than they were in the past, or vice versa. The expectations of director conduct have evolved over the years, including in the post-Enron era, but that does not mean the courts have begun to take on a political agenda to favor stockholders over directors. That evolution in director expectations is a function of the development of the common law reflecting changing business mores and sharper pleading in corporate litigation, focusing more precisely on process. Delaware courts are balanced and objective, and the business judgment rule is alive and well.

\(^{253}\) See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019) (en banc); see also Veasey, supra note 252, at 169.
will extend to ESG-related risks. In the absence of uniform standards, legal requirements, or regulations, Caremark liability is unlikely to attach in the ESG context even if the particular ESG-related risk is deemed mission critical. Otherwise, liability for a failure to set up systems to monitor ESG factors under existing jurisprudence remains aspirational.

In the absence of firmer legal and regulatory requirements and uniform standards, centering legal liability on aspirational standards of political risk or ESG oversight seems risky in itself because companies’ responses may be scattered and inconsistent. Doing so might place corporate managers under considerable pressure and, in some cases, make them potentially liable for best practices or aspirational social norms.

IV. PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE RESPONSES TO POLITICAL PRESSURES

The modern corporation is not a neutral political actor. Corporations proactively engage with politics through lobbying and contributions and influence regulation through a range of practices. These actions arguably advance business objectives and help secure better outcomes for shareholders and other stakeholders. Companies also react to powerful external market forces, including political actors using the bully pulpit to publicly critique firm actions or threaten regulation and customer backlash stemming from business practices and perceived or actual company positions on sociopolitical issues.


256. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 19, at 392-93.
A. Proactive Manifestations of Corporate Political Power

Corporations are not merely passive victims of demands from political constituencies; they proactively wield significant political power. They subtly, and sometimes not so subtly, deploy a range of tactics to influence politics for business gain.257

1. Lobbying

Defined broadly, lobbying means “to conduct activities aimed at influencing public officials and especially members of a legislative body on legislation.”258 Most large corporations have an internal apparatus that identifies, monitors, and works to influence laws and regulations to achieve optimal business outcomes.259 Companies may also employ K-Street lobbyists and political insiders to achieve desired political and legislative aims.260 Beyond traditional lobbying, companies can leverage their favorable reputations to serve as credible authorities on issues that affect their business and industry.261 They can shape draft legislation and provide research and expertise to government actors.262 They can also build coalitions with other industry participants in support of legislation.263 Traditional lobbying “relies on gaining quiet access to officials, then leveraging that access to exert influence behind the scenes.”264 Yet companies also employ more aggressive tactics beyond traditional lobbying. Rather than engaging with government actors, companies may

257. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 1500.
261. Id. at 1508 (“FedEx has a reputation for going beyond mere advocacy in its political efforts.”).
262. Id. at 1508-09. For example, hospitality and sports and entertainment companies have worked closely with local and state governments to develop COVID-19 protocols.
263. Working through trade associations allows companies to influence politics without the backlash that may accompany high visibility. See id. at 1509 (“By participating in politics through trade groups, FedEx has been able to play a leadership role while reducing the visibility of its participation.”).
264. Pollman & Barry, supra note 19, at 387.
engage in regulatory arbitrage, which involves circumventing and exploiting loopholes.\textsuperscript{265} They may also engage in regulatory entrepreneurship, which is a blunter, more offensive lobbying tactic leveraged by well-known companies such as Uber, Tesla, Airbnb, UFC, FanDuel, and Draft Kings.\textsuperscript{266} Such companies “make an issue as publicly salient as possible, rally the public to their cause, then use their popular support as leverage to win the change they want from resistant officials.”\textsuperscript{267} Companies engaging in regulatory arbitrage and regulatory entrepreneurship often find it easier to seek forgiveness than permission from government actors.

2. Corporate Political Spending

Corporate political spending reflects attempts to influence legislative outcomes.\textsuperscript{268} According to the 2020 CPA-Zicklin Index of Corporate Political Disclosure and Accountability, “private firms spent nearly $2.2 billion lobbying Congress—more than half of all lobbying expenditures—and millions more on contributions directly, by their political action committees and through third party groups to particular candidates.”\textsuperscript{269} The overwhelming majority of public companies have political action committees (PACs) organized for the purpose of raising and spending money to elect or defeat candidates.\textsuperscript{270} A general rationale for political spending is to have a

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{265} Elizabeth Pollman, \textit{Technology Firms and the Limits on Regulatory Arbitrage}, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July 8, 2019), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2019/07/08/technology-firms-and-the-limits-on-regulatory-arbitrage/ \[https://perma.cc/BJ4T-74PB\] (“[R]egulatory arbitrage can affect stakeholders and impose costs on communities. Particularly when a company aggressively maneuvers around a law in a way that creates perceptible social costs, the public can react negatively and ultimately affect whether, and the extent to which, such a strategy is a valuable course of action. Because regulatory arbitrage can be viewed as circumventing obligations to society or unfairly taking advantage of loopholes, its propensity to provoke social pushback may be greater than other forms of business decisions more generally.”).

