THE FAULTY LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE “BASEBALL RULE”

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ABSTRACT

This Article examines the so-called “Baseball Rule,” the legal doctrine generally immunizing professional baseball teams from liability when spectators are hit by errant balls or bats leaving the field of play. Following a recent series of high-profile fan injuries at Major League Baseball (MLB) games, this century-old legal doctrine has come under increased scrutiny, with both academic and media commentators calling for its abolition. Nevertheless, despite these criticisms, courts have almost uniformly continued to apply the Baseball Rule to spectator-injury lawsuits.

This Article offers two contributions to the ongoing debate surrounding the Baseball Rule. First, it provides new empirical evidence establishing that the risk of being hit by an errant ball or bat at a professional baseball game has increased considerably in recent years. Specifically, fans attending MLB games today are sitting more than 20 percent closer to the field than they were when the legal doctrine was first established. This fact, along with other changes in the way in which the game is played and presented to fans, have converged to substantially reduce the reaction time that spectators have to protect themselves from flying objects entering the stands,

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calling into question courts’ continued reliance on the century-old rule.

Second, the Article makes the novel observation that courts and academic commentators have, to date, largely failed to reconsider the Baseball Rule in light of the emergence of the law-and-economics movement, and in particular the contributions the movement has offered regarding the optimal apportionment of tort liability. By subjecting the doctrine to such an economic analysis, this Article finds that the host team will usually constitute the lowest-cost or best risk avoider, thus suggesting that the legal immunity currently provided to teams by the Baseball Rule inefficiently allocates tort liability in spectator-injury lawsuits.

As a result, the Article concludes by contending that future courts (or legislatures) should reject the Baseball Rule and instead hold professional baseball teams liable for spectator injuries. Specifically, it asserts that the Baseball Rule should be replaced by a strict-liability regime, thereby better incentivizing teams to implement the most economically efficient level of fan protection in their stadiums.
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INTRODUCTION

On September 20, 2017, a one-year-old girl was enjoying an afternoon at the ballpark with her grandparents at Yankee Stadium in New York City. Seated only five rows from the field, just past the visitors’ dugout, the girl had a terrific view of that day’s game between the Yankees and the Minnesota Twins. Unfortunately, the young child’s proximity to the field also placed her at a heightened risk of being hit by an errant ball or bat leaving the field of play. In the bottom of the fifth inning, Yankees third baseman Todd Frazier hit such a foul ball, a missile of a line drive that entered the stands at a blistering 106 miles per hour. Before anyone could react, the ball hit the girl squarely in the head, causing multiple facial fractures—including to her orbital bone and nose—and leaving a visible imprint of the ball’s seams on her forehead.

While the young girl was fortunate to escape the incident without being more seriously injured, the episode nevertheless quickly sparked renewed concern over the issue of spectator safety at professional baseball games. Although only a single fan to date has lost his life after being hit by an errant ball or bat at a Major

1. See Andrew Marchand, Young Fan Taken from Yankees Game to Hospital After Being Hit by Foul Ball, ESPN.COM (Sept. 21, 2017, 1:28 PM), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/20768433/young-fan-new-york-yankees-game-hit-face-foul-ball [https://perma.cc/N9RR-GKT3] (reporting that the child was sitting “with her grandparents about five rows up on the third-base side of Yankee Stadium”).


League Baseball (MLB) game, serious incidents like the one at Yankee Stadium have become increasingly common in recent years, occurring more frequently than many fans realize. Indeed, according to a recent analysis by Bloomberg, approximately 1750 fans are hurt each year by foul balls while attending MLB games. This equates to a rate of roughly two injuries per every three games, making a fan injury from a foul ball a more common occurrence than a batter being hit by a pitch. Moreover, that estimate does not include any injuries sustained by the more than forty million fans who annually attend games hosted by one of the nearly 250 minor-league teams competing at lower levels of professional baseball.

Despite the frequency with which these incidents are increasingly occurring, professional baseball teams have historically had little motivation to take greater steps to protect their spectators from injury. Under what has commonly become known as the “Baseball

5. See Robert M. Gorman & David Weeks, Death at the Ballpark: A Comprehensive Study of Game-Related Fatalities of Players, Other Personnel and Spectators in Amateur and Professional Baseball, 1862-2007, 133 (2009) (reporting that 14-year-old Alan Fish died in 1970 after being hit in the head by a line drive foul ball at a Los Angeles Dodgers game). In addition, at least one fan has been killed by a foul ball while attending a minor-league game. See id. at 134 (recounting that a 68-year-old fan at a then-minor-league Miami Marlins game in 1960 was struck in the side of the head by a foul ball, and eventually died two days later).

6. See id. at 131 (declaring that baseball “is among the most dangerous spectator sports”).


8. Id.


10. To its credit, in response to the aforementioned public scrutiny, MLB has recently taken steps to incentivize its teams to adopt greater measures to protect their fans from injury, primarily through the installation of additional protective netting. See infra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing efforts). While certainly laudable, as discussed infra, these precautions do not obviate the need for a critical reassessment of the Baseball Rule, as there is no guarantee that these teams’ voluntary measures are fully providing the most socially desirable level of protection, see infra notes 303-05 and accompanying text, nor that they will be adopted by the numerous teams competing at the minor-league level, see infra notes 311-14
Rule,” courts for over a century have consistently held that professional baseball teams are not liable for injuries sustained by fans hit by bats or balls leaving the field of play, so long as the teams have taken minimal precautions to protect their spectators from harm.\footnote{See, e.g., Matthew J. Ludden, Take Me Out to the Ballgame ... but Bring a Helmet: Reforming the “Baseball Rule” in Light of Recent Fan Injuries at Baseball Stadiums, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 123, 124 (2013) (stating that “the baseball rule holds stadium owners to a lower duty of care for the safety of fans compared to the reasonable duty of care owed by most property owners”); Aaron Wakamatsu, Note, Spectator Injuries: Examining Owner Negligence and the Assumption of Risk Defense, 6 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (2009) (finding that “[c]ourts have concluded that stadium owners and teams do not owe a duty to protect their patrons from ‘common, frequent, and expected’ risks” such as those presented by foul balls (quoting Jones v. Three Rivers Mgmt. Corp., 394 A.2d 546, 551 (Pa. 1978))).} Specifically, as traditionally applied, the Baseball Rule imposes a legal duty upon professional teams to merely implement two safety measures.\footnote{Cases arising from foul-ball or errant-bat-related injuries are typically brought as negligence actions, alleging that the team breached its duty of care by failing to take sufficient precautions to protect fans from injuries. See Joshua D. Winneker et al., Who Let the Dogs Out: Should a Stadium Owner Be Held Liable for Injuries Sustained From a Mascot’s Errant Hot Dog Toss?, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 369, 370 (2014) (Lawsuits filed by “[f]ans [who] have been hurt by foul balls or pieces of a bat ... have all been grounded in tort law under a negligence theory.”).} First, teams are generally expected to install protective netting to shield the “most dangerous area” of their stadiums from errant flying objects, a region rigidly interpreted by courts to consist only of those sections of seats located immediately behind home plate.\footnote{See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing the “most dangerous area” requirement).} Second, teams must also maintain a sufficient number of screened seats to meet the anticipated consumer demand for protected seating during an average game.\footnote{See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the sufficient number of seats requirement).} Assuming a team has satisfied these two requirements, then under the Baseball Rule it is considered to have met the duty of care it owed to its patrons, and therefore cannot be held legally liable for their injuries.\footnote{The Baseball Rule is thus a particularly narrow, sport-specific application of the general legal principle holding that sports facilities are not liable for spectator injuries resulting from sporting equipment leaving the playing field, so long as the facilities have taken reasonable measures to protect their fans from injury. See Walter T. Champion, Jr., “At the Ol’ Ball Game” and Beyond: Spectators and the Potential for Liability, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 495, 504 (1991) (noting that fans are owed a standard of ordinary or reasonable care by facilities hosting}
Although often erroneously attributed to the generally unenforceable liability waivers that teams routinely place on the back of their tickets, courts have instead traditionally justified the Baseball Rule by observing that foul balls and flying bats are inherent and unavoidable parts of the sport and thus present a risk that anyone of ordinary intelligence attending a game should easily be able to discern. Moreover, courts have noted that many spectators actually prefer to watch the game from a seat unobstructed by protective netting, to both enjoy a clearer view of the field and also preserve the possibility of catching a foul ball, a cherished memento for many fans. Thus, courts have crafted the Baseball Rule in hopes of balancing the competing interests of enhancing fan safety and spectator demand for unobstructed seating.

Nevertheless, following a recent series of highly publicized ballpark injuries like the one recently sustained by the young girl at hockey games, professional wrestling matches, or automobile races).

16. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, The Score: No Lawyers, No Nets, Dozens of Injuries, BLOOMBERG (May 11, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-05-11/the-score-no-lawyers-no-nets-dozens-of-injuries [https://perma.cc/LBS5-5NT6] (“However sympathetic they might be, these injured fans have almost no ability to have their day in court. That’s because every ticket to a baseball game comes with a disclaimer that reads something like this: ‘The bearer of the ticket assumes all risk and danger incidental to the game of baseball.’”).

17. See, e.g., Yates v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[T]he disclaimer on the back of plaintiff’s ticket could not form the basis of defense because the print was so small that it was not legibly reproduced on the photocopy submitted to the trial court. Plaintiff’s acceptance of a ticket containing a disclaimer in fine print on the back is not binding for the purposes of asserting express assumption of the risk.”).

18. See, e.g., Costa v. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (“[W]e are persuaded that the potential for a foul ball to enter the stands and injure a spectator who is seated in an unscreened area is, as matter of law, sufficiently obvious that the defendant reasonably could conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the risk.”).

19. See Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn. 1913) (“In fact, a large part of those who attend prefer to sit where no screen obscures the view. The defendant has a right to cater to their desires.”); see also Brett Celedonia, Flying Objects: Arena Liability for Fan Injuries in Hockey and Other Sports, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 115, 130 (2008) (“[B]aseball has developed into a sport in which spectators not only hope, but expect to come into contact with the ball.”). MLB teams have granted fans the right to keep foul balls since 1921. See Glovin, supra note 7 (reporting that the custom of allowing fans to keep foul balls dates back to May 16, 1921, when “a spectator at a New York Giants game ... refused to surrender a ball knocked into Polo Grounds seating”).

20. See, e.g., Grimes v. Am. League Baseball Co., 78 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935) (concluding that the Baseball Rule enables teams to balance fan demand for unscreened seating with the need to protect the stadium’s most dangerous seating locations).
Yankee Stadium,\textsuperscript{21} the continued justifiability of the Baseball Rule has come under increased scrutiny, with both academic and media commentators calling for the doctrine to be abolished.\textsuperscript{22} Indeed, despite the slim chances of success in court, injured spectators routinely continue to file lawsuits against professional baseball teams in hopes of persuading a judge to disavow the doctrine and impose liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.\textsuperscript{23} At the same time, however, other fans have opposed the suggestion that teams should be legally required to take greater precautions to protect spectators from injury, fearing that any resulting efforts by teams to install additional protective netting would deprive these individuals of their preferred unobstructed views of the field.\textsuperscript{24}

This Article seeks to offer two primary contributions to the renewed discussion surrounding, and heightened criticism of, the Baseball Rule. First, the Article presents new empirical evidence establishing the extent to which fans’ risk of being hit by a flying object at a professional baseball game has increased in recent years.\textsuperscript{25} Specifically, over the last quarter century, MLB teams have built nearly two dozen new stadiums, almost all of which place spectator seating significantly closer to the playing field than ever before.\textsuperscript{26} As a result, fans today frequently sit more than 20 percent...

\textsuperscript{21} In addition to the Yankee Stadium incident, for instance, on June 5, 2015, a fan attending a game between the Oakland Athletics and Boston Red Sox at Fenway Park suffered life-threatening injuries after being struck in the head by the shattered barrel of a bat swung by Oakland second baseman, Brett Lawrie. See Vincent C. Lucchese, \textit{Fair or Foul: The Baseball Rule’s Place in Modern Major League Baseball}, 24 \textit{SPORTS L.J.} 95, 99 (2017) (discussing incident).

\textsuperscript{22} See, e.g., Bob Collins, \textit{After Fan is Hit by Bat, Calls to End ‘Baseball Rule’}, MPR NEWS (June 8, 2015, 8:15 AM), https://blogs.mprnews.org/newscut/2015/06/after-fan-is-hit-by-bat-a-call-to-end-the-baseball-rule/ [https://perma.cc/377Z-DEPA] (summarizing criticisms of the Baseball Rule); Nocera, \textit{supra} note 16 (condemning the Baseball Rule); see also Mohit Khare, \textit{Note, Foul Ball! The Need to Alter Current Liability Standards for Spectator Injuries at Sporting Events}, 12 \textit{TEX. REV. ENT. \\& SPORTS L.} 91, 91 (2010) (contending that courts should reject “limited duty” rules that protect sports teams from liability for fan injuries).

\textsuperscript{23} See J. Gordon Hylton, \textit{A Foul Ball in the Courtroom: The Baseball Spectator Injury as a Case of First Impression}, 38 \textit{TULSA L. REV.} 485, 485 (2003) (“While the general legal rule that spectators are considered to have assumed the risk of injury from foul balls has been reiterated over and over, injured plaintiffs have continued to sue in hope of establishing liability on the part of the park owner.”).

\textsuperscript{24} See Lucchese, \textit{supra} note 21, at 96 (“[W]hen baseball fans first heard rumblings in the media ... that netting should be extended, they vehemently denied the need for it.”).

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{See infra} Part II.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{See infra} Part II.A.
closer to home plate than was the case throughout most of the twentieth century. This fact, along with a presumptive increase in the speed with which baseballs are being hit into the stands, has substantially reduced the reaction time that fans have to avoid errant flying objects heading in their direction. Indeed, in some cases it may now be virtually impossible for spectators to react in time to protect themselves from a particularly hard-hit foul ball. Consequently, wayward balls and bats present a much greater risk to fans today than at the time the Baseball Rule was first established in 1913, undercutting the justifiability of courts’ continued adherence to the century-old doctrine.

Second, the Article makes the novel observation that courts have uniformly failed to reconsider the Baseball Rule in light of the lessons instilled by the law-and-economics revolution of the 1970s and 1980s, and in particular the insights it provided regarding the most efficient allocation of liability in torts cases. Indeed, no prior court or academic commentator has subjected the Baseball Rule to a full-blown economic analysis, a surprising omission given how dramatically the law-and-economics movement has altered the collective understanding of the ideal apportionment of negligence liability. This Article attempts to correct this oversight by analyzing the doctrine under economic principles of optimal risk allocation, concluding that, because the host team itself will almost always be the lowest cost or best risk avoider, the traditional Baseball Rule improperly shields teams from legal liability.

Given these insights, the Article ultimately concludes that courts should no longer adhere to the Baseball Rule and should instead

27. See infra text accompanying note 158.
28. See infra Part II.B.
29. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
30. Cf. Ludden, supra note 11, at 125 (contending that evidence of the increased risk of injury was previously “too speculative” to increase teams’ liability under the Baseball Rule).
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. Along these same lines, although this Article predominately focuses on injuries sustained by spectators at professional baseball games, this analysis likely applies with equal force to other sports—such as professional hockey—where some courts have also imposed a lesser standard of care on teams to protect their fans. Cf. Celedonia, supra note 19, at 122-26 (discussing cases in which courts have held that professional hockey teams are not liable for injuries sustained by fans hit by errant pucks).
expand the extent to which professional baseball teams may be held legally responsible for injuries sustained by their spectators. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by examining the historical evolution of the Baseball Rule, surveying its origin in 1913 as well as its subsequent judicial development over the last century. Part II then examines the extent to which the risk of being injured by an errant ball or bat at a professional baseball game has increased in recent years. In particular, Part II presents new empirical data establishing that fans’ ability to defend themselves from flying projectiles has decreased considerably due to recent trends in both stadium construction and the way in which baseball is played and presented to fans. Next, Part III considers the failure of courts to adapt their application of the Baseball Rule to two important changes in the underlying law of torts, namely the rise of the law-and-economics movement and the recent judicial repudiation of the traditional tort defense of assumption of risk. Finally, Part IV offers several suggestions for how courts should modify their Baseball Rule jurisprudence to more equitably resolve lawsuits brought by fans injured by errant balls or bats while attending professional baseball games. Most notably, it asserts that courts (and legislatures) should replace the Baseball Rule with a strict-liability regime, forcing teams to internalize the cost of spectator injuries, thereby best incentivizing them to implement the most economically efficient level of fan protection in their stadiums.

I. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE BASEBALL RULE

The typical spectator injury lawsuit presents an injured fan suing the host team and/or stadium operator on a theory of negligence. 34. This Article predominately focuses on the applicability of the Baseball Rule to cases involving injuries sustained at professional, as opposed to amateur, baseball games. As noted below, the application of the Baseball Rule to amateur facilities triggers different potential policy considerations, arguably warranting a different allocation of legal liability. See infra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.

35. In addition to the host team itself, legal liability for spectators’ injuries may also potentially extend to other affiliated entities that own or manage the team’s stadium, typically taking the form of some sort of governmental agency or authority. See A. David Austill, When it Hits the Fan: Will There Be Liability for the Broken Bat?, 24 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 83, 93 (2013) (observing that there may be an additional stadium-operator defendant in foul-ball cases in addition to the team itself). For simplicity’s sake, this Article will refer
Because spectators are considered to be invitees on the defendant’s premises, teams would normally owe their fans a duty of care to protect the patrons from reasonably foreseeable dangers. Plaintiffs will thus contend that given the generally predictable nature of errant balls or bats leaving the field of play, the defendant team breached its duty of care by failing to implement more robust safety precautions—such as a larger protective screen or net—to better protect fans from the risk posed by these flying objects. Historically, courts have all but uniformly resolved these cases in the team’s favor under the Baseball Rule.

A. The Origins of the Baseball Rule

Considering that baseball has been played professionally for nearly 150 years—dating back to the founding of the first all-professional team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, in 1869—it is somewhat surprising that the first reported decision in a foul-ball liability case was not issued by a court until 1913. Much of this...
delay is likely attributable to differences in the way baseball was played in its early professional days.\textsuperscript{42} Quite unlike the game that fans are accustomed to today, in its early form, professional baseball featured pitchers throwing the ball in an underhanded fashion to batters, who in turn instructed the hurler on where to locate the pitch.\textsuperscript{43} These two factors significantly reduced the odds that a batter would errantly strike a ball in such a manner that it would enter the stands, thus decreasing the likelihood of spectator injuries.\textsuperscript{44}

However, with the onset of overhand pitching in 1884, along with rule changes that no longer allowed batters to call the location of their pitches, the potential danger to fans increased.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, the threat of injury to spectators sitting immediately behind home plate quickly grew to the point that this area colloquially became known as the “slaughter pen.”\textsuperscript{46} Not surprisingly, as a result, most professional baseball teams quickly began to follow the lead of the National League’s Providence Grays, which in 1879 became the first team to erect a screen protecting a portion of its stadium seating area from errantly tossed or hit baseballs.\textsuperscript{47} Despite initial fan complaints about the obstruction these nets presented, by the late 1880s some form of protective screening had nevertheless become commonplace throughout professional baseball.\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{Exhibition Co.} was the first reported decision in a foul-ball-related case). As Professor Hylton notes, however, media reports suggest that fans may have filed earlier cases, although no reported decision ultimately resulted from these disputes. See id. at 486 n.4.

42. \textit{See} \textit{id.} at 486-88.

43. \textit{See} Gorman & Weeks, \textit{supra} note 5, at 131 (arguing that “[i]n the formative years of the game, there was not much reason to be concerned for fan safety” due to “the underhand style of delivering the ball” along with the fact that “the batter called for the pitch”); Hylton, \textit{supra} note 23, at 486-87 (contending that underhanded pitching rules meant that “skilled batters had little trouble hitting the ball squarely, and thus sharply hit foul balls infrequently entered the areas in which spectators were [sic] likely to be situated”).

44. \textit{See supra} note 43 and accompanying text.


46. \textit{See} Hylton, \textit{supra} note 23, at 488 (observing that the “frequency of injuries suffered by those” sitting behind home plate resulted in that area earning “the nickname the ‘slaughter pen’”).

47. \textit{See id.}

48. \textit{See id.} (stating that “[i]n spite of the safety they provided, the new screens were not always well received” by fans, but nevertheless were commonplace “by the late 1880s”).
The existence of such protective netting would prove central to the first reported judicial decision considering a baseball team’s liability for a foul-ball-related fan injury. In the 1913 case of *Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co.*, the Missouri Court of Appeals considered whether to hold the Kansas City Blues of the minor-league American Association liable for an injury sustained by a fan hit by a foul ball while sitting in an unprotected seat down the third-base line of the team’s stadium.\(^49\) Because the Blues did not sell any reserved seats, all seating at the stadium was available on a first-come, first-served general admission basis.\(^50\) On the day in question, the plaintiff, S.J. Crane, had purchased a $0.50 grand-stand ticket,\(^51\) providing him with several advantages over a cheaper, $0.25 bleacher ticket.\(^52\) Specifically, in addition to being seated closer to the action in the stadium’s main seating area, fans with grandstand tickets could also choose whether to sit in a seat behind the protective screen—which extended from home plate down to third base at the Blues’ stadium—or instead sit in an unprotected seat providing an unobstructed view.\(^53\)

Crane ultimately elected to sit in a seat not protected by netting\(^54\) and at some point during the game was hit by a foul ball.\(^55\) He then sued the team for negligence, alleging that it should have taken greater precautions to protect him from injury.\(^56\) In response, the Blues pled two affirmative defenses, denying liability because Crane had both (i) assumed the risk of injury and (ii) been contributorily negligent by electing to sit in an unprotected seat.\(^57\)

\(^{49}\) 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913); see also Hylton, supra note 23, at 493-94 (recounting the facts of the case).

\(^{50}\) *Crane*, 153 S.W. at 1077 (“Reserved seats are not sold.”).

\(^{51}\) *Id.* (“[T]he fee to the grand stand being 50 cents.... Plaintiff attended a game as a spectator, and paid for admission to the grand stand.”).

\(^{52}\) *Id.*

\(^{53}\) *Id.*

\(^{54}\) *Id.* (reporting that “during the progress of the game” Crane “was struck by a foul ball and injured”).

\(^{55}\) See Hylton, supra note 23, at 494 (“In his complaint, Crane asserted that the ballpark owner had been negligent in failing to screen in the entire grandstand and that this negligence was the proximate cause of his injury.”).

\(^{56}\) *Crane*, 153 S.W. at 1076 (stating that the defendant’s “answer ... pleads contributory negligence and assumed risk”).
In deciding the case, the Missouri appellate court began by discussing the duty of care that the defendant team owed to spectators like Crane.\(^58\) In particular, the court noted that as a business engaged in “providing a public entertainment for profit,” the team was not legally obligated to completely ensure the safety of its fans (such as by installing netting to protect each and every seat in the stadium from an errant ball or bat).\(^59\) Instead, the court held that the defendants were simply expected to “exercise reasonable care, i.e., care commensurate to the circumstances of the situation, to protect their patrons against injury.”\(^60\)

Applying this standard to the professional baseball industry, the Crane court placed particular emphasis on an agreed upon statement of facts the parties had jointly filed in the case.\(^61\) That statement acknowledged that “[b]aseball is our national game, and ... the risks and dangers incident thereto are matters of common knowledge.”\(^62\) Along those lines, the court observed that the game of baseball involved “hard balls ... thrown and batted with great force and swiftness,” with the result that “such balls often go in the direction of the spectators.”\(^63\) Given the nature of the dangers inherent to the game, the court then stated that the “duty of defendants towards their patrons included that of providing seats protected by screening from wildly thrown or foul balls, for the use of patrons who desired such protection.”\(^64\) Because the team had provided Crane with the option of sitting in a grandstand seat protected by a screen, the court thus determined that the defendant team had fully met its legal duty.\(^65\) As a result, because the plaintiff “voluntarily chose [to sit in] an unprotected seat,” the court determined that he “assumed the ordinary risks of such position,” and thus was not entitled to any recovery for his resulting injuries.\(^66\)

\(^{58}\) Id. at 1077.
\(^{59}\) Id.
\(^{60}\) Id.
\(^{61}\) Id. at 1076 (“The cause was submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement of facts.”).
\(^{62}\) Id. at 1077.
\(^{63}\) Id.
\(^{64}\) Id.
\(^{65}\) Id.
\(^{66}\) Id. at 1078.
Other early courts followed the lead of the *Crane* decision, holding that so long as teams provided a screened seating option for their fans, a spectator choosing to sit in an unprotected seat assumed the risk of his injury.67 A few months later in 1913, for instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota cited the *Crane* opinion approvingly in *Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n*.68 As in *Crane*, the plaintiff in *Wells* had been injured by a foul ball while sitting in an unscreened section of the ballpark.69 And as in *Crane*, the *Wells* court ultimately held that when a fan decides to attend a baseball game “with full knowledge of the danger from thrown or batted balls ... the management cannot be held negligent when it provides a choice between a screened in and an open seat: the screen being reasonably sufficient as to extent and substance.”70 Furthermore, the *Wells* court noted that while “[b]aseball is not free from danger to those witnessing the game,” its “perils are not so imminent that due care on the part of the management requires all the spectators to be screened in.”71 To the contrary, the court observed that “[i]n fact, a large part of those who attend prefer to sit where no screen obscures the view. The defendant has a right to cater to their desires.”72 Likewise, the Supreme Court of Washington cited both *Crane* and *Wells* when ruling against an injured fan in 1919 in *Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass’n*.73

Indeed, subsequent courts adopted the same rationale even in cases where the injured fan had erroneously been sold a ticket to an unscreened seat after requesting one in a protected seating area.74 Moreover, courts also refused to impose liability on teams when an injured fan alleged that she was unaware of the risks posed by the

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68. 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn. 1913).
69. *Id.* at 707 (“Plaintiff testified that she took a seat ... about 10 feet west of the easterly end of the screen.”).
70. *Id.* at 708. The *Wells* court went on to note that “[t]his is virtually the rule applied in *Crane* [sic].” *Id.*
71. *Id.*
72. *Id.*
73. 181 P. 679, 679 (Wash. 1919); see also Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 144, 146 (Cal. 1935) (per curiam); Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, 279 P. 277, 278 (Or. 1929).
sport, with the courts concluding that the danger of foul balls was sufficiently obvious that even those unfamiliar with the game should have been able to discern it. This marked an extension of the original logic in *Crane*, where the court had only assumed the plaintiff understood the risk of injury because he had admitted as much in an agreed upon statement of facts.

That having been said, courts did not always rule in the team’s favor as a historical matter. Courts did, for instance, require teams to provide satisfactory netting for fans, such as in the case of *Edling v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co.—*decided by the same Missouri appellate court a year following *Crane*—in which the defendant team was held liable for an injury caused by a foul ball that struck a fan after flying through a square-foot-sized hole in the stadium’s protective netting. However, in cases where a fan was struck by a ball that merely curved around otherwise sufficient netting, courts refused to impose liability on the team.

**B. The Continued Development of the Baseball Rule**

While in its initial form the Baseball Rule simply obligated teams to offer their spectators a choice between protected and unprotected seating, by the 1930s courts applying this principle began to add several additional, seemingly modest, requirements. In *Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n*, for instance, the Supreme

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75. See, e.g., Brown v. S.F. Ball Club, Inc., 222 P.2d 19, 21 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (“We find nothing here to take appellant outside the usual rule, whether it be said that this ‘common knowledge’ of these obvious and inherent risks are imputed to her or that they are obvious risks which should have been observed by her in the exercise of ordinary care.”); Schentzel, 96 A.2d at 186 (“It strains our collective imagination to visualize the situation of the wife of a man obviously interested in the game, whose children view the games on the home television set, and who lives in a metropolitan community, so far removed from that knowledge as not to be chargeable with it.”).

76. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing same).

77. 168 S.W. 908, 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914) (“[T]he evidence of plaintiff tends to show that the ball which struck him passed through a hole almost a square foot in area, that there were many holes of various sizes, and through which a ball could pass, scattered over the screening, and the inference from all of the evidence of plaintiff is very strong that the screening was old, worn, and rotten, and had not been repaired in either that or the preceding season.”).


79. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
Court of Minnesota was presented with a case in which the plaintiff was forced to sit in an unscreened location after all of the protected seats had been taken by other fans. Thus, in the words of the Brisson court, the case raised the novel question of whether a team “must provide screened seats for all those who desire them, regardless of the number of spectators who come to see the game.” The court ultimately answered this question in the negative, holding that a team satisfied its duty of care when it “provide[d] screen[ing] for the most dangerous part of the grandstand and for those who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats.” Thus, in cases where demand for screened seating was unusually high, there was no legal obligation for the team to provide a protected seat for every fan who desired one.

The Brisson decision modified the Baseball Rule—as originally formulated in Crane and Wells—in two important ways. First, Brisson clarified that rather than providing a de minimis amount of screened seating, to avoid liability teams must instead protect a sufficient number of seats to satisfy the typical demand for protected seating. Subsequent courts have continued to adopt this formulation of a team’s duty of care.

Second, and perhaps more significantly, the Brisson court added an additional new requirement to the Baseball Rule: affirmatively obligating teams to screen “the most dangerous part of the grandstand.” Although at first glance this addition would appear to

80. 240 N.W. 903, 903 (Minn. 1932) (“For the game at which he was hurt plaintiff bought a ticket for a grand-stand seat, but asserts that such seats were all filled when he arrived.”).
81. Id. at 904.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 144, 146 (Cal. 1935) (per curiam) (“The duty imposed by law is performed when screened seats are provided for as many as may be reasonably expected to call for them on any ordinary occasion.”); Cates v. Cincinnati Exhibition Co., 1 S.E.2d 131, 133 (N.C. 1939) (“Those operating baseball parks or grounds are held to have discharged their full duty to spectators in safeguarding them from the danger of being struck by thrown or batted balls by providing adequately screened seats for patrons who desire them, and leaving the patrons to their choice between such screened seats and those unscreened.”); Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, Inc., 229 P.2d 329, 330 (Wash. 1951) (“There is no obligation to screen all such seats, however, and the proprietor’s duty is fulfilled when screened seats are provided for as many as may reasonably be expected to call for them on any ordinary occasion.”).
86. Brisson, 240 N.W. at 904.
represent only a minimal expansion of the traditional doctrine, in reality this new obligation changed the rule in important, but heretofore unrecognized, ways. Indeed, as originally formulated, the Baseball Rule simply required that teams give spectators a choice between screened and unscreened seating, thus generally ensuring that fans could exercise their own free will by selecting a protected seat or else assume the risk of sitting in an unprotected location. Following *Brisson*, however, teams now had an obligation to take steps to protect spectators seated in locations subject to the highest risk of injury. Thus, *Brisson* imposed an affirmative duty on teams to safeguard at least a portion of their fans, whether these spectators desired such protection or not.