\textsuperscript{266} Pollman & Barry, \textit{ supra } note 19, at 385-89, 395, 402-03.

\textsuperscript{267} Id. at 387.


\textsuperscript{270} Recent societal trends suggest fewer companies may begin utilizing PACs. See
voice on issues influencing the company’s business. Corporate political activities, including expenditures for political speech, are quite controversial because many observers view them as falling outside of the standard business process, a misuse of shareholder funds, and prone to abuses of managerial power in pursuit of their own individual preferences. Although many companies are under no obligation to disclose their giving, some do so voluntarily, and elected officials may disclose their donors. Strategically, the better time to make political contributions is not when the company is in crisis but to establish a relationship, show support, and make political allies during periods of relative stability. One, two, or three years later, companies can reengage, seek support, and attempt to influence favorable legislative outcomes. In the 2020 federal election, corporations spent over $100 million, of which at least $33 million came from public companies. These amounts pale in comparison to the estimated $1 billion in dark money funneled into elections. The Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. FEC decision contributed to, or set the stage for, the current political giving environment and it also endorsed political giving disclosures.


275. See id.

276. Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 53, 53-54 (2009). In Citizens United, the Supreme Court also endorsed political spending disclosures. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (“With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information needed to hold corporations and
response, investors are taking a proactive stance on political spending disclosures and transparency, pressuring management through shareholder proposals. Specifically, “these resolutions call for regular reports on decision-making processes for donations and a comprehensive account of all political spending on candidates, lobbyists, parties, trade groups and any other organizations that may use the money for political ends.”

According to the New York Times, [in 2019, there were 51 political spending proposals at S&P 500 companies; none passed, and they received an average of 28 percent support. Last year, [2020,] of 55 similar proposals, six passed and average support rose to about 35 percent.... So far this year [2021] ... five of the seven [so-called political transparency proposals] that have been put to a vote won majority support.]

Notwithstanding its benefits to business objectives, political spending can pose a reputational risk to companies and requires director oversight. In theory, it may make sense to spend equally among candidates irrespective of party to appear unbiased. In practice, however, equitable giving may prove to be a challenge where, for example, a particular political party dominates a legislature. In the wake of the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol insurrection, companies withheld donations to politicians who supported the insurrection or challenged the 2020 presidential election results to protect their reputations. For example, the investment management company Charles Schwab permanently shut down its PAC and donated the remaining funds to the Boys...
and Girls Club of America and Historically Black Colleges. Charles Schwab issued a press release: “In light of a divided political climate and an increase in attacks on those participating in the political process, we believe a clear and apolitical position is in the best interest of our clients, employees, stockholders and the communities in which we operate.”

Recent trends indicate a movement toward greater transparency for corporate political expenditures and more board oversight. For example, “[t]he number of [S&P 500] companies that fully or partially disclosed their political spending in 2020 or that prohibited at least one type of spending was 332, up from 304 in 2016.” Notably, in 2016, 111 S&P 500 companies “had policies requiring board oversight of political spending and board committee review of company policy, political expenditures and trade association payments.” Four years later, in 2020, that number had “risen to 162 [S&P 500] companies, an increase of almost 46 percent.” Moreover, “[t]he number of companies adopting general board oversight or more granular committee review of political spending has increased between 13 and 35 percent depending on the type of spending.”

3. Corporate Charitable Donations

Corporate charitable donations provide direct and indirect benefits for companies. They are permitted under both common law and statutory schemes, and the U.S. Internal Revenue Code incentivizes corporate giving, recognizing a desire for companies to contribute to public causes. Historical and contemporary legal
frameworks recognize and encourage corporate engagement with public causes.²⁹⁰

However, according to one study, “based on ... [its] most conservative estimated elasticities, 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving is politically motivated.... [That] is about 2.5 times larger [than PAC contributions].”²⁹¹ Another study found that when a congressional representative joins a certain committee that has policy implications for a firm, its “foundation is more likely to give” grants to charities the representative is a part of or that are located within the representative’s district.²⁹² Another area of concern is managerial accountability to shareholders; that is, using shareholders’ money for non-business-related purposes. Managers might choose their own pet projects which are only tangentially related to the business or pursue other self-interested aims.

In any case, challenges to corporate donations are likely to fail as long as defendants can show reasonableness and some nexus between the donation and benefit to long-term business interests.²⁹³ Courts are reluctant to speculate on the equivalence of the charitable expenditure to company benefit.²⁹⁴ Reasonableness, in the corporate giving context, is construed permissively.