As with the requirement that teams provide sufficient screened seating to meet normal anticipated demand, subsequent courts have also generally adhered to the *Brisson* requirement that teams must protect the “most dangerous area” of their stadiums. However, rather than interpreting this requirement flexibly—relying on a case-by-case determination of risk levels present in various seating sections of a particular stadium—subsequent courts have instead almost uniformly held that this standard only requires teams to screen the area immediately behind home plate, something virtually every professional team has done since the 1880s.

Meanwhile, in addition to modestly expanding the scope of teams’ duty of care under the Baseball Rule, over time courts have also carved out a few limited exceptions to the doctrine. The first of these

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88. *See* Brisson, 240 N.W. at 904.
89. *See id.*
90. *See* Fried & Ammon Jr., *supra* note 67, at 44 (noting that “most courts [have] adopted a ‘two-prong’ test” with the first stating “that the facility owner must protect the most dangerous section of the ballpark”).
92. *See supra* notes 45-48 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the use of protective netting at professional baseball games).
exceptions dates back to 1925, imposing liability on a team when a fan is injured when multiple balls are simultaneously in use on the field.\footnote{See Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, 147 N.E. 86, 87, 89 (Ohio 1925).} In Cincinnati Baseball Club Co. v. Eno, a fan sitting in an unscreened section of the stadium was struck in the jaw by one of several balls in use during a session of batting practice held during the intermission between two games of a double-header.\footnote{Id. at 87 (noting that the fan alleges she was hit by a “batted ball[] inflicted in the intermission between two set games, commonly called a ‘double header’”).} Although the Supreme Court of Ohio concurred with the general doctrine originally set forth in Crane and Wells limiting a team’s liability once it offered its fans a choice of protected or unprotected seats,\footnote{Id. at 87 (summarizing Crane, Wells, and Kavafian, before stating, “[w]e concur in the soundness of the views expressed in the above cases with regard to injuries incurred by balls thrown or batted during the course of a baseball game”).} the court nevertheless determined that that rule did not govern the case before it.\footnote{Id. at 88 (“This case, however, presents a situation materially different from those above cited both as to the liability of the defendants and as to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.”).} Instead, emphasizing the fact that the ball that struck the plaintiff was hit just fifteen to twenty-five feet from where she sat, the Eno court held that “it is impossible for the spectator to protect [her]self by watching the ball” in situations where there are “several balls ... simultaneously in play upon the field.”\footnote{Id. (“Evidence was given tending to show that the players while batting the ball were from 15 to 25 feet from the grand stand.”).} As a result, the court allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial against the team.\footnote{Id. at 89 (“Hence the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the judgment of the court of common pleas.”).} Another court reached a similar outcome in Maytnier v. Rush, when a fan was injured by an errantly tossed ball thrown by a pitcher warming up in the bullpen while the game was in progress on the playing field.\footnote{See 225 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967) (“The facts here in issue evidence an entirely different situation in which the plaintiff was struck by a ball, not in play in the game, coming from his left at a time when the spectators’ attentions were focused on the ball actually in play in the game, to plaintiff’s right.”). But see Brummerhoff v. St. Louis Nat’l Baseball Club, 149 S.W.2d 382, 383-84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941) (holding that a team is not liable for an injury sustained by a fan after being hit by a ball during batting practice); McNiel v. Fort Worth Baseball Club, 268 S.W.2d 244, 245, 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (same). See generally Scott B. Kitei, Note, Is the T-Shirt Cannon “Incidental to the Game” in Professional Athletics?, 11 Sports Law J. 37, 45-47 (2004) (discussing cases).}
Second, some courts have held that teams may be liable for injuries sustained by fans while stationed in a non-seating area of the stadium. In *Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp.*, for instance, a fan was hit by a ball while standing in an interior walkway within the ballpark.\(^{101}\) Finding that the danger of being hit by a foul ball while standing in such an area of the stadium was not one that most fans would find to be “common, frequent [or] expected,”\(^{102}\) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Baseball Rule did not foreclose the plaintiff’s lawsuit against the team.\(^{103}\) Similarly, in *Maisonave v. Newark Bears Professional Baseball Club, Inc.*, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ruled that a fan could proceed with his case after being struck by a ball while purchasing a beverage in the stadium concourse.\(^{104}\)

Finally, two courts have allowed cases to proceed when a fan was injured as the result of a distraction created by the defendant team’s mascot. In *Lowe v. California League of Professional Baseball*, a spectator was hit in the eye by a foul ball after having his attention diverted by the Rancho Cucamonga Quakes’s dinosaur mascot, Tremor, who repeatedly bumped the plaintiff’s shoulder with his tail.\(^{105}\) Although the court agreed that fans sitting in unprotected seating areas normally cannot recover for their injuries, it found that the team nevertheless “had a duty *not to increase* the inherent risks to which spectators at professional baseball games are regularly exposed.”\(^{106}\) Because mascots are “not integral to the sport of baseball,”\(^{107}\) the court concluded that the plaintiff should be allowed to

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101. 394 A.2d 546, 547-48 (Pa. 1978) (noting that the plaintiff was hit while standing in an interior walkway on the second level of the stadium).

102. *Id.* at 551.

103. *Id.* at 552 (“The Superior Court was in error when it extended to appellant, standing in this walkway, the no-duty rule applicable to patrons in the stands.”).

104. *See* 881 A.2d 700, 702 (N.J. 2005) (“[A] foul ball struck plaintiff in the face as he purchased a beverage from a mobile vending cart on the concourse of a minor league stadium.”); *see also* Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 296 P.3d 373, 375 (Idaho 2013) (allowing a fan to proceed with a case after being hit in the stadium’s Executive Club restaurant, one of the only areas of the stadium not protected by netting). *Maisonave* was eventually superseded by statute, as discussed below. *See* New Jersey Baseball Spectator Safety Act of 2006, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-43-48 (West 2006); *see also infra* Part I.D.

105. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 105-06 (Ct. App. 1997).

106. *Id.* at 106.

107. *Id.* at 109 (emphasis omitted).
proceed to trial against the team. Likewise, in *Coomer v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp.*, the Missouri Supreme Court allowed a spectator to proceed with his lawsuit after he was hit in the eye by a hot dog thrown between innings by the Kansas City Royals’s mascot, Sluggerrr. Aside from these limited exceptions, however, the vast majority of jurisdictions today continue to adhere to the Baseball Rule in cases where a fan is injured while sitting in an unprotected area of the stadium.

Recognizing that they faced slim odds of success by pursuing negligence claims against teams on the basis of insufficient screening, beginning in the late 1970s plaintiffs often began to pursue parallel claims alleging that the defendant team was negligent due to its failure to warn spectators of the potential danger presented by foul balls. As with claims based on a failure to provide sufficient screening, courts generally have also been unsympathetic to these failure-to-warn claims. In particular, courts have held that because the dangers posed by foul balls are “open and obvious,” teams did not have a duty to provide warnings to spectators. As a result, fans have generally fared no better on this theory than they did in the more traditional cases discussed above.

108. *Id.* at 112.

109. *See* 437 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Mo. 2014) (“In the past, this Court has held that spectators cannot sue a baseball team for injuries caused when a ball or bat enters the stands.... The risk of being injured by Sluggerrr's hotdog toss, on the other hand, is not an unavoidable part of watching the Royals play baseball.”).

110. *See, e.g.*, Payne v. Office of the Comm'r of Baseball, No. 15-cv-03229-YGR, 2016 WL 6778673, at *7 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2016) (“[A] majority of states follow the 'Baseball Rule,' which limits the duty of care that stadium owners and operators owe to spectators.”), aff’d, 705 F. App’x 654 (9th Cir. 2017). *But see* S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 909 (Ind. 2014) (declining to adopt the Baseball Rule, and instead concluding that such a decision should be made legislatively, rather than judicially).


113. *See* Friedman, 731 S.W.2d at 573, 575 (“[T]here is no duty to warn of the risk of being hit by batted balls when attending a baseball game, because the risk is obvious.”) (quoting Falkner v. John E. Fetzer, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)).

114. *But see* Coronel v. Chi. White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45, 50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[T]he Sox were under a duty to warn plaintiff of the possible dangers of being struck by a foul-tipped
C. The Subsequent Mischaracterization of the Baseball Rule

While most courts have thus continued to adhere to the Baseball Rule first established in Crane and Wells—and as enlarged by Brisson—their characterization of the underlying legal basis for the rule has changed in important, but largely unrecognized, ways. Traditionally, courts applying the doctrine had held that teams owed their fans a standard duty of reasonable care. As the logic went, so long as teams installed protective screening in front of the most dangerous area of the stadium, and provided a sufficient number of protected seats to meet ordinary demand, then the team had satisfied its duty of care by providing protection appropriate to the degree of risk entailed in watching a professional baseball game.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, courts began to describe the Baseball Rule in very different terms. Rather than characterizing the duty that teams owed to their spectators as that of reasonable care, courts and commentators instead began to refer to the Baseball Rule as a “no duty” or “limited duty” rule. This mischaracterization is unfortunate.

115. See, e.g., Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913) (“[Defendants] were bound to exercise reasonable care, i.e., care commensurate to the circumstances of the situation, to protect their patrons against injury.”); Curtis v. Portland Baseball Club, 279 P. 277, 277 (Or. 1929) (“Under the law, defendant was obligated to exercise reasonable care and diligence commensurate with the danger involved, to protect its patrons from injury.”).

116. See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional scope of the Baseball Rule as modified by Brisson).

117. See, e.g., Rudnick v. Golden W. Broads., 202 Cal. Rptr. 900, 905 (Ct. App. 1984) (“A baseball club complying with Quinn’s screening standard has fulfilled its limited duty to spectators as a matter of law and is entitled to summary judgment.”) (emphasis added); Benefam, 635 N.W.2d at 220 (characterizing the Baseball Rule as a “limited duty’ rule” under which “a baseball stadium owner is not liable for injuries to spectators that result from projectiles leaving the field during play if safety screening has been provided behind home plate and there is a sufficient number of protected seats to meet ordinary demand”); Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm’t, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1173 (Nev. 2008) (“We conclude that stadium owners and operators have a limited duty to protect against ... injuries” caused by foul balls); Friedman v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 731 S.W.2D 572, 574 (Tex. App. 1987) (“Virtually all jurisdictions have adopted the limited duty of stadium owners to screen certain seats, and have held that where there is a screened area for the protection of spectators, and a fan elects to sit in an unscreened area, liability will be precluded even though injury arises.”) (emphasis added).
As originally formulated, the Baseball Rule was best understood as an ex ante, bright-line rule establishing the standard duty of reasonable care that was required given the characteristics of the sport. Indeed, the doctrine was originally intended to balance two competing policy objectives: (i) providing a sufficiently safe environment for fans wishing to be protected from the dangers of errant balls and bats; and (ii) allowing teams to meet the demand of the large number of fans who desire unobstructed views of the playing field, often in hopes of potentially catching a foul ball. Courts believed that their original formulation of the Baseball Rule reasonably balanced these objectives given the relative degree of risk that errant balls or bats posed at the time. Thus, far from establishing a “limited” or “lesser” duty of care for professional baseball teams, the doctrine was instead originally intended to delineate how the standard duty of reasonable care ought to be applied to the professional baseball industry given the inherent dangers of the sport.

Unfortunately, the subsequent mischaracterization of the Baseball Rule by modern courts has created the erroneous impression that the doctrine imposes only a narrow burden on professional teams to protect their spectators. For instance, interpreted properly, the requirement that teams install netting to protect their stadiums’ “most dangerous area” imposes a flexible standard, one that is adaptable as future changes in the way the game is played increase the danger present to fans sitting in different sections of the ballpark. Indeed, in a typical negligence case, having defined a team’s duty as providing netting in front of the most dangerous area of the stadium, the question of whether the defendant breached that standard would normally be one of fact. The resulting factual inquiry

118. Cf. Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 833, 837 (1997) (“While spectator foul ball injuries are a regrettable by-product of baseball, they are generally not injuries that we should blame on the stadium operators because there was nothing careless about their behavior.”).

119. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which the Wells court balanced the competing interests in fan safety and consumer demand for unobstructed seating).

120. See, e.g., Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass’n, 142 N.W. 706, 708 (Minn. 1913) (“Baseball is not free from danger to those witnessing the game. But the perils are not so imminent that due care on the part of the management requires all the spectators to be screened in.”).

121. See, e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 37,
would then typically give specific consideration to a variety of factors, such as the extent of the stadium’s existing netting, the proximity of unprotected seats to home plate, and the history of previous injuries in the seating area in question. In fact, in Wells, the trial court was ordered to conduct just such an analysis on remand in one of the original Baseball Rule cases decided all the way back in 1913.

Rather than engage in such a factual inquiry to determine which areas of the ballpark actually pose the greatest risk to fans, however, modern courts have instead summarily concluded that the danger to fans is most acutely present—and thus that protection was only required—simply in the area immediately behind home plate. Far from basing this interpretation of the “most dangerous area” of the stadium on any actual data, courts have instead reached this inference on an entirely conclusory basis. As the court in Coronel v. Chicago White Sox stated, for example, “[t]he most dangerous part of a ball park is universally recognized as the area behind home plate.” Rather than cite any empirical evidence showing that this was, in fact, the only portion of the stadium that posed a heightened risk to fans, the Coronel court instead relied on citations to several prior decisions from other jurisdictions.

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122. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how to better define “the most dangerous area”).
123. Wells, 142 N.W. at 709 (concluding that “the question of defendant’s negligence” depended on the question of whether “the screen should [have] extend[ed] beyond the place plaintiff chose for her seat,” or alternatively if “the ordinarily prudent person would deem [the screen to have been] of sufficient size to afford reasonable protection”).
124. See, e.g., Yates v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[W]e note that numerous courts have recognized the area behind home plate as the most dangerous area of the ballpark.”); see also Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah 1995) (“[W]e hold that the Trappers had a duty to screen the area behind home plate.”); Coronel v. Chi. White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45, 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“The most dangerous part of a ball park is universally recognized as the area behind home plate.”).
125. See, e.g., Yates, 595 N.E.2d at 580; Coronel, 595 N.E.2d at 47.
126. 595 N.E.2d at 47.
Meanwhile, none of these cited decisions themselves offered any factual support for this conclusion; instead, they simply cited other precedents that had also reached this conclusion on an entirely circumstantial and conclusory basis.\footnote{128}

Thus, at no point has any modern court engaged in a factual determination of which areas of a baseball stadium actually present the greatest risk to fans.\footnote{129} Nevertheless, modern courts routinely treat the matter of identifying the sections of a ballpark that present the greatest danger—and thus those which must be screened—as having been conclusively and incontestably settled.\footnote{130} Unfortunately, as discussed in greater detail below,\footnote{131} this overly narrow and rigid interpretation of the Baseball Rule fails to account for recent factual changes that have heightened the degree of risk posed to fans sitting in sitting areas other than those immediately behind home plate.