4. Government’s Revolving Door

Corporate executives frequently enter and exit government posts while former government officials function as lobbyists, directors, and senior executives of public companies, securing lucrative financial opportunities following their government service.²⁹⁵ One
study suggests that firms with political connections financially outperform their peers in the presence of political risk.\textsuperscript{296} To capitalize on their political insights, companies—for example, Boeing, FedEx, Bristol Myers Squibb, and Lyft—hire former senior-level government officials to serve on their boards of directors and in other capacities.\textsuperscript{297} This revolving door flows in the other direction as well. In some cases, administration officials come from the management, consulting, and financial services sectors. For example, current Secretary of Transportation Pete Buttigieg is a former McKinsey associate, and SEC Chair Gary Gensler was a Goldman Sachs partner.\textsuperscript{298} In addition to financial capital, corporations wield


\textsuperscript{297.} FedEx hired the following political officials to serve on its board: “Howard Baker, former senator; Charles Manatt, Washington lawyer and former Democratic Party national chairman; George Mitchell, former Senate Majority Leader; and Shirley Jackson, RPI President and former member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.” Fisch, supra note 1, at 1507 (footnotes omitted). Former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh served on the board of Bristol Myers Squibb. Jeff Blumenthal, Former FBI Director, Penn State Investigator Freeh to Chair Phila. Law Firm, PHILA. BUS. J. (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2013/02/05/former-fbi-director-penn-state.html [https://perma.cc/4KPG-BQEF]. He was also hired by credit card issuer MBNA, ultimately serving as board director and general counsel and ethics officer. Id. Anthony Foxx, Former U.S. Secretary of Transportation during the Obama administration, served as chief policy officer for rideshare company Lyft and currently serves on the boards of Martin Marietta Corporation and CDW Corporation. Investors Biography: Anthony R. Foxx, MARTIN MARIETTA, https://ir.martinmarietta.com/board-directors/anthony-foxx (last visited Jan. 29, 2023).

social or relationship capital—that is, value derived from formal and informal networks.\(^\text{299}\) The revolving door builds valuable relationship capital; for both government and business, it assures friends in high places.\(^\text{300}\)

5. Public/Private Collaboration

Contrary to public rhetoric, corporations and government are engaged in a collaborative and symbiotic relationship.\(^\text{301}\) Out of necessity, state, local, and federal governments render make-versus-buy decisions.\(^\text{302}\) Some observers overemphasize the adversarial aspects of the private and public sector relationship and warn against oversized government, but these criticisms do not grasp the reality of their codependency. Public-private partnerships offer opportunities for meeting social needs. The traditional public-private partnership is grounded in government procurement.\(^\text{303}\) Federal and state governments constitute a major customer channel for large, publicly traded corporations.\(^\text{304}\) Although the uninitiated might consider national defense a government function managed by several military branches, it relies heavily on a civilian private sector.\(^\text{305}\) Simply put, defense industry growth promotes private job creation. Some political actors encourage outsourcing to private employers who might build facilities in their states and hire their

\(\text{299. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 1, at 1504-07 (describing relationships among FedEx, its CEO and founder, and Washington insiders).}\)


\(\text{301. Id.}\)

\(\text{302. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537, 1544, 1547 (1981) [hereinafter Williamson, Modern Corporation] (arguing that the modern corporation evolved in part from a desire to reduce transaction costs and other economic factors); Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 113-14 (1971) [hereinafter Williamson, Vertical Integration] (analyzing the benefits of internalization versus external procurement).}\)

\(\text{303. See Lüchinger & Moser, supra note 296, at 2-6.}\)

\(\text{304. See id.}\)

\(\text{305. See CLARK, supra note 11, § 16.3, at 697, 699.}\)
Recent examples of collaboration in other areas include COVID-19 vaccine development and manufacturing, space exploration, infrastructure improvement, and commercial airline airlifts out of Afghanistan. These collaborations inform a more holistic view of public-private exchange and collaboration: extensive, nuanced, and emblematic of the powerful position publicly traded companies occupy in society.

6. Expertise, Capacity, and Informational Advantages

The size and impact of modern corporations make collaborative engagement necessary. The private sector wields significant expertise advantages over the public sector across a range of domains, particularly technology. Thus, the government’s make-versus-buy calculus extends beyond cost to expertise and capacity, inter alia. In the context of national security, leveraging private sector expertise to support military and intelligence operations around the world is necessary. For example, the Department of Justice and other federal agencies leverage the surveillance and data analysis capabilities of companies such as Microsoft, IBM, Google, and Amazon to provide critical technology upgrades.