The mischaracterization of the Baseball Rule as being a “limited” or “no” duty rule has helped to reinforce this artificially constrained interpretation of a team’s duty to its fans.\footnote{132} Once courts acceded to an understanding of a baseball team’s legal obligation as being substantially reduced compared to that which a business would normally owe its patrons, it naturally followed that these same courts would adhere to an overly narrow view of the level of protection that teams should be expected to provide to their spectators.\footnote{133} Conversely, if modern courts instead held that professional baseball teams generally owe a standard duty of reasonable care to their fans—in following with both the original Baseball Rule cases and much of the rest of tort law\footnote{134}—then this doctrinaire insistence

\footnote{424 N.E.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. 1981)).

\footnote{128. See, e.g., Merritt, 323 S.E.2d at 682; Clapman, 468 N.E.2d at 697-98; Akins, 424 N.E.2d at 533.}

\footnote{129. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.}

\footnote{130. See, e.g., Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“The rule that emerges in these cases is that a stadium proprietor cannot be liable for spectator injuries if it has satisfied a ‘limited duty’—to erect a screen that will protect the most dangerous area of the spectator stands, behind home plate, and to provide a number of seats in this area sufficient to meet the ordinary demand for protected seats.”).}

\footnote{131. See infra Parts II.A-B.}

\footnote{132. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{133. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.}

\footnote{134. See supra Parts I.A-I.B.}
that teams must only protect the area immediately behind home plate would be less tenable. Instead, courts would reasonably expect teams to adjust the level of protection offered in light of the level of risk that fans in each area of the ballpark actually face.

D. The Codification of the Baseball Rule

Finally, although the Baseball Rule is generally understood to be a common law doctrine, in four jurisdictions—Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, and New Jersey—the rule has actually been codified by statute.135 In two of these jurisdictions—Illinois and New Jersey—the state legislatures elected to codify the Baseball Rule after it had been rejected (at least partially) by the judiciary;136 in the other two instances, the legislatures simply appear to have decided to proactively establish the doctrine as state law.137

While slight differences exist, these statutes typically state that teams cannot be held liable for injuries caused by errant balls or bats so long as the team has taken basic precautions—in line with modern judicial formulations of the Baseball Rule—to protect their fans.138 Arizona’s statute, for instance, specifies that a team will not be liable for an injury if it offers a sufficient number of protected seats to meet expected demand,139 while New Jersey offers the same insulation from liability to teams so long as they have installed netting protecting the most dangerous area of their stadium (specifically identified by statute as being that behind home plate).


138. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

139. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-554(A)(1) (“An owner is not liable for injuries to spectators who are struck by baseballs, baseball bats or other equipment used by players during a baseball game unless the owner...[d]oes not provide protective seating that is reasonably sufficient to satisfy expected requests.”).
Meanwhile, Colorado limits a team’s liability so long as it maintains its stadium “in reasonably safe condition relative to the nature of the game,” the most flexible standard of the four. The Colorado statute therefore potentially requires teams to adjust their level of protection as emerging circumstances warrant. Illinois’s statute, on the other hand, provides teams with the broadest protection, establishing that they will not be liable for playing-equipment-related fan injuries unless the fan was sitting behind a defective screen (i.e., defective in some manner other than size), or was injured by willful or wanton conduct on the part of the team or players. This protection from liability thus goes above and beyond that established judicially by the Baseball Rule, neither requiring teams in Illinois to screen any particular part of their stadium nor ensure that a sufficient number of protected seats are available to meet anticipated demand.

Thus, to the extent that the Baseball Rule is to be modified, in these four states—with the possible exception of Colorado—any change would have to be undertaken legislatively, rather than through the judiciary.

II. THE RISK OF BEING INJURED AT PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL GAMES HAS INCREASED IN RECENT YEARS

The fact that courts have, by and large, continued to adhere to the Baseball Rule in such a rigid manner is somewhat surprising given several important changes that have conspired in recent years to increase the risk that foul balls (and, to a lesser extent, errant bats) pose to fans. Indeed, differences in how the game has both been played and watched over the past twenty-five years raise significant

140. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:53A-47(b) (imposing liability in cases where a team has “fail[ed] to provide protection for spectators in the most dangerous sections of the stands. This limited duty may be satisfied by having a net behind home plate”).
142. See id.
144. Cf. id.
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
questions regarding the continued viability of the Baseball Rule, at least as it has traditionally been applied by courts. 147

A. Changes in Stadium Construction

To begin, fans attending professional baseball games today are, by and large, sitting closer to the playing field than was the case at any point during the twentieth century. This is because MLB teams have constructed new ballparks at a dizzying pace over the last quarter century, with twenty-one of the thirty major-league teams currently playing in a stadium that was built since 1992.148 Similar building trends have occurred throughout minor-league baseball as well.149 During this period, most teams have sought to emulate the so-called “retro” style of ballpark first popularized by the Baltimore Orioles with the opening of Oriole Park at Camden Yards in 1992.150 Along with featuring unique, asymmetrically shaped playing fields, a common hallmark of these retro-style stadiums is their placement of fan seating in much closer proximity

147. Cf. Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof’l Baseball Club, Inc., 881 A.2d 700, 708 (N.J. 2005) (“[T]here is a ‘pragmatic difficulty [in] applying an old rule to a sport that has changed tremendously in the last seventy years.’”) (quoting David Horton, Comment, Rethinking Assumption of Risk and Sports Spectators, 51 UCLA L. REV. 339, 365-66 (2003)); Fried & Ammon, Jr., supra note 67, at 54 (“Sport viewership has significantly changed over the years, but most courts [applying the Baseball Rule] have yet to embrace this change.”).


151. See Dobkin, supra note 150, at 2 (“The Orioles designed the ballpark ... with unique dimensions, historic architecture and an outfield open to views of the city.”).
to the field than had previously been the case.152 Indeed, because teams are not subject to liability for most fan injuries under the Baseball Rule, clubs have had little incentive to balance fan safety with seating proximity, thus leading teams to chase profits by putting fans ever closer to the action.153

In order to determine precisely how much closer to the field fans are sitting today, data were marshalled to empirically establish the extent to which MLB stadium design has changed over the years. Specifically, relying on stadium dimension data gathered and maintained online by Andrew Clem,154 the yearly average of both (1) the distance between home plate and the wall immediately behind it (i.e., the “backstop”), and (2) the overall amount of foul territory within the stadium, were calculated for all MLB ballparks in use from 1920 to the present. While data regarding the precise distance between home plate and the first row of each ballpark’s unprotected seating were, unfortunately, not available, the data presented below nevertheless clearly establish that fans are sitting closer to the field than ever before.155 For instance, the data regarding the distance between home plate and the backstop reflects the proximity of what will typically be the closest seat to home plate,156 thus serving as a useful proxy for the distance between home plate and the nearest unprotected seat. Indeed, anecdotal data suggest that the distance from home plate to the backstop has traditionally been only a few feet shorter than the distance between home plate and the first row of unprotected seating further down the foul lines.157 Meanwhile, the

152. See Goldberg, supra note 148 (noting that Camden Yards “ushered in the era of retro ballparks” in part by featuring “seats close to the field”).

153. See Kent Greenfield, MLB Teams Should Pay for Fan Injuries, BOS. GLOBE (June 10, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/06/10/mlb-teams-should-pay-for-fan-injuries/NGlssjUp5vFY3pVmA8JasI/story.html [https://perma.cc/H7GJ-BLNR] (“[B]ecause baseball teams are freed of any financial risk, they need not make hard judgments that balance the fans’ experience with their safety. They can generate money by making the game seem more intimate. That includes building seats closer to the action and minimizing protective netting that obscures views — without suffering a downside.”).


155. See id.

156. See id.

157. For example, in Globe Life Park, the current ballpark of the Texas Rangers, the backstop is fifty-two feet from home plate, see id., and the first row of seats on the first and third base sides are fifty-six feet, eight inches from home plate, a difference of four feet, eight
decrease in the overall amount of foul territory within each stadium further establishes the extent to which fans are sitting closer to the playing field, as the shorter the distance grows between the first row of seating and the playing field, the less foul territory will exist.

Figure A. Average Distance Between Home Plate and the Backstop

With regards to the average distance between home plate and the backstop, the data reveal that fans today are sitting approximately 21 percent closer to the field on average than they were back in 1920, shortly after courts first established the Baseball Rule. As depicted in Figure A above, whereas the average backstop distance at MLB stadiums was just over sixty-five feet from home plate in 1920, today that distance has decreased to just under fifty-two feet. Much of this decline occurred during two intervals in particular, both periods of substantial stadium construction. Between 1962 and 1977, teams constructed sixteen new MLB ballparks, during which time the average MLB backstop distance declined

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159. See supra Figure A.
from over sixty-five feet—where it had remained relatively static since 1920—to just over fifty-eight feet, a decrease of 11 percent. This trend continued from 1992 to present during the construction of the retro ballparks, when the average distance between home plate and the backstop dropped another six feet, again representing an 11 percent decline.

The data regarding the yearly average amount of foul territory establish a comparable trend, as depicted in Figure B below. For most of the period from 1920 to 1960, MLB stadiums averaged around 29,000 square feet of total foul territory. While the construction boom from 1962 to 1977 decreased this territory slightly—to an average of around 27,000 square feet, a decrease of 7 percent—this trend has accelerated much more rapidly since 1992. Indeed, today the average amount of foul territory at MLB ballparks totals around 23,500 square feet, a decrease of 21 percent since 1920, and representing a fairly precipitous decline of another 13 percent over the last twenty-five years.

Figure B. Average Amount of Foul Territory

Thus, by both metrics, fans attending MLB games today are sitting in much closer proximity to the playing field than was the

161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See infra Figure B.
165. See id.; Clem’s Baseball: Stadium Milestones, supra note 160.
case one hundred, or even just twenty-five, years ago.\textsuperscript{167} Moreover, the fact that the overall foul territory has declined more precipitously over the last quarter century than has the distance to the backstop\textsuperscript{168} suggests that a disproportionate part of this recent change has resulted from a decline in the distance between unprotected seats and home plate.\textsuperscript{169}

From an injury prevention standpoint, the fact that fans today are sitting 21 percent closer to the playing field than a century ago\textsuperscript{170} means that, all else remaining static, spectators have approximately 21 percent less time to react to a ball hit in their direction than would have been the case around the time that the Baseball Rule was first established. This makes the prospect of attending a professional baseball game substantially more dangerous today than it was one hundred years ago, at least for those fans seated in relatively close proximity to the playing field.

For example, assuming that the first row of unprotected seating in a stadium has historically been approximately five feet further away from home plate than the closest seat behind the backstop—as the anecdotal evidence cited above suggests\textsuperscript{171}—then a fan in the first exposed row in 1920 would have been sitting around seventy feet from home plate, while a similarly situated fan today would be just fifty-seven feet away. For a foul ball hit at 80 miles per hour, this means that a fan in 1920 would have had around six-tenths of a second to shield themselves from the ball, while a fan today would have less than one-half of a second to react.\textsuperscript{172}

While the difference of one-tenth of a second may not appear to be particularly significant, in terms of injury avoidance even this short an amount of time can be critical.\textsuperscript{173} The average human reaction time to visual stimuli is around .248 seconds, but varies

\textsuperscript{167} See supra Figures A, B.
\textsuperscript{168} Cf. supra text accompanying notes 162-66.
\textsuperscript{169} Because overall foul territory represents the total square footage of the space between the playing field and seating areas of a stadium, a slower decrease in backstop distance inherently means that sections of seats other than those screened areas immediately behind home plate must be moving closer to the field at a faster rate.
\textsuperscript{170} See Clem's Baseball: Stadium Statistics, supra note 154.
\textsuperscript{171} See supra note 157 (discussing data from two ballparks currently and previously used by the Texas Rangers).
\textsuperscript{172} A ball hit at 80 miles per hour travels approximately 117 feet per second.
\textsuperscript{173} See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
depending on an individual’s age, gender, handedness, physical conditioning, and level of fatigue. However, that average rate accounts merely for the amount of time that an individual needs to mentally process a visually perceived danger, and does not necessarily encompass all of the subsequent time that it may take to move one’s hands, arms, and/or body to avoid injury. In the context of avoiding a foul ball, for instance, one expert has estimated that a reaction time of less than one full second would give a fan “virtually no time to react” to a particularly hard-hit foul ball.

B. Changes in the Way the Game is Played

Unfortunately, the reaction times stated above—based on a foul ball traveling at 80 miles per hour—almost certainly understate the potential danger that fans experience today. While comprehensive data on the velocity of foul balls is unfortunately not available, anecdotal data suggest that baseballs enter the stands traveling at speeds of 100 to 110 miles per hour on a relatively frequent basis.

174. See Aditya Jain et al., A Comparative Study of Visual and Auditory Reaction Times on the Basis of Gender and Physical Activity Levels of Medical First Year Students, 5 INT’L J. APPLIED BASIC MED. RES. 124, 125 (2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4456887/ (reporting same). While the study cited above measures the reaction time of a sample of medical students responding to the appearance of a visual stimulus on a computer screen, its results are consistent with other studies based on a broader range of test subjects. See, e.g., Reaction Time Test, HUMAN BENCHMARK, https://www.humanbenchmark.com/tests/reactiontime/ (stating that the “average human reaction time may fall between 200-250 [milliseconds]”).


176. See Costa v. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1091 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (reporting that the plaintiff’s expert witness testified that “the plaintiff had virtually no time to react to [a] ball” that hit her “no more than 1.07 seconds from the time it left the bat”).

177. See, e.g., Baseball Fans Deserve More Protection from Foul Balls, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2017, 2:43 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-baseball-foul-balls-netting-20171013-story.html (noting that the ball leaves the bat—often exceeds 100 mph); see also Matthews, supra note 2 (reporting that Todd Frazier hit a foul ball at 106 mph); Carrie Muskat (@CarrieMuskat), TWITTER (Sept. 13, 2017, 6:49 PM), https://twitter.com/CarrieMuskat/status/898145691104628736 (noting that the Chicago Cubs’s Anthony Rizzo hit a foul ball that entered the stands traveling 110 miles per hour); Carrie Muskat (@CarrieMuskat), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2017, 2:45 PM), https://twitter.com/darenwillman/status/839245696020598784 (noting that the Oakland Athletics’s Renato Nunez had just hit a foul ball at 110 miles per hour). See generally Goplerud & Terry, supra note 37, at 460 (observing in 2003 that “[f]oul balls enter the spectator areas at speeds upward of eighty to one hundred miles per hour”).
At 110 miles per hour, a spectator seated sixty feet from home plate would have just four-tenths of a second to react to a foul ball, giving even those fans paying extremely close attention to the action on the field virtually no chance of avoiding injury.\textsuperscript{178} Indeed, at four-tenths of a second the hypothetical fan described above would actually have less time to react than MLB batters have to avoid being hit by a 95 mile-per-hour fastball.\textsuperscript{179} If elite professional athletes of this caliber are often unable to get out of the way of such a fast-moving projectile,\textsuperscript{180} it should come as no surprise that fan injuries from foul balls have become even more common occurrences than batters being hit by a pitch in recent years.\textsuperscript{181}

Although precise data are again unfortunately not available, the frequency with which foul balls are hit at 100 or more miles per hour has likely increased over the last few decades, for several reasons. For one thing, baseball players today are widely regarded as being in much better physical condition than was the case fifty or one hundred years ago.\textsuperscript{182} Because the average batter today is almost certainly physically stronger than in prior eras,\textsuperscript{183} players

\textsuperscript{178.} See supra notes 174-75 (discussing average human reaction time).