In the modern economy, data is the new gold, and private companies often have access superior to that of certain governments. Corporate concentrations and their interaction with data are an ongoing concern for regulators. Corporations wield significant power through advertising, using the press and social media to promote products and services and to shape consumer

308. See Williamson, Modern Corporation, supra note 302, at 1541-42.
310. See id.
preferences.\textsuperscript{312} Specifically, Facebook, Amazon, and Twitter, among others, have come under fire for their use and potential misuse of customer data.\textsuperscript{313} At the same time, governments, although critical of these companies, once again, seek to leverage their data to advance their own capabilities and objectives.\textsuperscript{314}

7. \textit{The Corporate Bully Pulpit and the Power of Persuasion}

The quasi-governmental position companies occupy in contemporary society requires a degree of public acceptance. Accordingly, companies must speak up for themselves to maintain good stakeholder relations and irreproachable reputations.\textsuperscript{315} In the age of social media and broad misinformation campaigns, silence may signal a company’s indifference or make it vulnerable to outside observers who claim to define its positions.\textsuperscript{316} In response, companies may use the corporate “bully pulpit” to make political statements and take positions.\textsuperscript{317} When using the corporate bully pulpit, companies must remain sensitive to a diverse audience including various shareholders, customers, employees, regulators, and other stakeholders. In recent years, “[n]umerous public corporations began to take positions on the varied societal issues of our time from gay marriage to global equity and, most notably, climate change, going far astray from their traditionally narrow involvement.”\textsuperscript{318} This observer further notes, “[w]ith the recent rebirth of the ‘stakeholder’ movement, it has been forcefully argued that businesses should not be narrowly concerned with shareholder value, but instead become active participants in a broader campaign for social


\textsuperscript{313} See, e.g., Diaz, supra note 311.

\textsuperscript{314} See id. at 431.

\textsuperscript{315} See id. at 431-32.

\textsuperscript{316} See id. at 431.


\textsuperscript{318} Charles Elson, Corporate Political Involvement, DIrs. & Bds., https://www.directorsandboards.com/articles/singlecorporate-political-involvement [https://perma.cc/8V2V-5CY4].
justice.”\(^{319}\) Notably, business leaders, not simply fringe activists, are speaking out on these issues. For example, Bob Chapek, former CEO of Walt Disney Co., recently spoke out against Florida’s passage of the “Don’t Say Gay” law.\(^{320}\) Activists for social change seek corporate participation or to shift corporate objectives.\(^{321}\) Thus, a

319. \(\text{Id.}\)

320. Kelsey Ables, \textit{Disney Suspends Political Donations in Florida After Bill Restricting LGBTQ Discussion}, \texttt{WASH. POST} (Mar. 12, 2022, 7:42 PM), \url{https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2022/03/12/disney-donation-pause-dont-say-gay-bill/} [https://perma.cc/D2PW-5AZ7]. Chapek’s strong opposition to the law sparked an intense battle with Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, who, along with the Florida legislature, revoked Disney’s special tax status in the state. Brooks Barnes, \textit{Disney to Lose Special Tax Status in Florida Amid ‘Don’t Say Gay’ Clash}, \texttt{N.Y. TIMES} (Apr. 21, 2022), \url{https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/21/business/disney-florida-special-tax-status.html?referringSource=articleShare} [https://perma.cc/LRN8-5AUQ]. Another example would be the recent response to an onslaught of restrictive voting bills pursued by Republicans in forty-three states, particularly Georgia: former American Express CEO Kenneth Chenault, former CEO of Merck Kenneth Frazier, and other corporate executives issued general statements against such voting restrictions. Andrew Ross Sorkin & David Gelles, \textit{Black Executives Call on Corporations to Fight Restrictive Voting Laws}, \texttt{N.Y. TIMES} (Apr. 3, 2021), \url{https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/31/business/voting-rights-georgia-corporations.html} [https://perma.cc/ZE68-V3JH]. Prior to restrictive voting legislation passing in Georgia, “almost no major companies spoke out against the legislation, which introduced stricter voter identification requirements for absentee balloting, limited drop boxes and expanded the legislature’s power over elections.” \textit{Id.} Atlanta-based corporations, “including Delta Air Lines, Coca-Cola and Home Depot, offered general statements of support for voting rights, but none took a specific stance on the bills. The same was true for most of the executives who signed the new letter, including Mr. Frazier and Mr. Chenault.” \textit{Id.} But compare the following approach taken with respect to reproductive rights:

When Texas lawmakers advanced a restrictive voting rights bill this year, American Airlines and Dell Technologies, two of the state’s biggest employers, were early and vocal critics of the effort.

But this week, as a law that prohibits most abortions after about six weeks took effect in Texas, both companies declined to comment on the measure.

American Airlines and Dell were representative of the business community at large. While many corporations are taking stands on voting rights, climate change, immigration and other important matters, few companies would comment on the abortion law.


321. See Lin, \textit{supra} note 26, at 1546 (“The broad reach and deep impact of social activism powered by new information technology means that businesses are frequently engaged in social issues whether they want to be or not.... [C]hanges in social expectations about corporate behavior have also altered corporate social activism. Many in society and within
Company's response to social activism can threaten or enhance its reputation. More specifically, "failure to account for complex reputational risks may destroy the long-term value of a company." A company under a cloud of litigation, investigations, and even social media outrage may suffer reputational damage with serious financial ramifications.