\textsuperscript{181.} See Glovin, supra note 7 (comparing the rate of foul-ball injuries to batters being hit by pitches).

\textsuperscript{182.} See, \textit{e.g.}, Horton, supra note 147, at 343-44 (“[N]ew training techniques and technologies have made play faster and players stronger.”); Zachary D. Rymer, \textit{Why Today's Baseball Players Don’t Have the Same Skills as Old-Timers}, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 16, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1334652-why-todays-baseball-players-dont-have-the-same-skills-as-old-timers ([M]odern ballplayers are bigger, faster and stronger than the old-timers, and they throw the ball faster, hit it harder and field it better.).

today will typically be able to swing their bats both faster and harder than before, with the result that balls now likely often fly further and more quickly into the stands than was the case at the time courts first established the Baseball Rule.\footnote{See Neil Paine, Here’s What 56,785 Homers Look Like on a Map, FIVETHIRTY EIGHT (July 17, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-far-did-56785-home-runs-travel/ [https://perma.cc/58DX-85EV] (finding that through only 55 percent of the 2017 MLB season, hitters had hit the ball an aggregated distance equal to 69 percent of the total distance for an average complete MLB season).}

At the same time, pitchers are also throwing harder today than ever before, with the average fastball velocity increasing across MLB by nearly 3 miles per hour between 2002 and 2016, as depicted in Figure C above.\footnote{This data was presented in Jeff Zimmerman, Velocity’s Relationship with Pitcher Arm Injuries, HARDBALL TIMES (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.fangraphs.com/tht/velocitys-relationship-with-pitcher-arm-injuries/ [https://perma.cc/WA4V-R8JA]. While league-wide pitch velocity data was not collected prior to 2002, anecdotal evidence suggests that pitch velocities have been increasing for decades. See, e.g., Jayson Stark, The Age of the Pitcher, ESPN.COM (June 15, 2012), http://www.espn.com/mlb/story/_/id/8048897/the-age-pitcher-how-got-here-mlb [https://perma.cc/D3XC-XZQH] (quoting John Mirabelli, former Vice President of Scouting for the Cleveland Indians, as stating, “[w]hen I first started doing this 25 years ago, if you saw a kid touch 90 (mph) at 17 years old, you were like, ‘Oh my God’ ... Now, just about every guy (on a scouting director’s radar) throws 90, and most of them throw 92. And you never saw amateur guys throwing in the upper 90s. Now you see it all the time. It’s unbelievable.”).}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{average fastball velocity}
\caption{Average Fastball Velocity for MLB Pitchers}
\end{figure}

\footnote{Physicists have determined that pitch velocity accounts for around 15 percent of speed...}
more importantly, the faster a pitch is thrown, the less likely a batter is to hit it squarely with his bat. Consequently, as pitching speeds have increased, so too have the odds that a batter will mishit a ball, sending it into the stands at an elevated speed.

Taken together, then, recent trends in MLB stadium construction, along with changes in the way the game is played on the field, have converged to place spectators at a greater risk of injury than was the case just twenty-five years ago. Even if a fan sitting in relatively close proximity to the field today is paying full attention to the game, she may nevertheless have little to no chance to avoid a foul ball traveling in her direction. Indeed, the danger to fans sitting in close proximity to home plate has become so pronounced in recent years that the Major League Baseball Players Association—the union representing all major-league players—has pressed MLB team owners to enlarge the size of their stadiums’ protective screening for over a decade during collective bargaining negotiations.

C. Changes to Ticket Policies

A third relevant difference worth noting with respect to the continued viability of the Baseball Rule relates to the way in which ticketing policies across professional baseball have changed since the doctrine was first established in 1913. In most of the initial cases applying the doctrine, plaintiffs had purchased general tickets with which a ball leaves the bat. See Joe Lemire, Exit Velocity Proves Pitchers Provide Minimal Power to Long Balls, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2015, 1:21 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/09/22/exit-velocity-harder-a-pitch-comes-in-the-harder-it-goes-out/72624244/ [https://perma.cc/8J4D-6UQG] (quoting Alan Nathan, physics professor emeritus at the University of Illinois).

187. See id. (quoting Cleveland Indians pitcher Trevor Bauer as stating, “[i]f I throw 95 and the guy’s 100% on time, it’s probably going to leave the bat harder than a pitch that’s 85 (when he’s) 100% on time, but the chances of being 100% on time at 95 are probably not as good as being 100% on time at 85”).

188. See Takatoshi Higuchi et al., The Effect of Fastball Backspin Rate on Baseball Hitting Accuracy, 29 J. APPLIED BIOMECHANICS 279, 283 (2013), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4bbe/c7cdh2d4c061759bf4ad7476a35bf3068203.pdf [https://perma.cc/89SV-R9V3].

189. See supra note 21, at 121 (noting that during negotiations for “the previous two CBAs ... the players proposed [fan safety] improvements”).

190. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
admission tickets granting them the right to sit in any unoccupied seat in the applicable stadium’s grandstand. \textsuperscript{192} Thus, in most early Baseball Rule cases, fans had the ability to choose a seat for themselves upon entering the stadium, and therefore could make a more informed choice as to whether to sit behind the protective netting or instead view the game from an unscreened location. \textsuperscript{193}

Today, however, seats at professional baseball games are sold almost exclusively on a reserved basis, meaning that a fan’s ticket specifies the exact seat in which she must sit. \textsuperscript{194} As a result, spectators today do not have the same opportunity to select a location from which to view the game upon entering the stadium as was taken for granted in the early Baseball Rule cases. At the same time, because teams frequently fail to clearly identify whether a particular seat is located behind the protective screen at the time a ticket is purchased, \textsuperscript{195} fans in many cases may not be able to definitively ascertain whether the ticket they are purchasing will entitle them to sit in a seat shielded from the playing field.

Moreover, the public availability of protected seats is often much more limited today than was the case one hundred years ago. \textsuperscript{196} At most MLB stadiums, a large percentage of seats behind home plate are sold exclusively in season-ticket packages, and as a result are

\textsuperscript{192} See, e.g., Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913) (noting that plaintiff’s general admission ticket gave him “the option of seating himself at some place behind the netting or in an unprotected seat”).

\textsuperscript{193} See id.


\textsuperscript{195} While some teams identify which seating sections are behind a net, others do not. Compare Comerica Park Map, TIGERS.COM, https://www.mlb.com/tigers/ballpark/netting [https://perma.cc/AJY7-HU7Y] (listing sections that are entirely or partially protected by a screen), with Angel Stadium Seating Map, ANGELS.COM, http://losangeles.angels.mlb.com/ana/ticketing/seating.jsp [https://perma.cc/SP7Z-PZDF] (providing no indication of which seats are protected by netting). Meanwhile, few, if any, teams allow fans to search for seats based on their protected status when purchasing tickets online.

\textsuperscript{196} See Gil Fried et al., Don’t Sit There...or There...or There: An Analysis of Ball Park Protection and Foul Ball Injury Risks, 13 INT’L J. SPORT MGMT. 423, 423 (2012) (“At major league baseball games there might be very few seats available in a screened area that are either available for concerned fans or are reasonably priced enough to represent a viable option for concerned fans.”).
rarely available to fans on a single-game or day-to-day basis.\footnote{197} Meanwhile, even when protected seats are currently available for purchase, they will often prove to be cost-prohibitive for many fans, as the price of tickets immediately behind home plate has increased exponentially from the time that the Baseball Rule was first established.\footnote{198} In the seminal case of Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., for example, the plaintiff had purchased his grandstand ticket for $0.50, the equivalent of $12.62 in today’s dollars.\footnote{199} In contrast, the overall average ticket price for an MLB game today is $31, while the price for a seat immediately behind home plate can often exceed $100.\footnote{200} In 2017, for instance, a box seat behind home plate at Boston’s Fenway Park averaged around $150 per game,\footnote{201} while a similar seat at New York’s Yankee Stadium ranged from $128 to $300 per ticket as of April 2018.\footnote{202} Consequently, fans today do not have the same ability to select a protected seat for themselves as was taken for granted by courts at the time the Baseball Rule was first formulated over a century ago. Not only are seats behind the protective net often unavailable to fans buying tickets on a single-game basis,\footnote{203} but even when they

\footnote{197. See Fried & Ammon Jr., supra note 67, at 59 (“Spectators can be precluded from these sections based on ... long-term contracts to secure seat location.”); Khare, supra note 22, at 99 (“Seats behind home plate ... are almost never readily available to consumers unless they are season ticket holders who are given first priority.”).}

\footnote{198. See Khare, supra note 22, at 99 (“[T]he prices on premium seats have increased dramatically ... [s]eats behind home plate, for instance, have become the most expensive seating area at a baseball game.”).}

\footnote{199. 153 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. App. Ct. 1913); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DATABASES, TABLES, & CALCULATORS BY SUBJECT: CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/ZC2P-7AXD].}


\footnote{201. See Boston Report, Red Sox to Increase 2018 Ticket Prices by 2.5 Percent, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 27, 2017, 2:09 PM), http://www.nbcsports.com/boston/boston-red-sox/red-sox-increase-2018-ticket-prices-25-percent [https://perma.cc/8L5G-8H62] (taking the average of the Field Box prices for 2017 to get the average cost for seats behind home plate at Fenway Park).}

\footnote{202. See 2018 Individual Game Pricing, Yankees.com, https://www.mlb.com/yankees/tickets/pricing [https://perma.cc/PWR5-23TG] (taking the range of New York Yankees’s Field Level tickets directly behind home plate on the accompanying interactive map as of April 2018).}

\footnote{203. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.}
are available, adjusted for inflation such tickets frequently cost eight times as much, or more, than they did in 1913.204

D. Increased Spectator Distractions

Finally, fans attending professional baseball games today face a plethora of potential distractions that did not exist decades ago. At the time courts first established the Baseball Rule, the experience of attending a game was vastly different than it is today, with the game itself serving not just as the primary entertainment, but as the only attraction offered.205 In contrast, baseball games today are increasingly marketed as multifaceted entertainment experiences, offering spectators a variety of additional stimuli potentially distracting their attention from the action on the field.206

For instance, most professional stadiums today feature large, colorful, video-enhanced scoreboards that compete for fans’ attention by presenting a never-ending stream of statistics, advertisements, and replays, often all in spectacular high definition.207 Similarly, over the last four to five decades, most professional teams began employing boisterous team mascots to entertain fans throughout the game.208 While these mascots conduct a number of in-game promotions during breaks in the action—such as t-shirt or hot-dog tosses209—they may also interact with, or perform for, fans even while the game is transpiring on the field.210 Perhaps even

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204. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.

205. See Fried & Ammon Jr., supra note 67, at 54-55 (“Fans are enthralled by a comprehensive experience ranging from doing the wave, to between innings games, to watching other distractions.”).


207. See Kenneth R. Swift, I Couldn’t Watch the Ball Because I Was Watching the Ferris Wheel in Centerfield, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW., 2005, at 1, 34 (“Fans now have ... huge scoreboards [running] crazy promotions.”).


209. See Kitei, supra note 100, at 53.

more dangerous, MLB teams now routinely encourage spectators to use their smartphones during the game, offering free Wi-Fi to fans in order to allow them to order food and interact with the team on social media in real time via the “MLB Ballpark” mobile application.211

Consequently, while spectators could historically be expected to occasionally take their eyes off the field to look around the stadium or converse with friends, expecting a fan today to pay particularly close attention to every pitch of a game is much less realistic than was the case a century ago. As a result, for a variety of reasons, fans attending professional baseball games today are exposed to a higher risk of injury than at any point in time since courts first established the Baseball Rule in 1913.

III. COURTS HAVE FAILED TO ADAPT THE BASEBALL RULE TO CHANGING LEGAL DOCTRINE

Not only have courts continued to adhere to the Baseball Rule over the last one hundred years despite the increased risk that errant balls and bats pose to fans,212 but they have also curiously elected to persist in abiding by the century-old doctrine despite intervening changes in the underlying law of torts, transformations that arguably undercut continued reliance on the doctrine.

A. The Rise of the Law-and-Economics Movement

First, modern courts applying the Baseball Rule have uniformly failed to consider whether continued adherence to the doctrine is warranted in light of the important insights that the law-and-economics movement has contributed to tort law. In the years since the 1970 publication of then-Professor Guido Calabresi’s seminal book *The Cost of Accidents*,213 both academic commentators and courts

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211. See The Official Ballpark App, MLB.COM, http://www.mlb.com/apps/ballpark/ [https://perma.cc/XC82-98VZ] (discussing the app’s functionality); see also Fried & Ammon Jr., supra note 67, at 57 (reporting that as early as 2000, teams had begun to allow fans to order food via “Palm Pilots or similar devices”).
212. See supra Parts I-II.
have significantly altered their understanding of the manner in which tort liability can most efficiently be applied.\footnote{214} Perhaps most significantly, law-and-economics scholars realized that tort law could be better used to encourage parties to act in ways that maximize aggregate social welfare by incentivizing them to take steps “to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents.”\footnote{215} Along these lines, economic analyses of tort law suggested that the optimum standard for negligence cases is one that imposes liability on whichever party was the lowest cost, or best risk, avoider.\footnote{216} In other words, when deciding what level of reasonable care is required under the circumstances in a given negligence case, courts should consider whether the injury could have most efficiently been avoided by the plaintiff or the defendant. By doing so, courts can allocate liability in a way that increases the likelihood the parties will adopt the optimal level of precaution necessary in a given case, thus minimizing the overall social cost of accidents.\footnote{217}

Unfortunately, modern courts have failed to consider or apply this insight when deciding cases under the Baseball Rule.\footnote{218} Had these courts undertaken an economic analysis of the doctrine, they would have likely concluded that in most cases the defendant team was the lowest cost or best risk avoider, as teams (rather than their

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[214]{See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 Md. L. Rev. 12, 14 (2005) (noting the book’s “landmark status” evidenced by the fact it has been cited nearly 1,000 times in the scholarly literature, along with sixty citations in judicial decisions).}
\footnotetext[215]{CALABRESI, supra note 213, at 26.}
\footnotetext[216]{See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 815, 828 (1990) (“[A]n optimal negligence rule will ordinarily place liability on the lowest cost-avoider.”); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1284 (2003) (“[E]fficient allocations usually assign risks to the party best able to avoid a potential loss or able to avoid the loss most cheaply, in order to provide the maximum incentive for that party to take the necessary precautions.”).}
\footnotetext[217]{See Yoed Halbersberg & Ehud Guttel, Behavioral Economics and Tort Law, in The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law 405, 407-08 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) (“[T]here exists an efficient level of precautions that minimizes the overall social costs of the accident, such that taking either more or less care is socially undesirable.”).}
\footnotetext[218]{See, e.g., Costa v. Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090, 1093 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (“[W]e are persuaded that the potential for a foul ball to enter the stands and injure a spectator who is seated in an unscreened area is, as matter of law, sufficiently obvious that the defendant reasonably could conclude that a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the risk.”).}
\end{footnotes}
fans) will typically be best positioned to prevent—or otherwise minimize the cost of—these accidents.\footnote{219. Cf. Horton, supra note 147, at 362 (“Stadium owners, who track the rate and severity of injuries in different parts of their facilities, are better situated to avoid harm than fans.”).}