Company stances may also have serious consumer implications. For example, according to one 2018 survey of Americans, "77% of respondents agreed that CEOs are obligated to speak out when their company's values are violated or threatened, and nearly half (48%) agreed that companies should take positions on social issues they consider important to their workforce and to society, even if not directly related to their business." The survey also found that when consumers share the views espoused, CEO activism may positively influence purchase decisions; nearly half of respondents (46 percent) said they were more likely to buy from a company led by a CEO who speaks out on an issue they support. On the other hand, consumers who disagree with the CEO’s position may forsake the company and its products or services. The recent experiences of Nike and Under Armour illustrate these tensions. Whereas Nike

323. Id.
326. For more information, see, for example, Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, The New CEO Activists, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/01/the-new-ceo-activists [https://perma.cc/YE97-SYG4]; Katie Robertson & Julie Creswell, Under Armour Founder Kevin Plank to Step Down as C.E.O., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/22/business/under-armour-kevin-plank.html [https://perma.cc/ZX2X-SZ96] ("In 2017, [Under Armour’s CEO, Kevin Plank,] was criticized by some of his company’s celebrity endorsers [and brand ambassadors], including Stephen Curry and Dwayne Johnson, when he said in an interview that President Trump’s business background made him ‘a real asset’ to the country."). Additionally, the “Wall Street Journal reported [in 2018] that the company[, Under Armour,] had a culture of inappropriate behavior toward women, including visits to strip clubs that often included Mr. Plank and were charged to corporate cards." Id.
embraced the activism of Colin Kaepernick’s NFL protests and incorporated him into an extensive ad campaign associating the Nike brand with youthful social activism, Under Armour, through its CEO’s statements espousing support for President Donald Trump, alienated key stakeholders including its celebrity brand ambassadors and a younger customer base. In the former instance, Nike made a calculated, risky business decision to align with Kaepernick’s social justice stances to build consumer affinity for its brand. Under Armour’s statements were uncalculated, poorly timed, and risky, especially for an upstart company seeking to build market share against larger competitors with legacy brands. These divergent approaches reveal the upsides and downsides of political risk management.

Company responses to political issues demand a nuanced, contextually driven approach. In some situations, a company might opine on an issue to prevent backlash; in others, a statement could alienate certain stakeholders or create an unintended controversy, so no action is warranted. Companies’ political statements may require strategic follow-up, including changing course, apologizing, retracting, or doubling down. In response to a board survey following the recent enactment of voting restrictions in Georgia, 54 percent of board members felt that companies doing business in Georgia should take a position; of that group, 72 percent said companies should overtly oppose the law and 23 percent said companies should issue a general statement supporting the protection of voting rights.

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330. See id.

should have teams and processes in place to quickly address the question of public statements ex ante and ex post.

B. External Political Pressures Prompting a Reactive Corporate Response

1. Investors and ESG

Pressure from parts of the investment community to incorporate ESG factors and frameworks into business practice is growing. With potential regulation of ESG-related SEC disclosures and political activity on the horizon, the public and shareholders have become increasingly active, pressuring companies to address their proposals on climate change, political spending, and diversity. In a sign of things to come, proxy advisory firm ISS recently rebuffed Uber for its lack of disclosure of political activity. Some scholars argue that demographic shifts in the shareholder base—Generations Y and Z—may affect future increases in corporate activism.

If many social proposals are likely to have little economic impact on the corporation, “[a] number of new funds are now deliberately appealing to socially conscious investors through well-publicized plans employing social considerations as one of the major elements influencing investment decision.” Company attentiveness may

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336. Blumberg, supra note 27, at 453.
yield benefits: “The company that displays social responsibility may thus attract future professional investor support because of anticipated performance in the basic economic aspects of the business arising from the broader horizons demonstrated in the social area.”

2. Consumer Sentiment

Consumer backlash, or economic boycotts, have a tradition reaching back to the founding of the United States. Contemporary consumers may be swayed by a company’s position and actions, or lack thereof, on a range of social issues. Consumer surveys illustrate the connection between demand preferences and social activism. In some instances, the product brand may be inextricably tied to a social issue. In others, the connection may be tenuous. Thus, consumer sentiments cannot be ignored as a strategic imperative that poses risk to a firm’s bottom line and reputation.

337. Id. at 454.
338. See id. at 426, 442; see Vogel, supra note 20, at 72, 76-77.
3. Political Actor Maneuvering

Political actors contribute to the politicization of modern corporations. They can use their bully pulpit to denounce corporations and strategically shift their own accountability to a large, recognizable target. For corporations, political capital is an “intangible asset that provides ... long term value extending beyond an isolated policy issue [or dispute].” For lawmakers incentivized to maximize political capital by generating broad political support, policy choices may indicate “what is ‘in it’” for them “when they move” in a particular direction. The present political moment is ripe for policy entrepreneurs. On the surface, it seems rational for lawmakers to target the most powerful interest group—managers and institutional investors. The most pragmatic outcome is often “a compromise among various interests, albeit slanted to preserve a broad coalition of support, thereby maximizing lawmaker utility.”

Sometimes purely efficient or fair regulation may lack political appeal, and merely symbolic, inefficient, and hybridized policies have more political utility. On balance, strategic inefficiency may be a net positive because it limits the backlash economic shocks, scandals, and social unrest generate. The fact that any backlash averted cannot be precisely measured does not diminish the value of political capital. Lawmakers’ pursuit of self-interest and maximization of political utility may actually benefit shareholder and stakeholder constituencies. From this perspective, reform outcomes are not simply zero-sum scenarios for various stakeholders. Another popular critique of lawmaker maneuvering or

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342. Blumberg, supra note 27, at 454.
343. See id. at 430-31.
344. Fisch, supra note 1, at 1498-99 (highlighting FedEx as an example of the various ways corporations obtain and utilize political power); see Simmons, supra note 43, at 329.
345. See Sam Peltzman, George Stigler’s Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation, 101 J. POL. ECON. 818, 824 (1993); Simmons, supra note 43, at 329.
347. Id. at 323.
348. See id.
349. Roe, supra note 92, at 217 (“The prospect of backlash—or of strategically tempering otherwise efficient rules and institutions to finesse away a more destructive backlash—complicates a law and economics inquiry.”).
350. See id. at 240.
351. Simmons, supra note 43, at 365.
opportunism is the aggrandizement of government bureaucracies and their power perhaps beyond the optimal point, which may discount the value of nongovernmental institutions.\footnote{Clark, supra note 11, § 16.3, at 698-99.}

The impact of public opinion must also be considered. Even though the concept is ambiguous, ascertaining general public sentiment is an informative exercise for boards, executives, and lawmakers alike, providing a “crude measure of public legitimacy for corporate governance.”\footnote{Simmons, supra note 43, at 331. As Adolf Berle asserts: [A] modern American corporation understands well enough that it has a “constituency” to deal with. If its constituents—notably its buyers—are unsatisfied, they will go to the political state for solution. Hardly any present-day board of directors or corporation management would take the position that it could afford to disregard public opinion—or would last very long if it did. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 56 (1954).} Although public opinion “tends to be cyclical and intense,”\footnote{Simmons, supra note 43, at 331; see Berle, supra note 353, at 57 (“A disadvantage (not peculiar perhaps to a political as contrasted with an economic balancing force) is the fact that movements of public opinion tend to be sluggish in commencing, and extreme once they start. A situation has to be really out of hand before public pressure begins to assert itself, and when it does passions run high.”).} it does not “automatically [spring] into people’s minds”; it may be partially “manufactured.”\footnote{E Delman, supra note 312, at 53.} “In and of themselves, citizen demands may not have a significant impact on corporate conduct”; they “are more likely to be successful when coupled with [investor and] lawmaker intervention or the threat thereof.”\footnote{Simmons, supra note 43, at 331. Mark Roe’s description of “backlash” acknowledges the importance of broader public sentiment beyond the manager-shareholder constituency. See Roe, supra note 92, at 217-18.}

Politics can disrupt markets, but it can also mediate economic turmoil. Corporate scandals, social unrest, and severe “economic disruptions often change the distribution of political power and create opportunities for public policy entrepreneurs to rearrange things to their advantage.”\footnote{Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 58 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989).} Despite a lack of organization, diffuse constituencies may participate in the political process when they are provided with “free (and easy to digest, perhaps entertaining) information” and “political saliency, a major national [or
international] issue that commands attention and motivates action." The influence of social media has amplified this effect.

V. POLITICAL RISK, POLITICIZATION, AND CORPORATE PURPOSE

A. The Debate

Shareholder and stakeholder governance approaches reflect a tension between two visions of corporate governance: a tight focus on investor return and a panorama that encompasses all constituencies affected by the corporate entity. Support for either approach can be found in case law, the regulatory architecture, and the academic literature. Specifically, politics connects with the corporate purpose debate in the following ways. A key justification for the stakeholder approach is that “many types of corporate activities that appear to be profit-reducing voluntary expenditures for the

358. Id. at 51-52.
360. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("Although such considerations [of other corporate constituencies] may be permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013) ("Directors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders which require that they strive prudently and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants."); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, ... directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders."); Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) ("It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corporation’s stockholders."). But see Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that directors can consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)’); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 112 (Del. Ch. 2011) ("A board of directors ‘is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.’ ” (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1150)); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("[D]irectors in pursuit of long run corporate (and shareholder) value may be sensitive to the claims of other ‘corporate constituencies.’ ... There is a time, however, when the board’s duty becomes more targeted and specific and its range of options becomes narrower.").
public good are really conducive to profit maximization in the long run. 361 Proponents also make a big-picture argument that companies engaging in socially responsible activities will lead to an overall better business climate. 362 Thus, a concern regarding strict shareholder profit maximization is that, to a certain degree, it is self-defeating, leading to a society that is suspicious of corporations. 363