To begin, many foul-ball-related injuries could easily be avoided through the installation of additional safety netting at little cost to the team.\footnote{220. See Lucchese, supra note 21, at 119-20.} Indeed, professional-grade netting is relatively cheap and easy to install, averaging around $8,000 to $12,000 per 60 feet, and requiring only a few days to mount.\footnote{221. See Chris Bumbaca, To Screen or Not to Screen? Debate on Added Netting at MLB Parks Continues as Lawsuit Filed, KAN. CITY STAR (July 17, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/sports/mlb/kansas-city-royals/article27539521.html [https://perma.cc/LA65-JFNN] (reporting that “installing additional netting in the name of enhanced safety is a relatively inexpensive proposition—about $8,000 to $12,000 per stadium, according to one vendor’s estimate”).} Considering that MLB is a $10-billion-per-year organization,\footnote{222. See Maury Brown, MLB Sees Record Revenues Approaching $10 Billion for 2016, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2016, 3:22 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2016/12/05/mlb-sees-record-revenues-approaching-10-billion-for-2016/#5af077dc7088[https://perma.cc/4MVZ-TVFT].} such a cost is a drop in the bucket for major-league teams, and is one that would almost immediately be recouped once the expanded screen prevented even just a single serious injury, the medical bills alone for which can easily total more than $150,000.\footnote{223. See, e.g., Julia Marsh, Yankees Fan Hit in the Face by Foul Ball Loses Injury Lawsuit, N.Y. Post (Oct. 24, 2017, 3:28 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/10/24/yankee-fan-hit-in-the-face-by-foul-ball-loses-injury-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/8RH6-G64C] (stating that a man hit in the eye by a foul ball at a New York Yankees game spent “$160,000 in medical bills for reconstructive surgery”).}

While hard data regarding the number of fans who sustain such costly injuries at professional baseball games each year is not available, several recent studies have estimated the frequency with which these incidents occur.\footnote{224. See, e.g., Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1.} For instance, as noted previously, a recent analysis by Bloomberg estimated that more than 1700 fans are injured each year by foul balls at MLB games, a rate of two people every three games, making foul-ball injuries a more frequent occurrence than a batter being hit by a pitch.\footnote{225. Glovin, supra note 7.} Meanwhile, a second study recently determined that foul balls account for thirty-five
injuries per one million fans, a rate that would result in more than 2500 fans being hurt each year at MLB games given the league’s recent attendance levels. Importantly, neither study attempted to account for foul-ball-related injuries sustained by the forty million fans who attend minor-league games each season, roughly 950 to 1400 of whom could be expected to be hurt each year given the injury rates estimated above. Not all of these injuries will be of a particularly severe nature. But based on the results of the second study referenced above, 7.5 percent of foul-ball injuries ultimately require hospitalization, meaning that—given the projected injury totals estimated above—nearly 300 people per year may currently require hospital care to treat injuries inflicted by flying objects leaving the field of play at professional baseball games.

While the societal cost of foul-ball injuries is thus likely to be exponentially greater than the cost of installing extra screening, that is not to suggest that the cost to the team of erecting additional netting is necessarily limited to the purchase and installation price of the screen. To the contrary, many spectators actively prefer to sit in seats providing unobstructed views of the field, often in hopes of catching a foul ball. Consequently, any significant enlargement of

226. See Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1 (“A Milsten study revealed that there are more than 35 spectator injuries from foul balls at MLB games for every one million spectator visits.”).

227. MLB attendance has approached or surpassed seventy-three million for each of the last fifteen years. See Brown, supra note 222.

228. See Sickels, supra note 9 (reporting that more than forty-one million fans attended minor-league baseball games in 2016).

229. The estimation was calculated by multiplying forty-one, to represent the forty-one million fans who attend minor league baseball games each year, see id., by thirty-five, to approximate the number of fans per one million fans to be injured by foul balls. See Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1.

230. See Fried et al., supra note 196, at 439 (discussing results of the study by Milsten et al.).

231. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. At MLB games, at the 7.5 percent hospitalization rate, see supra note 230 and accompanying text, approximately 190 fans may require hospital care out of the 2500 fans injured each year. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text. Additionally, approximately 105 minor league baseball fans out of the 1400 fans injured each year, see supra note 229 and accompanying text, may require hospital care each year at the same hospital care rate. Together, approximately 300 fans will annually require hospital care across professional and minor league games for injuries resulting from foul balls.

the size of the protective netting will result in some incremental decrease in utility for a sizeable subset of fans. Due to recent improvements in net technology, however, teams can install thinner screens that present less of an obstruction to fans’ views of the field while still providing more than suitable protection. Regardless, on balance any reduction in overall social welfare resulting from subjecting an increased number of fans to an obstructed view of the field will typically be outweighed by the injury-reduction benefits these screens provide, at least in those unprotected areas of the stadium where fans are currently subjected to the highest degree of risk. Indeed, despite the universal presence of safety netting, seats immediately behind home plate are often among a stadium’s most expensive. This suggests that fans will continue to prioritize proximity to the field over an unobstructed view, and will adjust to the presence of additional netting.

Not only will teams thus often prove to be the lowest-cost avoider in cases involving foul-ball-related injuries, but they will also typically constitute the best-risk avoider in most cases as well. Unlike

("[T]here is inherent value in having most seats unprotected by a screen because baseball patrons generally want to be involved with the game in an intimate way and are even hoping that they will come in contact with some projectile from the field (in the form of a souvenir baseball)."; Garrett R. Broshuis, *Death to the Crazy Hotdog Vendor? The Continued Erosion of the Baseball Rule After Coomer v. Kansas City Royals, 31 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 21, 22 (2014) ("[M]any spectators actually want foul balls to enter the stands in the hopes of catching a souvenir."); Christopher McNair, Note, *Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque: The New Mexico Supreme Court Balks on the Baseball Rule*, 41 N.M. L. REV. 539, 548-49 (2011) ("[M]any fans attend baseball games hoping to catch foul balls and other souvenirs from the field of play.").

233. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.

234. See Lucchese, *supra* note 21, at 119 ("Modern technology has made protective netting thinner, stronger, last longer, and easier to see through than the netting used years ago.").

235. The calculus may prove to be different in areas where the degree of risk is less acute. See *Benejam*, 635 N.W.2d at 222 ("[T]here is inherent value in having most seats unprotected by a screen because baseball patrons generally want to be involved with the game in an intimate way and are even hoping that they will come in contact with some projectile from the field (in the form of a souvenir baseball)."; see also Sugarman, *supra* note 118, at 836 (observing that such “precaution[] would deprive the fans of an important pleasure they ought to be able to enjoy—seeing the game relatively up-close without the annoyance of having to look through a screen").

236. See infra note 309 and accompanying text.

237. See *supra* notes 198-202 and accompanying text.

238. See Ludden, *supra* note 11, at 138 ("[T]he fact [is] that some of the most expensive seats at a baseball game—behind home plate—are covered by netting, which has not stopped fans from paying top dollar for tickets in these areas on a daily basis.").
spectators, who have access to little to no public data regarding foul-ball injury rates in particular seating locations, teams are better positioned to track and study the rate at which fans are injured in different sections of their stadiums.\footnote{See Horton, supra note 147, at 362 (“Stadium owners, who track the rate and severity of injuries in different parts of their facilities, are better situated to avoid harm than fans.”).} Indeed, through the use of newly installed optical camera and radar technology—popularly called “Statcast”—MLB teams now have the ability to track both the location where every ball is hit and the speed at which it leaves the bat.\footnote{See Baseball Savant: About, MLB.COM, https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/about [https://perma.cc/A6HZ-N9FX] (describing Statcast as “a series of high-resolution optical cameras along with radar equipment” that “precisely tracks the location and movements of the ball and every player on the field, resulting in an unparalleled amount of information covering everything from the pitcher to the batter to baserunners and defensive players”).} If properly marshalled, this technology could allow teams to build accurate risk models establishing the danger that errant flying objects pose to particular seating locations,\footnote{See Paul Casella, Statcast Primer: Baseball Will Never Be the Same, MLB.COM (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.mlb.com/news/statcast-primer-baseball-will-never-be-the-same/c-119234412 [https://perma.cc/C9U4-8J62] (“Statcast is capable of measuring the velocity, launch angle and vector of the ball as it comes off the bat. From there, Statcast will also track the hang time and distance that the ball travels, as well as a projected landing-point distance on home runs.”).} placing the team in the best position to take steps to alleviate the danger to fans. Regardless, even without such advanced risk models, the defendant team would almost certainly have to be considered the best risk avoider in cases where a ball or bat was travelling into the stands so quickly that a fan did not have sufficient reaction time to protect herself.\footnote{Cf. Goplerud & Terry, supra note 37, at 450 (“[T]he argument that even a knowledgeable hockey fan is as a matter of law better able to prevent injury from a hundred mile per hour puck than an adequate barrier is untenable.” (emphasis omitted)).} Because the spectator is literally unable to avoid injury in these cases, the team will inevitably be in a superior position to prevent the accident through the installation of additional protective screening.\footnote{See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (discussing fans’ limited reaction time to foul balls).}

In contrast, one might nevertheless alternatively contend that fans are themselves the best risk avoiders and should bear the burden of their own injuries. As the argument goes, a fan can easily prevent his or her own injury in one of several ways, such as by electing to sit in a protected seat, choosing to sit in a remote area of
the ballpark where a foul ball is unlikely to travel, or simply opting not to attend baseball games at all. These arguments are ultimately unpersuasive, however. First, as noted above, protected seating at modern professional games is often either cost-prohibitive or entirely unavailable to fans on anything other than a season-ticket basis, and thus does not represent a realistic option for many fans. Meanwhile, any legal standard that requires spectators to either sit in remote areas of the stadium or alternatively forgo attending professional baseball games altogether would itself be suboptimal. In either case, fans would be forced to refrain from engaging in their preferred course of conduct, thus reducing aggregate social welfare. Indeed, imposing an obligation on spectators to sit in remote areas of the ballpark far removed from the action will decrease the utility of the experience for hundreds of thousands or millions of fans. Worse still, a rule suggesting that individuals should simply stop attending baseball games altogether in order to avoid injury would force fans to completely forgo otherwise socially desirable behavior. Ultimately, the collective cost of the loss of utility enjoyed by baseball fans adopting these alternative avoidance mechanisms likely more than outweighs the relatively modest

244. See, e.g., Neinstein v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613-14 (Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting that a fan wishing to avoid injury at a Los Angeles Dodgers game could elect to sit in either one of the approximately 3,000 seats protected by screening, or else one of the “approximately 20,000 seats on the reserved level and 6,000 seats in the right and left field pavilions where the chances of being struck by a batted or thrown ball are extremely remote”); see also Horton, supra note 147, at 352-53 (discussing Neinstein v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., and the court’s arguments).

245. See supra notes 194-204 and accompanying text (discussing recent changes in ticketing policies that undercut the continued adherence to the Baseball Rule).

246. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836-37.

247. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, The New Old Efficiency Theories of Causation and Liability, 7 J. Tort L. 65, 71 (2014) (acknowledging the view that “the purpose of tort law ... is or should be the maximization of aggregate social welfare, with welfare defined ... as utility (pleasure or preference satisfaction)”).

248. Cf. Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836 (observing that such “precautions would deprive the fans of an important pleasure they ought to be able to enjoy—seeing the game relatively up-close without the annoyance of having to look through a screen”).

cost—financial and otherwise—of installing additional safety netting for the teams.

Thus, should courts subject the Baseball Rule to an economic analysis, they will find that the defendant team will almost always occupy the position of lowest-cost avoider for foul-ball-related injuries. Indeed, considering the relatively trivial expense it would take to prevent these injuries through the installation of additional protective netting,250 compared to the frequency with which these incidents occur and the financial toll they inflict,251 economic principles of optimal risk allocation suggest that imposing liability on the defendant team for foul-ball-related injuries will typically yield the most socially beneficial outcome.252

Consequently, the insights provided by the law-and-economics movement strongly suggest that the Baseball Rule currently fails to impose liability on the lowest cost and best risk avoider—the team itself—in the most efficient and socially optimal manner.253 Unfortunately, by artificially shielding teams from liability in foul ball cases, courts’ adherence to the traditional doctrine has historically provided little incentive for teams to take greater steps to best minimize the aggregate cost of these accidents, either through the installation of additional protective netting or by experimenting with other emerging injury-avoidance mechanisms.254

250. See Bumbaca, supra note 221.

251. See Wakamatsu, supra note 11, at 1 (discussing the frequency of fan injuries from foul balls); Marsh, supra note 223 (discussing the medical costs of a fan who was hit by a foul ball in the head).

252. For instance, under the classic formula established by Judge Learned Hand, liability should arise in cases where “the cost to the defendant of avoiding the accident would have been less than the cost of the accident, discounted by the probability of its occurrence, the defendant's failure to avoid the accident is termed negligence.” Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward A Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1057 (1972).

253. See supra Part III.A.

254. As of 2014, for instance, MLB had yet to undertake any analysis of foul-ball-related injury rates. See Glovin, supra note 7 (reporting that, in 2014, “Major League Baseball ... ha[d] no plans to mandate such protections during games, preferring to leave decisions to individual teams”); Nathaniel Grow, On Broken Bats, Protective Netting, and the Baseball Rule, FANGRAPH (June 8, 2015), https://www.angraphs.com/blogs/on-broken-bats-protective-netting-and-the-baseball-rule/ [https://perma.cc/B8NL-ZWRW] (“Teams currently have little financial motivation to take greater precautions to avoid fan injuries, as they are not legally responsible for any injuries that do occur, but could potentially see the demand for some of their most expensive seats decline should they install an additional barrier between fans and the field.”); see also Horton, supra note 147, at 345 (contending that placing liability
Nevertheless, the fact that teams constitute both the lowest cost and best risk avoider in foul-ball injury cases does not necessarily mean courts should require teams to install protective netting in front of all—or necessarily even most—of the seating areas within their ballparks, as such an obligation would itself be suboptimal.255 As noted above, many fans actively prefer to sit in seats providing unobstructed views of the field, and thus any overextension of protective netting beyond those seating areas presenting a significant risk of injury could result in a reduction in aggregate social welfare.256 Consequently, rather than require teams to install an overabundance of screens, the most socially desirable result is likely to fall somewhere between the status quo and universal netting of the entire stadium.257 Thus, teams should be required to take steps to protect fans in additional high-risk areas from errant projectiles, and be permitted to leave those in lower-risk seats free to enjoy unobstructed views of the field. Ascertaining the optimal liability regime through which to secure such an outcome will be considered in greater detail in Part IV.

B. Misplaced Reliance on the Doctrine of Assumption of Risk

A second flaw in the logic of courts’ persistent adherence to the Baseball Rule relates to their continued frequent reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk to ground and justify their rulings on a defendant team’s behalf.258 Indeed, even though the assumption-of-risk defense has largely fallen out of favor legally,259 modern courts continue to rely on the doctrine to validate their imposition of the Baseball Rule.260

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255. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836 (observing that such a “precaution[] would deprive the fans of an important pleasure they ought to be able to enjoy—seeing the game relatively up-close without the annoyance of having to look through a screen”).

256. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.

257. See Grow, supra note 254.

258. See supra Part I.A.


As an initial matter, reliance on the assumption of risk doctrine has always been questionable in most spectator-injury cases. Dating back to the initial formulation of the Baseball Rule in 1913, courts have routinely confused two separate legal principles when ruling for a defendant team: breach of duty and assumption of risk. Assumption of risk, as traditionally understood, constitutes an affirmative defense in cases where a defendant has been found negligent due to a breach of her duty of care. In the overwhelming majority of Baseball Rule cases, however, no breach has occurred because the defendant team has satisfied its duty to its patrons by screening the judicially perceived most dangerous area of its stadium (i.e., the area immediately behind home plate) while also providing a sufficient number of protected seats for the fans that can be expected to desire them. Indeed, if assumption of risk were truly the basis for the denial of liability in Baseball Rule cases, then the requirement that teams must install netting behind home plate would be entirely superfluous, as the obviously heightened risk in that area would provide the strongest justification for the assumption-of-risk defense. Thus, even though courts routinely say that the plaintiff...

("[T]he vast majority of jurisdictions recognize [the] hazard [of being hit by a foul ball] to be a risk that is assumed by the spectators."); Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 901 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1995) ("[B]eing struck by a foul ball is 'one of the natural risks assumed by spectators attending professional games.'") (quoting Hamilton v. Salt Lake City Corp., 237 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1951)).

261. See Crane v. Kan. City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 153 S.W. 1076, 1077-78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913) (concluding that defendants “fully performed [their] duty” by “provid[ing] screened seats in the grand stand,” and that the plaintiff “assumed the ordinary risks” by “voluntarily [choosing] an unprotected seat”; see also Broshuis, supra note 232, at 21 (finding that “some courts focus[] more on assumption of risk principles and others ... on duty principles” in Baseball Rule cases); Horton, supra note 147, at 346 (observing that courts have “used both the duty-based baseball rule and assumption of risk to reject injured fans’ claims, often failing to differentiate between them”); Khare, supra note 22, at 97 (“Courts generally do not distinguish between the elements essential to primary assumption of risk and those of limited duty.”).


263. See generally Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836-40 (“[W]hile spectator foul ball injuries are a regrettable by-product of baseball, they are generally not injuries that we should blame on the stadium operators because there was nothing careless about their behavior.”).

264. See Turner, supra note 136, at 170 (“[C]ases that rely on the primary assumption of
has assumed the risk of his or her injury by electing to sit in an unprotected area of the stadium, this is not actually the case as a strict legal matter.\textsuperscript{265} Instead, the team is entitled to a favorable judgment under the Baseball Rule because it did not breach a duty of care in the first place, and thus cannot be held negligent as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{266}

Along these lines, viewing the Baseball Rule as simply providing an ex ante delineation of the standard duty of reasonable care a team owes to its spectators provides a better justification for why courts continue to adhere to the doctrine even in cases where a young child has been injured by a foul ball. Indeed, although it is difficult to argue that young children knowingly assume the risk of being hit by errant balls or bats at professional baseball games,\textsuperscript{267} courts nevertheless routinely rely on precisely this very logic in spectator-injury cases.\textsuperscript{268} In \textit{Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.}, for example, the Supreme Court of Utah refused to

\begin{quote}
risk doctrine to support the rule that an owner need only protect fans seated behind home plate are inherently contradictory because the area behind home plate—where the risk of being struck by a foul ball is most obvious and most commonly appreciated—is precisely where primary assumption of risk seems most applicable” (emphasis omitted)).

\textsuperscript{265.} See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 837 (arguing that “assumption of risk’ is beside the point” in foul-ball injury cases).

\textsuperscript{266.} See \textit{id.} at 836-40.

\textsuperscript{267.} See 2 LOUIS A. LEHR, JR., PREMISES LIABILITY § 40:13.10 (3d ed. 2017) (reporting that while children can generally be held to have assumed the risk of injury, the defendant should “show that the injured child (1) had actual knowledge of the danger; (2) understood and appreciated the risks associated with such danger; and (3) voluntarily exposed himself or herself to those risks”); see also Champion, supra note 15, at 506 (“Thus, the key issue for recovery for child spectator injuries in a sporting event is whether the child possesses the ability to appreciate the risk of occupying the place that he occupies and his actual understanding of that risk.”); Turner, supra note 136, at 164 (“It seems problematic to bar recovery on the basis of primary assumption of risk when the injured spectator is a young child.”).

\textsuperscript{268.} See, e.g., Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass’n, 46 P.2d 144, 145, 147 (Cal. 1935) (per curiam) (denying recovery to a fourteen-year-old girl on the basis that “it would seem clear that in accepting the unscreened seat, even temporarily, with full knowledge of the danger attached to so doing, she assumed the risk of injury”); Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219, 220, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “the everyday reality of attending a baseball game includes voluntarily subjecting oneself to the risk that a ball or bat might leave the field and cause injury” in a case involving “a young girl”); Friedman v. Hous. Sports Ass’n, 731 S.W.2d 572, 575-76 (Tex. App. 1987) (Cohen, J., concurring) (finding that an eleven-year-old girl had assumed the risk of being injured by a foul ball). But see Fried et al., supra note 196, at 429 (finding that minors are statistically more likely to prevail under the Baseball Rule than adults).
hold a minor-league team liable after a six-year-old girl was severely injured by a foul ball on the grounds that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury by sitting in an unprotected general admission area of the stadium. 269 Such decisions would be better reasoned if courts instead characterized the Baseball Rule as simply establishing the level of care the defendant team owed to the plaintiff, thus necessitating the conclusion that the defendant was not responsible for the child’s injury since it had sufficiently screened its stadium under the doctrine. 270

Courts’ continued misplaced reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk is all the more surprising given the recent legal trend towards the abolition of the defense. 271 The movement to eliminate assumption of risk dates back to the shift from contributory negligence regimes to those based on comparative negligence in tort cases. 272 Whereas the traditional theory of assumption of risk barred a plaintiff’s recovery entirely, under a comparative-negligence regime, the fact that a plaintiff knowingly engaged in risky behavior is better thought as one factor among many that may potentially offset some or all of the defendant’s liability. 273 As Professor Fleming James famously argued:

A plaintiff’s reasonable assumption of risk would not bar him unless the risk was one which defendant had a legal right to put up to plaintiff; and in such a case defendant breached no relevant duty. A plaintiff’s unreasonable assumption of risk would

269. 901 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1995) (concluding that spectators assume the risk of being hit by a foul ball at professional baseball games and that as a result “the trial court properly applied the doctrine of assumption of risk”).

270. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 837 (“[T]he ‘no breach’ analysis explains why, for example, even very young children in attendance at the game, who do not really know anything about baseball or the danger of being hit by a foul ball, also properly lose their cases.”).

271. See Broshuis, supra note 232, at 22 (“Some jurisdictions have gone further, not only casting aside contributory negligence but also disposing of the assumption of risk defense.”).

272. See Horton, supra note 147, at 344 (“Contributory negligence ... has largely been replaced by comparative fault, which allocates damages in proportion to the parties’ respective responsibilities. In light of this change, the extent to which assumption of risk remains viable has become one of the most unsettled issues in tort law.” (footnotes omitted)).

273. Cf. Simons, supra note 259, at 214 (“If, as the modernists claim, assumption of risk is either a limitation upon duty or a form of contributory negligence, then it bars recovery in the former guise but not in the latter.”).
constitute contributory negligence on his part; and this would be a defense without the need to invoke any separate doctrine.274

Following this logic, an increasing number of states have specifically abolished the doctrine of assumption of risk in recent years, either legislatively or judicially.275

Despite this general repudiation of the doctrine of assumption of risk, modern courts have continued to rely on the defense when rationalizing their decision to apply the Baseball Rule.276 In so doing, these courts have struggled to justify their continued reliance on an otherwise discredited defense, often emphasizing distinctions between primary and secondary, or express and implied, assumption of risk to explain why the defense continues to justify their adherence the Baseball Rule.277 Jurists could avoid these logical gymnastics by adopting the better view of the Baseball Rule, and concluding that a defendant team is not liable for a particular injury simply because it did not breach any legal duty owed to the plaintiff.278 Meanwhile, to the extent that prior courts have erroneously based their Baseball Rule jurisprudence on the assumption of risk defense, the recent abrogation of the latter doctrine offers future courts a prime opportunity to dispense with a suboptimal rule in spectator-injury cases.


275. See Austill, supra note 35, at 100 (“Some courts have abrogated the assumption of risk defense because it was incompatible with comparative fault, which abrogated the contributory negligence defense.”); see also 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 761 (2018) (“Some courts have indicated that the doctrine of assumption of risk, as a complete defense, does not or should not survive the adoption of comparative negligence laws.”).

276. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 700-02, 709-11 (Cal. 1992) (adhering to Baseball Rule precedents in a case involving an injury in a backyard football game on the basis of assumption of risk, despite acknowledging that the doctrine had generally been abrogated in the state of California); cf. Joe Novosel, Note, Baseball Bats Out of Hell: Potential Theories of Liability Arising From Maple Bat Injuries, 8 DePaul J. Sports L. & Contemp. Probs. 95, 99 (2011) (“[B]aseball rule’ jurisdictions that have subsequently adopted a comparative-negligence regime ... have not altered the rule’s limited duty.”).

277. See Horton, supra note 147, at 353-54 (dissecting the confused logic of the Supreme Court of California’s decision in Knight v. Jewett); see also Austill, supra note 35, at 99-100 (discussing various forms of assumption of risk).

278. See Sugarman, supra note 118, at 836-40.
IV. COURTS SHOULD ABANDON (OR MODIFY) THE BASEBALL RULE

As the foregoing analysis has shown, recent changes in the factual and legal underpinnings of the Baseball Rule have undercut modern courts’ continued reliance on the doctrine. Consequently, the time has come for courts (or legislatures) to update their jurisprudence (or statutes) to impose greater liability on teams when fans are hit by errant bats or balls while attending professional baseball games.

A. Strict Liability for Spectator Injuries

The most efficient manner in which courts or legislatures can move forward would be to replace the Baseball Rule with a strict-liability regime. As noted above, law-and-economics scholars have long asserted that tort law can best reduce the overall social cost of accidents by imposing liability on the lowest cost or best risk avoider, thus forcing that party “to internalize the costs of [its] potentially harmful activity”—the so-called “[e]fficient-deterrence theory” of liability.\(^\text{279}\) Strict liability, in turn, is believed to “[i]nduce[ ] [such] precaution by holding the potential injurer liable for losses if he caused them.... Because he can never escape liability for harms if he has caused, the best that a potential injurer can do under strict liability is to take sufficient precaution to minimize his expected liability.”\(^\text{280}\) Strict-liability regimes are particularly justified, according to law-and-economics scholars, in situations presenting a case of “unilateral precaution,” namely those in which only one party could realistically be expected to “have taken [measures] to reduce the likelihood of the accident or its consequences.”\(^\text{281}\) Indeed, on this view, “actors should bear the costs of those accidents that are ‘characteristic’ of their activities and then distribute those costs among all those who benefit from the imposition of the risks at issue.”\(^\text{282}\) Strict liability is believed to most effectively achieve this

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\(^{281}\) *Id.*

\(^{282}\) Gregory C. Keating, *The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict*
outcome due to the best risk avoider’s “superior ability to spread accident costs through insurance.” Moreover, “[t]he cost-pressures of higher insurance premiums also create incentives for [the best-risk avoider] to take safety precautions for their risky activities.”

These insights support the imposition of a strict-liability regime upon the professional baseball industry. As discussed above, not only are teams better positioned to reduce the cost of spectator injuries through the installation of additional netting, but they are also in a superior position compared to their patrons with respect to assessing the risk level present in different sections of a ballpark. In contrast, short of avoiding any high-risk seating areas entirely, fans may often have virtually no ability to prevent these injuries, with balls or bats moving so quickly that it is physically impossible for the spectator to react in time to protect herself. Thus, many injuries from foul balls and flying bats are best understood as presenting a case of unilateral precaution, where the team is the only party in a position to realistically reduce the likelihood of many of these accidents.

If baseball teams were forced to internalize the cost of their fans’ injuries under a strict-liability regime, then each team would be forced to decide for itself how to best balance fan safety with consumer demand for unobstructed views. Such a decision-making process would likely come down to a simple matter of economics. On the one hand, the team would have to determine how much ticket revenue it would stand to lose by installing a screen in front of a particular section of seats. On the other hand, the team would assess the heightened cost of premises liability insurance should the lack of netting in a section result in one or more fans incurring a costly physical injury.


284. Id.

285. See supra notes 216-38 and accompanying text (assessing the Baseball Rule cases under a theory of economic analysis).

286. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text (considering the risk of being hit by an unavoidable foul ball while attending a professional baseball game).

287. See Ulen, supra note 280, at 115 (defining the theory of unilateral precaution).

288. See generally id. at 107-12 (explaining the “economic model of individual or organizational decision making about the optimal allocation of resources” between building in safety and producing products).
The most likely outcome of such a balancing act would be for teams to install additional netting to protect the highest-risk areas of their ballparks from flying objects, while preserving unobstructed views in lower-risk sections of seats.\textsuperscript{289} Such a scenario would likely best minimize the overall cost of foul-ball-related injuries, thus maximizing aggregate social welfare.\textsuperscript{290} Indeed, fans sitting in highly dangerous areas of a ballpark who are not currently required to be protected under existing interpretations of the Baseball Rule would now find themselves safeguarded from potentially unavoidable injuries. At the same time, fans hoping to enjoy an unobstructed view and potentially catch a less-dangerous foul ball would still have plenty of seating options available. And in the rare case that someone seated in one of these lower-risk areas of the park is injured by a ball or bat leaving the field of play, then rather than having to internalize the cost of the accident themselves, they could instead seek potential compensation from the team under its premises liability insurance policy.

Admittedly, such a liability rule could slightly increase the cost of attending a baseball game, should some teams elect to pass the additional cost of their insurance policies on to fans.\textsuperscript{291} Ultimately, however, the extent of any such cost increase is likely to be modest, assuming that the team has also installed screening in front of its highest-risk seating sections. In any event, such an outcome is ultimately justified from a policy perspective insofar as it most efficiently places the cost of spectator injuries on the lowest-cost and best risk avoider.

Moreover, if a court or legislature was so inclined, it could further reduce the expected cost of imposing strict liability on professional baseball teams by incorporating an accompanying comparative-
negligence regime.292 By doing so, courts or legislatures could allow the fact-finder to consider evidence showing that a plaintiff contributed to his own injury by himself acting negligently, such as by being intoxicated, failing to pay sufficient attention to the action on the playing field, or even by voluntarily bringing himself into contact with the ball or bat by trying to catch it.293 In these cases, the court could fairly conclude that the plaintiff was responsible for a (potentially sizeable) share of his own injury, and thus substantially reduce the team’s liability for the accident.294

One potential objection to replacing the Baseball Rule with a strict-liability regime bears mentioning, namely that such a shift could result in excessive tort liability being imposed on operators of amateur baseball fields. Indeed, while this Article has predominantly focused on injuries occurring at professional baseball games, courts have typically applied the Baseball Rule to cases arising at amateur facilities as well.295 Unlike professional teams, which tend to be well heeled and directly profit from the activity that places fans at heightened risk,296 amateur stadium operators—often local municipalities—tend to operate in a more financially precarious position.297 Consequently, one might reasonably fear that imposing strict liability on these amateur facilities could result in the imposition of significant new netting- or insurance-related costs. These potentially unaffordable expenditures could possibly force a number of municipal facilities to close, thus harming overall social welfare


293. See Horton, supra note 147, at 370 (noting that comparative negligence would allow courts to “weed out unmeritorious claims [against a team] and reduce plaintiffs’ recoveries in proportion to their responsibility”).