A leading critique of the stakeholder approach (or argument in favor of shareholder primacy) is the concern that it provides managers cover to pursue their own political and other self-interested prerogatives in their decision-making. 364 In addition, “[c]orporations [already] owe many contractual, common law, and statutory duties to their [nonshareholder constituencies,] customers, suppliers, creditors, employees, and to the environment, the general public, and numerous governmental entities.” 365 At the extreme, critics contend a stakeholder approach may function as a plutocracy in disguise, in which managers deploy their power toward nonbusiness goals to serve their own preferences. 366 A second but weaker critique contends that publicly spirited activities do not create a better business climate after all but instead reduce incentives for governments to adopt needed regulatory measures. 367 A third, but very important critique, is that not all publicly spirited activities, including political activities, are conducive to long-term profitability. 368 From this third critique emerges a tension: not all political activity minimizes shareholder value; some activities may help the bottom line and others may not. 369 The challenge for corporate managers, academics, and policymakers is perhaps drawing a line between political activities maximizing profits in the long term versus those that do not. The integration of political risk into existing ERM frameworks may, in part, advance this process making the debate operationally relevant to corporate practice.

361. This statement is consistent with what Robert Clark labelled the limited monism approach. CLARK, supra note 11, § 16.2, at 681.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 684.
364. See id.
365. Id. at 678.
366. Id. at 684.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Cf. id.
B. Blurred Lines, Nonstate Actors, and Hybridization

Academic debate often ignores the fact that companies will inevitably act and react in response to politics. Modern corporations are immersed in a matrix of political activity that extends well beyond political spending. The growing impact of nonstate actors and the blurring of the lines between government and private enterprise have brought corporations into a broader conversation on public accountability.\(^{370}\) Large corporations “[a]s a major factor in the society ... cannot escape involvement in the urgent problems of the country.”\(^ {371}\) They function as quasi-public institutions, and their power or “bigness” is an ongoing public concern.\(^ {372}\) Historically and today, the driving force behind many types of business regulation is concern about corporate power and making large corporations, particularly management, more accountable to shareholder and stakeholder interests.\(^ {373}\) Some proponents of policy change view the abuse of corporate power as a metaproblem, requiring a deep structural remedy.\(^ {374}\) Corporations overtly crossing into the political sphere sparks controversy and entails risk.

Acknowledging corporate power and influence against a backdrop of political gridlock, stakeholders are lobbying companies directly

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370. Lin, supra note 26, at 1537-47.
371. Blumberg, supra note 27, at 427.
373. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 47, at 353-57. The checks on a corporation’s economic power include, inter alia, competition, profits, political intervention, and public consensus or sentiment. BERLE, supra note 353, at 51-59.
to address a range of social issues. In a sense, “the state [is regarded] as the corporate state, and the corporation as a prime target.”\textsuperscript{375} Corporations are not necessarily a nemesis but another vehicle to achieve activist goals.\textsuperscript{376}

Politics is divisive; it is also a mechanism to mediate conflict as well as preserve and enhance value. As quasi-governmental entities, modern companies cannot ignore politics and related risks and arguably still effectively serve the best interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.\textsuperscript{377} Although this characterization may draw criticism, it has greater descriptive and explanatory power than prevailing rigid theoretical constructs set at extremes or sometimes zealous demands for purity or neutrality.\textsuperscript{378} Even when managers have mixed motives, mixed objectives, and divided loyalties, their actions do not necessarily harm stakeholder or shareholder interests.\textsuperscript{379} The converse may also be true. Similarly, neutrality on issues may not be beneficial; it can be complicit with a suboptimal status quo and cause reputational damage in a volatile political environment.\textsuperscript{380} At the same time, politically driven decisions that

\textsuperscript{375.} Blumberg, supra note 27, at 428.


\textsuperscript{377.} See Blumberg, supra note 27, at 428-29.

\textsuperscript{378.} Debate over corporations’ purpose can be similarly divisive. One view maintains the corporation is merely an economic institution, responsive to only shareholder concerns. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 194, at 1034. Another maintains that the corporation is a political institution subject and accountable to societal group control. See id. Meanwhile, some observers straddle stakeholder and shareholder perspectives. Fisher and Shapiro succinctly explain how polarization can plague a debate. See Elizabeth Fisher & Sidney Shapiro, \textit{Disagreement About Chevron: Is Administrative Law the “Law of Public Administration”?}, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 111, 112 (2021) (“These disagreements amount to two different groups, who imagine administrative law in two completely different ways, talking past each other. Their disagreement cannot even be called a debate since each group employs a different vocabulary and preoccupation. Nor is it a political disagreement either.” (footnote omitted)).