294. See id. at 371-73.


296. See Brown, supra note 222.

by reducing the exercise and leisure opportunities for millions of people.298

Courts or legislatures could sidestep this legitimate concern by carving out an exception for amateur playing facilities from their newly created strict-liability regimes. Indeed, so long as an amateur facility is found to have generally taken sufficient steps to protect its most dangerous seating areas—either as traditionally defined or as interpreted more expansively as suggested in Part IV.B—then it could continue to receive protection under the traditional Baseball Rule. This would thus ensure that the imposition of strict liability on professional teams does not decrease the availability of recreational playing facilities, while at the same time providing additional incentive for professional baseball teams to take greater steps to protect their fans.

Consequently, future courts should decline to apply the Baseball Rule, and instead subject professional teams to a strict-liability regime, holding them presumptively liable anytime a fan is injured by an errant flying object at a baseball game.

B. Expanding the Definition of a Ballpark’s “Most Dangerous Area”

Alternatively, if courts or legislatures are unwilling to impose strict liability on teams to incentivize them to take greater precautions to protect their spectators from injury, then a more measured approach would be for courts to expand the existing duty of care that teams owe their fans under the Baseball Rule. Modern courts relying on the doctrine have typically defined the “most dangerous area” of a ballpark as simply being those sections of seats located immediately behind home plate.299 So long as a team provides protective screening in front of that area, and assuming that the number of screened seats is sufficient to meet average anticipated

298. See, e.g., Joshua H. Whitman, Note, Winning at All Costs: Using Law & Economics to Determine the Proper Role of Government in Regulating the Use of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Professional Sports, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 459, 482-83 (“Given the undeniably strong interest America has in athletics, anything undermining the athletic enterprise ... has a negative impact on the country’s overall social welfare.”).

299. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
consumer demand, then the team is not required to take any further precautions to protect its patrons.300

This overly rigid definition of the “most dangerous area” of a stadium is unwarranted as both a matter of law and fact. In a typical negligence case, having defined a team’s duty of care as requiring that it provide netting in front of the most dangerous areas of the stadium,301 the question of whether the defendant breached that duty would normally be one of fact.302 Rather than engage in that factual inquiry to determine which areas of a ballpark actually pose the greatest risk to fans, however, courts have instead simply assumed as a matter of law that the risk to fans is most acute only in the area directly behind home plate.303 Given recent trends in stadium construction and the presumptive increased speed with which balls enter the stands, there is strong reason to believe that other sections of seats beyond those immediately behind home plate now pose a heightened risk to fans, and thus are themselves quite dangerous.304 Moreover, because every baseball stadium is unique—featuring a playing field of distinctive shape with fans situated varying distances from the field—a determination of which areas of a ballpark present the greatest threat to spectators will inherently vary on a stadium-by-stadium basis.305

Consequently, future courts applying the Baseball Rule should, at a minimum, reject the rigid definition of the “most dangerous area” of a stadium and instead engage in a more fact-intensive inquiry to determine which sections of the ballpark in question are

300. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing the typical procedure in negligence cases).
303. See, e.g., supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
304. See Verducci, supra note 206, at 64 (“The best seats are the worst. A spot behind or next to a dugout gives a baseball fan the opportunity to see a ballplayer sweat, hear what little infield chatter remains in the game and dodge potentially lethal projectiles whizzing at more than 100 mph. Unprotected by netting, such seats are among the most dangerous in sports.”).
the least safe. Such an inquiry should consider a variety of factors, such as data regarding how often foul balls typically enter the relevant section during a given game and the number of fans who have been hurt by flying objects in the area in recent years. In addition, courts should also determine the distance between the first row of seats in the seating section in question and home plate, a measurement that will allow them to calculate the minimum reaction time that a fan in the area is likely to have to protect herself from a foul ball travelling at a speed of 100 miles per hour or more. At the same time, courts could also factor in whether a ballpark is used strictly for amateur games, which will generally present a lesser risk to spectators, thus often requiring less extensive protection measures and potentially warranting a laxer imposition of liability.

While the precise identification of which seating areas are the most dangerous will ultimately vary by stadium, over time courts conducting such an analysis would likely establish more objective standards to help guide professional teams in meeting their legal duty. For instance, courts could rule that any section of seating in which fans would be expected to have less than a second to react to a hard-hit foul ball constitutes a “most dangerous area,” and thus must be protected by netting in order for the team to escape liability under the Baseball Rule.

Not only would such an approach be more consistent with the general practice of determining whether a defendant has breached its duty of care in negligence cases, but it is also warranted in light of recent action by MLB. Specifically, following a spate of injuries in 2015, MLB issued a league-wide recommendation encouraging its teams to expand their protective netting to cover any seat located within seventy feet of home plate and/or residing between the two dugouts. The fact that MLB itself has officially

306. Cf. supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text (considering the unique policy considerations surrounding the application of the Baseball Rule to amateur facilities).

307. See Red, supra note 305.

308. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text (discussing typical practice in negligence cases).

309. See Paul Hagen, MLB Recommends Netting Between Dugouts, MLB.COM (Dec. 9, 2015), https://mlb.com/news/mlb-issues-recommendations-on-netting/c-15923307 [https://perma.cc/WMT7-DRUG] (“Major League Baseball has recommended that all teams should lengthen the safety netting at their ballparks to increase fan safety.”); see also Lucchese, supra note 21, at 100-01 (discussing the MLB recommendation).
encouraged its teams to extend their protective netting beyond just the area immediately behind home plate strongly suggests that the Baseball Rule, as traditionally applied, no longer imposes a reasonable level of care upon professional baseball teams. Indeed, if the League itself is calling on teams to screen any seat located within seventy feet of home plate,\textsuperscript{310} courts should follow suit by adopting a more expansive interpretation of the “most dangerous area” of a ballpark.

That having been said, the fact that MLB has encouraged its teams to take greater steps to protect fans from flying objects\textsuperscript{311} does not, in and of itself, resolve the issue entirely. Not only are major-league teams not bound by the League’s recommendations in this area,\textsuperscript{312} but neither are the nearly 250 teams\textsuperscript{313} competing at the minor-league level.\textsuperscript{314} Perhaps more importantly, there is also no guarantee that MLB’s proposed standard will satisfactorily protect all of the sections of every professional ballpark that present the greatest risk to fans.

Consequently, at a minimum, future courts should reject a rigid application of the Baseball Rule, and instead adopt a more flexible approach towards evaluating the risk of being hit by an errant projectile in other areas of a ballpark beyond those immediately behind home plate. Not only is such an approach more consistent with typical practice in negligence cases, but it will also further incentivize teams to better protect their spectators.\textsuperscript{315}

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\textsuperscript{310.} See Hagen, \textit{supra} note 309.
\textsuperscript{311.} See \textit{id}.
\textsuperscript{312.} See Glovin, \textit{supra} note 7.
\textsuperscript{313.} \textit{Teams by Name}, MiLB.COM, www.milb.com/milb/info/teams.jsp [https://perma.cc/3XZ7-L5SJ].
\textsuperscript{315.} Cf. Horton, \textit{supra} note 147, at 345 (contending that imposing liability on teams “places the onus where it should be: on stadium owners who are in the best position to consider new safety devices, procedures, and warnings”).
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C. Imposing a Duty to Warn

Finally, in addition to expanding the scope of a team’s potential liability under the Baseball Rule, courts should also reconsider the traditional rule that teams do not have a legal duty to warn fans of the potential danger presented by foul balls or flying bats. As noted above, courts have historically refused to require baseball teams to warn fans of these hazards, concluding that the threat posed by errant flying objects is open and obvious.\(^{316}\) Indeed, courts in other contexts have traditionally held that landowners are under no obligation to warn their invitees of open and obvious dangers, on the assumption that such a warning would be superfluous given the clear and unmistakable nature of the threat.\(^{317}\)

However, the soundness of applying this general common law rule to professional baseball teams is questionable for two reasons. First, while it is undoubtedly true that most fans would easily perceive the fact that a ball or bat may occasionally fly into the stands as a general matter, it is less clear whether a majority of spectators recognize the actual level of risk that these flying objects present. Indeed, injured spectators often insist that while they were generally aware that baseballs sometimes enter the stands, they assumed that they would typically take the form of an easily avoidable pop-up, not a line drive hit at 100 miles per hour or more.\(^{318}\) Meanwhile, even those fans who are aware that balls occasionally enter the stands at high rates of speed nevertheless may be unduly overconfident in their ability to react in time to catch the ball or otherwise protect themselves from injury. In other words, many fans will be blinded to the actual risk posed by hard-hit foul balls due to what is known in the field of behavioral economics as optimism bias—the mistaken belief that one is less likely to experience a

\(^{316}\) See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.

\(^{317}\) See, e.g., LEHR, JR., supra note 267, § 38:11 (“A landowner has no duty to warn an entrant of open and obvious defects of which the entrant should be aware in the exercise of reasonable care. If the danger is one that anyone would discover, the landowner has no duty to warn of it.” (footnotes omitted)).

\(^{318}\) See, e.g., Neinstein v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613 (Ct. App. 1986) (in which “plaintiff admitted that she had witnessed baseballs hit into the stands and was ‘generally familiar’ with the game” but nevertheless “denied that she ... [understood] the danger to which spectators are subject”).
negative event than others—and thus will also fail to fully perceive the extent to which their safety may be endangered.319

Even if one were to concede that the actual danger posed by foul balls and broken bats is sufficiently open and obvious, however, an important exception to the general no-duty-to-warn rule exists at common law.320 Specifically, even when a hazard is considered obvious, courts will still impose a duty to warn on defendants in cases where their invitees are likely to be distracted and thus cannot be expected to fully protect themselves from injury.321 This exception is especially relevant in the context of fan injuries at professional baseball games. As discussed above, fans attending professional games today are confronted by a number of potential distractions, ranging from flashy scoreboards and hyperactive mascots, to smartphones and conversations with friends.322 Each of these distractions threatens to divert spectators’ attention from the action transpiring on the playing field, thereby increasing the chances that a fan will fail to react in time to protect herself from an object leaving the playing field.323

To be sure, one could question the likely efficacy of any warnings offered by baseball teams. Indeed, mandatory notice regimes have generally fallen under criticism from scholars in recent years for being largely ineffectual.324 Moreover, even though many teams

319. See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1033, 1044 (2012) (“The second type of self-control error is optimism bias. Behavioral economists have identified circumstances in which individuals appear to underestimate the likelihood of their experiencing a loss. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler describe optimism bias as ‘[a] common feature of human behavior’ characterized by people tending to ‘think that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than to others.’ The tendency to underestimate the likelihood of a bad outcome leads decisionmakers to take on too much risk. Accordingly, this bias is often blamed for an individual’s impulsive or high-risk choices that might indicate a lack of self-control.” (footnotes omitted)).

320. See Lehr, Jr., supra note 267, § 38:11.

321. See id. (“An exception to the open and obvious danger rule exists when a person has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that the invitee will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what the invitee has discovered, or fail to protect him or herself against it. In these cases, the fact that the danger is known or obvious is not conclusive in determining the duty of the possessor, or whether the possessor has acted reasonably under the circumstances.”).

322. See supra Part II.D.

323. See supra Part II.D.

324. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027, 1029 (2012) (“Mandatory notice is understandably popular, but it
currently provide some warnings to fans—typically taking the form of a legally invalid disclaimer on the back of the fan's ticket and safety announcements via the scoreboard and public address system—juries from foul balls still frequently occur.

Nevertheless, imposing a legal duty on teams to sufficiently warn fans of the dangers of flying objects offers several potential benefits over the status quo. Because teams would be under a legal obligation to provide sufficiently effective warnings to spectators, the imposition of such a duty would incentivize teams to experiment with new, more productive methods of notifying fans of the dangers posed by flying objects. Along these lines, a legally sufficient warning would likely entail not just a warning to spectators that bats or balls may occasionally enter the stands—as is commonly the case today—but would likely also require teams to specifically notify fans of the heightened risk of injury that these objects may present. Spectators would thus be better informed of the actual danger that foul balls and flying bats pose, and would therefore be more likely to take steps to better protect themselves from injury,

325. See, e.g., Yates v. Chi. Nat’l League Ball Club, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 570, 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“The disclaimer on the back of plaintiff’s ticket could not form the basis of defense because the print was so small that it was not legibly reproduced on the photocopy submitted to the trial court. Plaintiff’s acceptance of a ticket containing a disclaimer in fine print on the back is not binding for the purposes of asserting express assumption of the risk.”); see also Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk: An Age-Old Defense Still Viable in Sports and Recreation Cases, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 583, 589 (2002) (noting that “the release and waiver language typically appearing on the back of event tickets is unenforceable” for several reasons: “First, there is no signature required, making it difficult to argue the existence of an agreement. Second, the ticket holder may not read the provision, and thus may claim lack of notice. Third, the printing is usually so small, it is not viewed as reasonable notice. And fourth, the space on the back of the ticket is so limited, it is impossible to print all the needed exculpatory language.”).

326. See, e.g., Rees v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., No. 84183, 2004 WL 2610531, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (describing how fans were notified as to the safety issues through the scoreboard and a public address).

327. See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying text.

328. Cf. Carol McCrehan Parker, Camping Trips and Family Trees: Must Tennessee Physicians Warn Their Patients’ Relatives of Genetic Risks?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 585, 616 (1998) (noting that in cases where a duty to warn is present, “courts may be asked to evaluate the sufficiency of the warning provided”).

329. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

330. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
whether by paying closer attention to the game or by opting to sit in less dangerous seating areas during future trips to the ballpark.

Along these same lines, courts could also require teams to provide better disclosure of whether particular seats are protected by netting at the time tickets are purchased. Although some MLB teams currently list which sections of seats are protected by screening on their websites, others do not.\textsuperscript{331} Meanwhile, few—if any—teams actually allow fans to specifically search for seats based on their protected status when purchasing tickets online.\textsuperscript{332} By imposing a duty to warn on teams, courts (or legislators) could pressure teams to provide better disclosure of whether a seat is protected. Such a requirement would once again enable fans to better protect themselves from the potential danger presented by foul balls, while at the same time helping remind even those fans opting to purchase unprotected seats of the need to be alert while watching the game.

CONCLUSION

The professional baseball industry is radically different in myriad ways today than it was a century ago. Nevertheless, courts continue to rely on a one hundred-year-old legal doctrine when determining whether to hold teams liable for spectator injuries resulting from errant balls or bats leaving the field of play. Although the Baseball Rule may have been justified at the time it was first established, its subsequent legal development, as well as recent changes in both the law of torts and the game of professional baseball itself have undermined courts’ continued reliance on this antiquated doctrine. Indeed, considering that baseball teams are best positioned to protect their fans from errant flying objects, this Article has concluded that the time has come for courts to dispense with the Baseball Rule, and presumptively hold professional teams strictly liable for their fans’ injuries, forcing teams to fully internalize the cost of the accidents their games produce.

\textsuperscript{331} See supra notes 194-96.
\textsuperscript{332} See supra notes 194-96.