\textsuperscript{380.} But see Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, Opinion, \textit{The Power of C.E.O. Activism}, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/opinion/sunday/the-power-of-ceo-activism.html [https://perma.cc/GQ5L-5Z2P] (“[I]n an era of political polarization, in which we are increasingly cloistered in neighborhoods, social networks and workplaces that serve as echo chambers for our ideological beliefs, corporate neutrality may be outdated.”).
overreach and ignore tenets of shareholder ownership may devalue and denigrate shareholder rights and disincentivize investment. Directors are caught at a dangerous intersection where they must artfully avoid collisions.

However, “if business ignored the public acceptance-expectation-demand process, and refused to involve itself in the solution of social problems,” we cannot assume that “the pressures for politicization would disappear.” Management may actually contribute to greater politicization. Contemporary accounts supporting shareholder primacy must acknowledge that “[t]he slowness of business to respond ... [and] its own role ... has contributed to putting business in the painful position of being a prime target in the movement for [social and environmental] reform.” Moreover, “[t]he intensity of these problems, the extent to which corporations have caused them, the limited response of corporations to their solution—in brief, the failure of business leadership—have accelerated the forces for politicization.”

Nearly fifty years ago, Philip Blumberg’s article The Politicalization of the Corporation identified how society’s view of business has changed to encompass social and moral good, along with, and at times ahead of, economic good. As “one of the major power centers in the society,” business is a focal point of change. He acknowledged eight factors that contributed to greater public demands on corporations, and they remain relevant today: (1) the failure of business leadership, (2) changing concepts about the role of business

381. Blumberg, supra note 27, at 429.
382. Id. (whereby management does not participate or resists efforts to do so “is any factor that is contributing strength to the position of management in resisting efforts to politicize the corporation, it is the ability to point to a record, albeit limited, of social participation”).
383. Id. at 428.
384. Id.
385. See id. at 425-26. In the same article, Blumberg concludes:
Business can only prosper by being part of a healthy society, and can only preserve its present degree of independence from public control by participation in the solution of social and environmental problems in accordance with public expectations and demands.... [B]y joining in the battle for social justice: the struggle against poverty, race and sex discrimination, environmental abuse, urban blight, and by having a significant number of independent directors reflecting public attitudes on its boards.
386. Id. at 426.
in society, (3) lack of management accountability, (4) the concentration of corporate economic power, (5) the communications revolution, (6) lack of responsiveness of the political system, (7) changing values, and (8) development of a socially oriented shareholder power base.387

The more effective company response to diffuse politicization in the contemporary context involves sensitivity and responsiveness to both investor concerns and political and social problems.388 “[B]usinesses should be able to articulate their profit-seeking purposes in a comprehensive manner that better accounts for the social interests and norms expected ... which in turn may actually lead to superior financial performance” and enhance their value for shareholders, employees, consumers, and society at large.389 A broad, hybrid approach to corporate governance is demanded, one not limited to shareholder concerns but incorporating input from a range of stakeholder constituencies. Yet managers cannot ignore the often residual goal of maximizing shareholder wealth.

CONCLUSION

Corporate political engagement is complex. It extends well beyond political spending and raises profound democratic legitimacy concerns. But in the absence of prescriptive regulation, curtailing corporate political influence, disclosure of political activity along with a reliance on market monitoring and enforcement will likely prevail. The COVID-19 pandemic, military conflict, and domestic social unrest have focused considerable attention on political risk and engagement. The disruptions to company operations are voluminous and diverse: entertainment and hospitality industry closures, airline industry cancellations, eviction moratoriums in residential real estate, international trade interruptions, manufacturing supply

387. Id. at 428-32.
388. See id. at 429-30. As one observer acknowledges, “the current—and likely future—terrain of business and social activism suggests that a singular narrative centered exclusively on amoral profit-seeking would be unsatisfactory for many corporate stakeholders, social activists, and policymakers.” Lin, supra note 26, at 1597-98.
389. Lin, supra note 26, at 1579-80, 1598 (“Being socially responsible does not mean being financially irresponsible.”).
shortages, employee vaccination mandates, and ride-hailing service restrictions.

ERM is the mechanism through which boards and their respective firms can manage complex political risks. In the current climate, more companies should emphasize and integrate political risk oversight in their ERM programs. Although its neglect may not trigger legal liability from regulators or courts, it can cause significant financial and reputational losses to the company. Politics should not be avoided but managed in a nuanced way pursuant to effective board oversight of ERM. It is negligent for corporate managers to operate with political blinders. Companies must contend with courts of law and the court of public opinion, each with its own distinct rules. Missteps in the latter may injure the corporation more seriously than unfavorable judgments in the former. The failure to manage political risk is not in the best interests of the corporation.